ing after something desirable, where the means to obtain it are not in our power; or where the opportunity may be for ever lost. It is excited by the contemplation of a something, which if it could possibly be obtained, might augment our portion of good; or by reflecting upon something, which, had it been possessed, performed, or avoided, might have proved peculiarly advantageous. Thus we may wish for impossibilities, which cannot be the objects of our active desires. The beggar may wish to be a King, who cannot seriously desire it. We may wish that we could fly, even without wings, and pay a visit to some of the planets; though we know that the wish will be in vain.

A Wish may refer to past scenes, where Desire is totally inapplicable. The essence of repentance consists in wishing that we had conducted ourselves in a different manner.

These instances abundantly confirm the remark of Lord Kaims, that we may wish for things not in our power; and they shew that the range of our wishes is of an infinite extent, comprehending impossibilities, that have a reference to the past, present, or future. (See Note M.)

HOPE is the encouragement given to desire;

the pleasing expectancy that its object shall be obtained. Without this affection, desire would sink into despondency; like a simple wish it would remain inactive, and prey upon itself; producing perpetual uneasiness, destitute of any advantage. Hope is so pleasing, and so invigorating an affection, that it is emphatically styled the Balm of Life. It preserves the mind from stagnating in its present possessions, corrects the uneasiness of desire, and animates it to struggle with the difficulties it may have to encounter. Hope possesses the happy secret of anticipating the good we desire. By the pleasing sensation it communicates, we already taste the pleasures we seek. Where the object has not been of the first importance, the pleasures of Hope have frequently been experienced to surpass those of actual possession; for the imagination is, in this affection, solely occupied by the ́supposed advantages and eligible qualities of its object, without attending to any of its imperfections. In its general operation, the indulgence of Hope is mixed with certain portions of doubt and solicitude; but when doubt is removed, and the expectation becomes sanguine, hope rises into joy, and it has been known to produce transports and ecstasies, equally with the full accomplishment of ardent desires. Thus,

according to the degrees of force with which it affects the mind, it may be considered either as an affection or a passion.

It also appears that Joy and Hope are very similar in their natures; and that the pleasing sensations they inspire, are very correspondent. The difference consists in the degree of uncertainty which intervenes before possession, and checks the ardour of hope; and as the object was in expectancy, the pleasure is not so powerfully quickened by the influence of Surprise. Yet where the object has been highly valued, and the anxiety great concerning its attainment, a release from this anxiety has communicated a delectable elasticity to the mind, and rendered its, sensations as vivid as those excited by more unexpected causes.

As the above Passions and Affections are inspired by the contemplation of Good, thus are most of them of a pleasant nature. This is obviously the case with Joy, and all the affections connected with it. Hope is also, uniformly, a pleasant affection. Desire will vary according to its object, degrees of strength, and the different passions and affections so frequently arising from it. Although in its mildest state,

it possesses a degree of restlessness, which serves as a stimulus to exertions, yet its immediate attendants give a preponderancy in its favour. Desire, as defined above, has always some species of Good for its object, which is always a pleasant object; and it is encouraged in its attempts, by the possibility or probability of attainment. These two circumstances united, more than compensate for the degree of restlessness it in general occasions. The sportsman, who delights in the chase, who endures cold, hunger, and fatigue, with more than patience, inspired by the hopes of exercising his skill, and carrying home the triumphant, though trifling, reward of his assiduity, is a just emblem of the state of our minds, in the pursuit of objects we deem of superior importance. Desires are not only comfortless, but approach to misery,-when they are impetuous and ungovernable,—when hopes are frequently checked by disappointments-when patience is wearied out by procrastinations, -and when desires are borne away by the whirlwind of turbulent passions, which they have excited.

1 The Wish, which characterizes the benevolent heart, is of a pleasing nature. When it refers simply to the melioration of our state, not being supported by hope, it subsides almost

as soon as it is formed. It is most painful, when it is excited by our own improper conduct, or by the neglect of advantages which are never to return.

ORDER II.

WE proceed to consider those Passions and Affections operating upon the Principle of Self-love, in which the idea of EVIL is immediately present to the mind.

These are distinguished into three Kinds: the first relates to actual losses and disappointments; the second, to evils of which we are apprehensive; and the third, to the conduct which seems to deserve reprehension. They inspire the passions of Sorrow, Fear, and Anger, with their different modifications and combina tions.

It is obvious from this general description of each, that they must be frequently blended together. Partial evils inspiring Sorrow, are frequently the harbingers of others which alarm our Fears; and both the evils we lament,