sturdy and unaffected by our phraseology, is known as fully to a deaf mute who has seen a statue sculptured, as to Professor Brown. Hence, we need not be surprised when Professor Brown adds, that the sculptor," after he has given the last delicate touches that finish the Jupiters, the Venus, or Apollo,the divine form which we admire, (as if it had assumed a new existence beneath the artist's hands,) is still the same quiescent mass that slumbered for ages in the quarry.

§ 5.—The sensible signification of a sentence is the sensible existence to which the sentence refers.

ness.

Is the Apollo the same quiescent mass that slumbered for ages in the quarry? This is the verbal account of its sameThe sensible sameness is x. The same to which I may refer by saying, that the statue is transformed from what it was in the quarry. We may debate the propriety of our respective phraseology, but let us not confound verbal disquisition with the realities of creation. The sensible reality is just as we discover; and when we divest it of all names, we shall understand it better than by the most laboured verbal description.

§ 6.—Phraseology is controlled by custom, but the sensible signification of phrases is controlled by nature.

"Ice," says the same philosopher, "differs from water only in this, the particles which formerly were easily separable, now resist separation with a considerable force." Is the difference between ice and water nothing but the above words? The words may constitute the verbal difference, but a difference exists which is independent of words. The sensible difference is x. We may refer to it by the words of Professor Brown, or by the words of some other philosopher, who may deem that he is greatly improving philosophy by the introduction of some new phrase; but if we would truly understand nature, we must turn from words to the mute revelation of our senses.

§ 7.—What is lightning? An old dictionary says, “it is the flash which attends thunder." The moderns laugh at this sim

ple explanation of lightning. They call it a discharge of elec trick fluid. But would we know the sensible signification of the word, we must dismiss both of the verbal meanings. The modern may be better than the ancient; but neither is lightning, except in the verbal signification of the term. Lightning, in its sensible signification, is x. The sensible signification is known to a deaf mute, as fully as to persons who can repeat a definition. The revelation of our senses can alone teach us the sensible signification of words.

§ 8.—We cannot transmute sights, feels, &c., into words.

What is a point? Mathematicians say it is something which possesses neither length, breadth, nor thickness. Mathematicians are right, but they are describing a verbal point. The distinction is nowhere admitted. They are attempting to resolve into words a sensible existence. The process is a delusion. Natural existences cannot be transmuted into words. Words may refer us to sensible existences, but words cannot become something that is not verbal.

§ 9.-A sensible point is wholly different from the above definition. It is x, and nothing can reveal it but our senses. So far from its possessing neither length, breadth, nor thickness, you will discover it to possess visible length and visible breadth. A visible existence without length and breadth is impossible.

§ 10.—Logick relates to the verbal meaning of words, and its conclusions must not be confounded with sensible existences.

Assuming that the definition is a point, and not discriminating that it is a verbal point merely, mathematicians deduce from the definition that no number of mathematical points, however congregated, can obtain either length, breadth, or thickness;-for what possesses no length, cannot acquire length by adding to it what also possesses no length, &c. The logick is incontestable, but let no man suppose it relates to more than a verbal point:— let no man mistake a process of language for the realities of the

external creation.

§ 11.-Again, every material sensible substance is said to be formed by an aggregation of certain insensible atoms. But are substances formed by those words? Yes, verbally they are thus formed, and the following are some of the verbal consequences which are deduced from the premises, and mistaken for physical investigations:-" As atoms are the first matter, they must be indissoluble, or they would be corruptible; and," adds Sir Isaac Newton, "they must be immutable also, in order to the world's continuing permanently in the same state, and of the same nature: hence," continues he, " God, in the beginning, created matter in solid, massive, hard, impenetrable, moveable atoms, incomparably harder than any of the porous bodies compounded of them; -nay, so hard as never to wear or break in pieces; no human power being able to divide what God made one at the creation. While these particles continue entire, they may compose bodies of one and the same texture in all ages; but if they were liable to wear or break, the nature of things depending on them would be changed."

