§ 15.-But why cannot the inert parts of the universe be the Deity? Because the term inert negatives such a conclusion. But the organized parts also cannot? No. Because the word organized admits an organizer, and Deity is impliedly selfexistent.

§ 16.-"No animal," continues the same writer, "can have contrived its own limbs and senses." Why? Because an implication attaches to the premises, that an animal cannot exist till its limbs and senses have been contrived.

§ 17.-"Nothing," he adds, "can be God which is ordered by a wisdom and a will superior to its own; and nothing can be God which is indebted for any of its properties to a contrivance beyond itself.”

§ 18.-Why? For one reason only; the word God excludes from its signification these consequences. Lest we might not know this, and hence not assent to his conclusions, Mr. Paley furnishes the word with a definition: thus, he says, "having in its nature what requires the exertion of no prior being, appertains to the Deity as an essential distinction, and removes his nature from that of all other beings."

§ 19. He says further: "since something must have existed from eternity, it is frequently asked why the universe may not be that something." He answers, "the contrivance perceived in it proves that to be impossible, for the contriver must have existed before the contrivance." Why? Because the word contrivance implies such a conclusion : no other reason exists. But why must something have existed from eternity? Because, to say that any thing is produced, admits a producer; to say that any thing is made, admits a maker; to say that any thing exists, admits a cause: hence, how ancient soever the universe may be, something must have preceded it; something must have existed from eternity.

§ 20.—That the earth must be globular, is a conclusion which also language forces us to adopt. In a plane, we tacitly admit

that some place exists where the plane terminates, where we may step or fall off. But we discover no such on the earth, hence the earth is not a plane. What shape, then, must the earth possess? Globular. Why? Because, to say that no precipitous termination exists, implies globosity. From a like necessity, we create antipodes, and all the other wonders inculcated by astronomy.

§ 21.-In Gill's Body of Divinity, the author says, "though angels are not endued with bodies, yet, as they are creatures, they must exist somewhere." Why? Because the consequence is included in the meaning which he attaches to the premises, that angels are creatures. He proceeds to ask where they could exist before the heavens and the earth were made, and concludes that they could exist nowhere. Why? Because the somewhere which he deems necessary, is included either in heaven or earth. The object of the author is to prove that angels were made subsequently to the heavens: a conclusion which is but an iteration of his previous admissions.

soever its colour in the Perhaps you will not

22.-"Every object, how gorgeous light, is void of colour in the dark." assent to this proposition, though you will admit that colour is invisible in the dark. Natural philosophy proceeds, therefore, as follows: "colour is the reflection of certain coloured rays of light."

Admit this, and objects become remedilessly void of colour in the dark. If you cannot apprehend this consequence, the following arguments may convince you, for they will show you

* When a tradesman brings me an account which asserts that I am his debtor, say a hundred dollars, I may be sure that the aggregate is fairly stated, for few men are careless enough to commit an errour in addition. The items of the bill may require examination. So, when a logician tells me the conclusion to which he is arrived by any process of argumentation, I seldom care to investigate his argu ments. I assume that he will not make a false deduction, any more than the tradesman will make a false addition. The part which requires examination are the logician's premises; these are like the tradesman's items. Most people, however, waste all their attention on a logician's arguments, and let him assume what premises he pleases. This is analogous to permitting a tradesman to charge you without restraint, provided he will be honest in his addition of the items.

that the consequence is included in the premises :-thus, colour is nothing but the reflection of certain coloured rays of light; hence, where no light exists, no reflection of coloured rays can exist; therefore, all objects are void of colour in the dark, however they may be endued with the conformation of parts that adapts them to reflect in the light its most gorgeous rays.

§ 23.-Propositions are sophistical when the conclusion is only seemingly (not actually) included in the premises.

Professor Stewart says, 66 a few moments' reflection must satisfy any one, that the sensation of colour can reside in the mind only; yet our constant bias is to connect colour with external objects."

But why cannot colour be connected with external objects? Because the premises affirm it to be a sensation in the mind. The proposition of Professor Stewart is, however, sophistical. In the premises he speaks of the sensation of colour, and in the conclusion he speaks of colour itself. A man may therefore say, that the sensation of colour resides in the mind, and yet the colour itself is connected with the external object.

24. Sometimes the premises are made to admit very covertly the conclusion.

"That light, itself a body, should pass freely through solid crystal, is regarded by us," says Professor Brown, "as a physical wonder."

Why? Because, to say light is "itself a body," includes an admission that it should encounter a difficulty in passing through "solid crystal.” This is a striking illustration of the indirect method by which premises may be made to affirm a conclusion. To say simply that light passes through solid crystal, would exhibit no reason why it should not pass; but when we add that light is "itself a body," we discover at once that it should encounter opposition.

§ 25.-Similar principles with the foregoing govern our assent to mathematical propositions.

Proposition IV, Theorem 1st, in the first book of Euclid, says: -"Let ABC, DEF, be two triangles, which have the two sides, AB, AC, equal to the two sides, DE, DF, each to each; viz, AB to DE, and AC to DF; and the angle BAC, equal to the angle EDF: the base BC shall be equal to the base EF."

That the base BC is equal to the base EF, is evidently admitted by the premises, which affirm that the angle BAC is equal to the angle EDF, and the sides AB, AC, equal to the sides DE, DF. But let us examine if the proof adduced by Euclid changes the character of the process. He says, if the triangle ABC be applied to DEF, so that the point A may be on D, and the straight line AB upon DE; the point B shall coincide with the point E. I would ask why? Because, says Euclid, AB is admitted to be equal to DE. The proof, then, thus far, is avowedly an admission of the premises.

§ 26.- The process is continued: thus, AB, coinciding with DE, AC shall coincide with DF. Why? Because, says the demonstration, the angle BAC is admitted to be equal to the angle EDF; but why does this prove that AC must coincide with DF? It will not prove it to those who do not discover that the coincidence is included in the admitted equality of the two angles. Our assent is governed by this discovery alone.

§ 27.-A process, similar to what we have already investigated, is repeated to show that the point C must coincide with the point F; wherefore, says the demonstration, as the point B also coincides with the point E, the base BC shall coincide with the base EF. Why? Because, says Euclid, if the base BC does not coincide with the base EF, two straight lines would inclose a space. And how do you prove that two straight lines cannot inclose a space? By an admission in the tenth axiom that they cannot. Two straight lines, says the axiom, cannot inclose a space.

§ 28.- In this theorem, then, the proofs are effected by showing that the points in debate are admitted either by the premises of the proposition, or by axioms, &c. I have operated on a theorem which is more easily analyzed than any other in Euclid, because the subsequent theorems are demonstrated by preceding ones: still, the same principle will be found in all.

§ 29.-Are the foregoing principles of language conventional, or a dictate of our sensible experience with physical bodies?

I have now shown, that we assent to a proposition when we discover that the premises affirm the conclusion; and that proofs and arguments effect nothing but to show us that such an affirmation exists. I have investigated this subject too cursorily, but I will leave it, and proceed to show why certain premises affirm certain conclusions: for instance, why the word half implies that it is less than the whole. Perhaps you will say, that the meaning of the word half admits that it is less than the whole; but I ask how it acquires this meaning? If you say, that common consent concurs in attaching this signification to the word, I ask how common consent came to this concurrence? Finally, is the conclusion forced on us arbitrarily by the framers of language, that a half is less than a whole? or does the conclusion depend on some principle which is superiour to any such dictation? The answer to this question will constitute the subject of my next lecture.