Vanity is that species of Pride, which, while it presumes upon a degree of superiority in some particular articles, fondly courts the applause of every one within its sphere of action; seeking every occasion to display some talent, or some supposed excellency. Generally speaking, it is the foible of superficial and frivolous minds, that think much more of their attainments, than of their remaining deficiencies. Yet it may be founded on the excessive love of praise, in those who possess no inconsiderable share of merit.

Haughtiness is an overt act of Pride, manifested by some conduct or expression, indicative of an unmerited contempt of others. It may be deemed in this case, the swelling of Pride into an emotion.

Arrogance indicates itself by some particular claims to precedency, or marks of distinction and respect, from those whom Pride considers its inferiors in station and character; or by impertinent pretensions to an equality with superiors.

These indications of false complacency in their mildest influence, may be placed with strict propriety among the affections. Upon sudden occasions they rise into emotions; and

some times, particularly when connected with anger, from a supposed insult or neglect, they possess every characteristic of passion.

Having considered the Passions and Affections immediately connected with the Possession of Good, we shall proceed to the Passions and Affections which are excited by the contemplation of Good, when it is not in our possession, but of which the attainment is deemed possible. Which constitutes our second division under the present Order. These are Desire and Hope.

DESIRE.

THE general nature of Desire has already engaged our attention. It has been described as that influential effect which the perception of Good or Evil produces within us, in consequence of which we seek to obtain the one and avoid the other. Our plan demands that we now contemplate Desire as it is excited by particular objects, conducive of some apparent good, either of benefit or pleasure, which we have not yet obtained.

According to the common acceptation of the term, Desire be considered as an eager long

may

ing for some Good, centered, or apparently centered, in particular objects, situations, or circum

stances.

This description is made as general as possible, in order to comprehend two different acts of the mind concerning such objects; which are signified by the terms Wish and Desire.

Lord Kaims expresses this difference in the following manner: "Desire, taken in its proper "sense, is that internal act which by influ"encing the will, makes us to proceed to action. "Desire, in a lax sense, respects also actions "and events that depend not on us; as when "I desire that my friend may have a son to

represent him; or that my country may "flourish in arts and sciences; but such internal "act is more properly termed a WISH than de"sire." Though this observation does not fully mark the difference, it plainly indicates there is one.

We will therefore first consider the Desire which is influential to action; and then advert more particularly to the characteristic distinctions between that and a Wish.

In the first sense, Desire may be defined, that uneasy sensation excited in the mind by the view, or by the contemplation of any desirable

* Elements of Criticism, vol. i.

P.

42.

good, which is not in our possession, which we are solicitous to abtain, and of which the attainment appears at least possible.

Desire is in its nature restless. Mr. Locke justly remarks that "it is the uneasiness it oc"casions, which excites the mind to pursue its

object, and rouses it from its natural state of "apathy and inactivity." Thus it is founded on some species of discontent; for were we perfectly contented and satisfied with all our sensations, and with every circumstance surrounding us, all desire must cease. It relates to something which is not immediately in our power, and which requires either our own exertions, or the agency of others over whom we possess some influence. It implies, therefore, that something is to be done, before the end can be obtained; and this necessarily implies also that there is a possibility of success attending the attempt. It is not always discouraged by difficulties; but our most active desires are never so ardent as to attempt known impossibilities.

Desires are either excited by the wretchedness of our present situation,-by periodical wants, which demand gratification,-by comparing the defects and imperfections of our own state, with the preferable state of others,-or by the recent

perception of some pleasing and useful quality in objects, which we wish to appropriate.

When Desire is excited by wretchedness itself, it looks forwards towards Good; towards liberation from this state, and the enjoyment of a better. Relief, and the means of relief, are the predominant ideas accompanying Desire. In this case, the idea of a good is immediately engrafted on the stock of evil. The desires excited by periodical wants belong to the appetites exclusively. When the comparison of our own state with that of others, implants desires, they proceed from the discovery of new sources of enjoyment, to which we were strangers, united with a conviction that there is a possibility of attaining them. The recent perception of pleasing qualities in objects, has a similiar influence. Our natural love of good inspires a wish to possess whatever promises an augmentation of our welfare.

Hence it appears, that our Ignorance is often the parent of contentment. We must acquire some knowledge of stations and qualities before we can desire them. The enlargement of our ideas becomes a copious source of discontent with our present possessions, and inspires ardent desires after new objects. Nothing can injure the good we possess, so much as the idea of a