of Dr. Watts, reduces all the passions to the three heads of admiration, love, and hatred; which he styles accordingly, the primitive passions. The others he denominates mixed passions; which he describes to be those which have admiration blended with them, and those compounded of the passions that fall under love and hatred. As the above remarks are no less applicable to this arrangement, I shall only observe, that since Mr. Grove has defined admiration to be" that sudden surprise at the novelty of an

object, by which the soul is fastened down to "the contemplation of it," there seems to be a peculiar impropriety in his placing it among the primitive passions: and this impropriety is increased by another observation which he makes, viz. that "Admiration seems to be a more spe"culative passion, as being employed chiefly "about the novelty or grandeur of objects." For which reason he places the chief energy of this passion" in the brain," which he denominates "the grand instrument, or condition "rather, of thought and contemplation." He adds," in the other passions, which respecting "the good or evil of objects, proceed from a prin

cipal of self-preservation, the spirits agitated are "in the heart, the fountain of life, and fittest "residence of those motions of the animal

spirits, which are intended for the benefit and "preservation of life."*

These observations certainly increase the difficulty of admitting admiration among the primitive passions. It may also be justly doubted whether the author's ideas of the nature of admiration be always admissible. But this is not the place to discuss that point.

The above comments upon the most material arrangements which have hitherto been followed, render some other classification desirable, which may be exempt from similar objections. Perhaps the securest method to obtain this end, will be previously to recollect, what is the first and leading principle of our nature; and then enquire what are the necessary consequences of this principle, in Beings formed as we are, placed in various situations, and surrounded by an infinite variety of circumstances. By thus attending to the history of the human mind, and tracing the manner in which it is affected by various causes, a proper arrangement may present itself. We shall, at least, avoid those mistakes and embarrassments, into which men of

* See System of Moral Philosophy; Chap. VII. of the Passions.

eminence have been betrayed, by pursuing other methods.

It will be universally acknowledged, that it is essential to the nature of every sensitive and intelligent being, to be gratified with, or delight in Well-being. This is so evident a principle, that the contrary cannot be supposed for a moment. Both reason and feeling unite to establish this axiom. We all feel the inestimable value of happiness, and we all know that to delight in misery, is a contradiction; it would be to annihilate misery. (See Note C).

This Well-being, or grateful state of existence, we unite to denominate an essential Good; and its opposite an essential Evil. Whatever promotes this state, we deem to be productive of good; whatever is an impediment to it, or occasions a state of uneasy sensation, we consider as productive of evil,

These ideas naturally lead us to esteem that as a Good also, which is productive of this desirable state; and to characterize as an Evil, whatever is inimical to it. Cause and effect are so intimately connected in our imagination, that we not only substitute the one for the other, by a figurative mode of speaking, but we quickly learn to consider that as a good in itself, which appears uniformly to be the means or instrument

of good; and to contemplate as an Evil, whatever we suspect to have a pernicious tendency. Under the impression of this sentiment, we indulge a predilection for the one, and feel an abhorrence of the other.

It is impossible for the attentive and considerate mind, to view or contemplate objects so diametrically opposite as apparent Good, or apparent Evil, either with total indifference, or with the same kind of sensation. We inevitably look upon what we deem to be a Good, or conducive to happiness, with a pleasant sensation. We deem it desirable, and it inspires the affection of LOVE. Whatever occasions, or threatens a privation of happiness, or inflicts positive misery, we view with displeasure, we consider it as injurious, or as an absolute evil, and it inspires the affection of HATRED: that is, we feel a strong attachment of the heart to whatever may contribute to Well-being, and we contemplate the reverse with feelings of displeasure, detestation, and abhorrence.

Although it may be said, without impropriety, that we all love to be happy, and hate to be miserable; yet this is such a self-evident truth, that it is very seldom uttered. The two expressions therefore, Love and HATRED, are almost

entirely applied to the cause, means, or instru ments of well-being or wretchedness; and we are habituated to love whatever is instrumental to our existing in a desirable state, and to hate its opposite.

SECTION III.

LOVE and HATRED; their Nature.

THESE two affections arise, immediately and inevitably, from our perpetual solicitude to enjoy the existence we possess. They are coeval with our ideas of Good and Evil. They are expe rienced by every one, in every situation, and in every period of life. They are inspired by every object which possesses some peculiarity, or is apparently endowed with some quality, of a beneficial or a pernicious tendency; that is, by whatever is able, according to our conceptions, to promote or impede enjoyment or happiness; from the smallest gratification up to the most exalted felicity; from the smallest discomfiture, to the depth of misery. They are also the parents of every other passion and affection;