-

§ 12.—But now arose a difficulty: these atoms become visible and tangible when numbers of them aggregate together; hence, they cannot be as small as mathematical points,-no aggregation of which can obtain length, breadth, or thickness. Atoms, therefore, must possess length, breadth, and thickness. But whatever possesses length, breadth, and thickness, can be divided into parts; where will you begin, then, to find the elementary atoms? Begin at what fragments you please, the fragment will be composed of parts, and can be divided. Pursuing this process, you never can arrive at the constituent particles which form the elements of matter. This difficulty is as old as Aristotle, who hence denied the existence of such particles. Modern ingenuity has removed the difficulty. God, at the creation, made the atoms sufficiently small to answer his purpose, and constituted them indivisible, not from lack of parts, but from lack of penetrability; and truly when we consider that the light which a candle emits every moment consists of a greater number of these native particles than the number of all the sands on the sea shore, we may reasonably leave them without further diminution. Alas! alas! that these verbal disquisitions should

be confounded with the sensible realities of creation! The disquisitions are logical and ingenious I admit. They may be scientifick and useful; and, like some other propositions, they may refer enigmatically to sensible particulars, which give them more significancy than is known to me; but we shall gain nothing by confounding verbal speculations with sensible realities.

§ 13. If you learn by my remarks to estimate correctly the above propositions only, you will have listened to me with but little benefit; for the above positions are so glaringly discordant from sensible realities, that without any elucidation you may be willing to dismiss them as fallacies. To disclose the principles which make the propositions defective is my object; that you may estimate correctly other propositions, which, though less repugnant to sensible experience, are as radically defective as the above.

§ 14. We cannot enlarge our sensible knowledge by words.

We can no more enlarge our sensible knowledge by words than you can enlarge the physical superficies of your farm by words, or than you can disclose colours to the blind. The revolution, for instance, of the earth around its axis, and around the sun, are significant of many sensible phenomena. These constitute the sensible signification (the x) of the propositions; while all that is not sensible is verbal. The words may be interesting, they may be logical processes, and mathematical processes; but they are not the realities of the external uniThese our senses alone can reveal to us.

verse.

15.-Sensible existences will not conform to our phraseology, but our phrases will signify the sensible existences to which the phrases refer.

The distant landscape which we behold from our window is, we are told, a wonderfully small miniature on the retina of our eye. The distant landscape is, however, not these words. So far as your words refer to what I behold, the distant landscape

is x. We may talk about it as we please, but the revelation of vision can alone give me sensible information in relation to it. Your language is sensibly significant of all the sensible revelations to which it refers, but all beyond is verbal.

§ 16.—We must refer to the revelation of our senses for the meaning of words, and not refer to words for the meaning of what our senses reveal.

But the colour of grass is certainly a sensation in our mind, and not any thing spread over the grass? I answer,-the location of the colour (if you refer to the sensible signification of location) is not words. It is x. To this you must refer for the meaning of any verbal location that you may give to colour.f If we appeal to words to explain the revelations of our senses, we are inverting the order of nature. We must appeal to our senses for the meaning of words.

§ 17.-All that my senses disclose, and all that I am conscious of experiencing within myself, constitute the realities of nature. The rest of my knowledge is verbal.

Our almost incessant employment of words tends to confound them with the phenomena of nature. We teach children the names of sensible existences, just as we teach them the names of the characters which compose the alphabet. The sight which we call moon, becomes to a child as much the sign of the word moon, as the sight of the character A becomes the sign of the sound which the character represents. The name and thing named become strangely confounded and identified. All our learning, from youth upwards, tends to confirm the confusion which exists between language and nature. Nothing is, however, more important to a correct understanding of language, than a subordination of it to natural existences; and this subordination cannot be effected till we discriminate between words and natural existences. Nothing is also more easy than to make the discrimination, provided you cease from speaking, both au

* For a full explanation of this subject, see Lecture XXIII.

† Ibid.