The Reader will perceive that these remarks have not the most distant reference to the grand question, concerning the materiality or immateriality of the Soul. They are simply opposed to those unfounded hypotheses, and vague conjectures, which, instead of explaining any one phenomenon, render our ideas more embarrassed. They indicate that we ought not to multiply principles, until we are qualified to assign to them their distinct offices, without encroachments or confusion. What can be more unsatisfactory than to suppose the existence of principles, totally opposite in their natures, in order to explain the contrarieties observable in humant character and conduct; and yet to allow that, in some instances, the operations of these principles are so similar, that philosophers themselves cannot ascertain the distinct province of each? Or what can be more superfluous than to imagine the existence of these distinct principles, merely to confer honour upon the one, and load the other with disgrace, when the nature of the object pursued, and the dispositions towards it, will solve every difficulty; will indicate an exalted or a depraved state of the Mind, without suggesting a single doubt whether the spiritual man ought, in any respect, to become responsible for the disgraceful pro

pensities of the carnal man, with whom he is compelled to inhabit?

It has been alleged that, during the impetus. of passion, the soul is in a state of much greater activity than at any other period. In most instances this is probably the case. Yet we should recollect that during the excitements of passion, the soul must necessarily manifest the greatest activity to the spectator, from its peculiar exertions upon the corporeal system. Whereas in the exercise of deep thought, the activity of the soul is concentrated within. Of consequence, when the mind is absorbed in profound meditation, instead of indicating more activity than usual, the external appearance will indicate less. Hence it is that deep thinkers are so frequently confounded, by those who are not deep thinkers, with the stupid. In such cases, the activity of the soul can only discover itself by the result of its labours; or by the injuries which intense application may have committed upon the constitution. Instances have existed in which mental occupation has produced an insensibility to every foreign impression. The subject has remained unmoved, in the midst of scenes calculated to excite the most horrid tumults of soul. When the Philosopher of Syracuse was so wrapped in contemplation, as to be insensible.

to all the horrors of a siege, his mind could not be less active than theirs who were the most agitated, by the scenes of complicated distress which surrounded them.

CHAPTER II.

Causes which create a Diversity in our Affections, enumerated.

Ir may seem natural to expect that men, formed with similar, and often with equal powers of discriminating the nature of objects, -in whom the sensations of pleasure and pain, happiness or misery, are also similar, and who are exposed to similar causes of excitement, should indicate a correspondent similarity in their affections, instead of such a diversity which is so conspicuous, not only in different persons, but frequently in the same person. It is well known that the predilections of individuals, for the supposed means of happiness, are extremely various; that one man will pursue with ardour, what another will contemplate with indifference,

or with disapprobation and disgust. Nor is there any person who entertains, invariably, the same disposition towards the same object. At one instant, he will not only feel a much stronger affection for it than he did at the preceding, but he may to-day contemplate, with contempt and abhorrence, that which yesterday may have excited raptures.

It is of considerable moment to trace the principal causes of these diversities, or point out some of the circumstances which have a very powerful influence over our minds. The number and extent of these will permit little more than an enumeration.

§ 1. The Influence of Experience.

many

These diversities and changes may, in cases, be ascribed to the difference observable between the suggestions of a lively imagination, and the more faithful reports of Experience. Our pre-conceptions are seldom accurate. If they be not entirely false, or totally opposite to the nature of the subject, they are almost sure to err on the side of excess or of defect. Experience, in numberless instances, corrects such errors, and

teaches us to estimate the qualities of objects as they really exist, and not according to a prejudiced conception, or an heated imagination. This will of consequence teach us highly to prize many things, which we had before neglected or despised, and to dismiss, with indifference and contempt, many things on which a deluded imagination had placed our supreme happiness. Such changes will take place in every individual in his passage through life. Their nature, and the uses made of them, constitute the difference between the wise man and the fool.

But there are many other causes which act more uniformly, upon whole classes and bodies of people, and give to each class a certain cast of character. Some of these are very similar in their effects; others dissimilar, irregular, and capricious.

Among those which are more uniform in their influence, may be placed the distinctions in character and dispositions observable in the

§ 2. Difference of Sex.

In most animals, of the inferior order, there is a manifest difference between the male and fe