ing some powerful change in our dispositions, by its recent appearance, or by the suggestion of a something we deem of importance. In all such cases we are obviously passive; we are acted upon without any previous determination of the will, or without any consent of our own.

As several of our passions are of a disagreeable and painful nature, and as this passive or helpless state is so frequently connected with suffering, the transition from one signification to the other, is not only natural but almost inevitable; and Passion will often be considered as synonymous with Suffering. In medical language, a person oppressed with disease is called a Patient, an involuntary sufferer, and the calmness with which he submits is termed patience; that is, the mind yields with tranquillity to the pains and indispositions of the body. The word Pathology, has also the same derivation: it is the history of the sufferings incident to the human frame. The Greeks expressed passions in general by Talos, which signifies suffering; and the Latin word Passio, from which we have adopted the term passion, has the same signification. The Stoics also gave the name of ran to all extraordinary emotions of the soul, because they considered them as mental diseases, by which the soul, while under their influence, was reduced to

a state of suffering. But this secondary sense, as far as it conveys the idea of an unpleasant or painful sensation, is alone applicable to the effects produced by passions of a certain class; for others are in their own nature pleasing; as joy and hope: whereas the primitive import of the word, that of passiveness, equally belongs to them all. The mind is equally passive in every effect suddenly and unexpectedly produced upon it, whether its influence be of a pleasant, or unpleasant nature. See Note A.)

The term Passion therefore, may with strict propriety be used, and used exclusively, to represent the first feeling, the percussion as it were, of which the mind is conscious from some impulsive cause; by which it is wholly acted upon, without any efforts of its own, either to solicit or escape the impression.

Probably it is in allusion to this passive state of the mind, that the terms passion and passion-. ately, are employed to express the powerful attachment to particular objects mentioned above. They insinuate that the influence of these beloved objects, is irresistible; and that the mind is completely under their dominion.

The state of absolute passiveness, in consequence of any sudden percussion of mind, is of short duration. The strong impression, or vivid

sensation, immediately produces a reaction correspondent to its nature, either to appropriate and enjoy, or to avoid and repel the exciting cause. This reaction is very properly distinguished by the term Emotion. The sensible effect produced at the first instant, by the cause of the passion, greatly agitates the frame; its influence is immediately communicated to the whole nervous system, and the commotions excited in that, indicate themselves by attitudes and motions of the body, and by particular expressions of countenance. These effects are such universal concomitants, that no very important change in the state of the mind can take place, without some visible change, of a correspondent nature, in the animal œconomy.

Emotions therefore, according to the genuine signification of the word, are principally and primitively applicable to the sensible changes and visible effects, which particular passions produce upon the frame, in consequence of this reaction, or particular agitation of mind. It is alone by these visible effects that the subject is discovered to be under the influence of any passion; and it is alone by the particular changes produced, or kind of emotion, that we are enabled to judge of the nature of the passion. Thus, although the passion exists prior to the

emotions, yet as these are its external signs, they must indicate its continued influence, as long as they continue to agitate the system. In consequence of this immediate connection, the words passions and emotions, are, in familiar discourse, where no philosophical precision is requisite, used synonymously; though, in reality, the latter are uniformly the effects of the former. Here, as in innumerable other instances, figurative modes of expression are adopted. The Synecdoche is perpetually employed, by which, cause and effect are confounded, or substituted the one for the other. Since emotions are faithful indications of their correspondent passions, and strong passions are always productive of emotions, we should deem it a pedantic precision to select, at all times, the appropriate word, when we mean simply to express the general effect.

However, the term Emotion is sometimes expressive of lively sensations which do not produce visible effects, in any degree proportionate to their feelings. In emotions the mind is not so completely, or necessarily passive. In general it possesses some power over the external signs; and in many cases, where the feelings would be too strong to remain concealed, were they totally void of controul, some other influential affection, either of fear, respect, humanity,

&c. may serve to repress or moderate their effects, and confine them to inward emotions.

Again, the term is frequently employed to mark the first impression, which particular objects make upon susceptible minds, whether they remain concealed or not. Thus in the fine Arts, the charms of musical compositions which are novel to us; the first view of a gallery of paintings possessing distinguished merit;the surprise of a beautiful or elevated sentiment, or poetic description, will generally make a more vivid impression upon us, than that which is felt in a continued, or renewed contemplation of the same subjects; and yet these impressions may not be so forcible as to produce the transports accompanying emotions from other causes. But the difference is simply in degree, not in kind. This species of enjoyment is peculiar to minds highly cultivated, whose repeated enjoyments of a similar nature have gradually moderated transports, and whose emotions have gradually subsided into gentler undulations, if I may thus express myself, in place of those agitations which the Inexperienced would inevitably betray upon similar occasions.

The third term Affection, has, in itself, a different signification from either of the above. It always represents a less violent, and generally a more durable influence, which things have