§ 9.—Before we can tell whether greenness is in grass, we must know the sense to which the word is intended to refer.

When I look at grass, is greenness in the grass? No, says Professor Stewart. But to what sense does he refer for the signification of the word in? The answer to this question settles the controversy. He refers to the information of feeling, as when I say my hand is in my pocket. But the feel in is not applicable to colour. Greenness is in grass when we refer to the sight in and the sight grass, and these alone are pertinent to colour.

§ 10.-Before we can answer the question that inquires where colour is situated, we must decide on the sense to which the word "where" shall refer for signification.

But where in truth is colour situated? Before the question can be answered, you must decide on the sense to which where shall refer. If you mean the feel where, colour is nowhere; but if you mean the sight where, you will find no difficulty in designating where colour exists.

§ 11. When I place my hand on grass, I may say colour is not here. Nothing is here but a certain texture of parts. But I refer to the sense of feeling. Feeling is not pertinent to colour. Feeling possesses no cognizance over it. The here which relates to colour is a sight. You may therefore place your hand on grass, and say colour is here; provided you refer to seeing for the meaning of the expression.

§ 12.-Before we can answer whether sweetness is in sugar, we must ascertain the sense to which the word in is intended to refer.

"Nothing is in sugar," says Locke, "but a certain texture of parts, which are so formed as to produce on our organs of taste the sensation of sweetness. Sweetness itself is not in sugar." But to what sense does Locke refer for the significa

tion of in? If he refers to feeling, sweetness of course is not in sugar. No man believes that he can feel sweetness in sugar. Sweetness is in sugar when we refer to the sense of tasting for the signification of the word in, and no other sense possesses any cognizance over the subject.

§ 13.—The senses alone can answer questions which relate to the external universe, and we must designate the sense to whose authority we are appealing.

When I smell a rose, is the fragrance in the rose or in my mind, &c.? Suppose we ask the senses. They alone can answer the question. What says feeling? He can feel all that is in the rose, but he will aver that he cannot feel fragrance. He can feel nothing in the rose but texture, substance, figure, &c. What says seeing? It can see every thing that is truly in the rose, but it cannot see any thing like fragrance. We may with no better result ask tasting and hearing. They will severally affirm that they can taste and hear all that is in the rose, but they can find no fragrance. When, however, we ask smelling, it can discover fragrance in the rose. The in must refer to the information of this sense. To ask whether fragrance is in the rose, meaning the feel in, the sight in, &c., is to talk absurdly.

LECTURE XXIV.

WE INTERPRET THE INFORMATION OF OUR SENSES BY Words, INSTEAD OF INTERPRETING WORDS BY THE

INFORMATION

OF OUR SENSES.

§ 1.-The sensible signification of a word is as various as the objects to which the word is applied.

CREATION is immense; still, the names of created objects form the one use to which language is appropriated. Every feeling, every desire, every action, can be recorded by language. No event is so eccentrick, no imagination so wild, no situation so peculiar, but language can publish it. To effect these innumerable appliances we possess but a few thousand words :hence, every word must possess a multitude of meanings.

Nothing is more definite than colours; still, in the application of language to them, we shall find that every word is employed diversely. White is applied to snow, to paper, to the glass of our windows, to our skin, to the floor of this room, to the walls, to light, air, water, and to silver.

§ 2.—Instead of interpreting words by sensible information, we interpret sensible information by words.

The versatility of language produces no embarrassment in the ordinary concerns of life. When a man tells us that the floor of our room is white, we look at the floor and interpret the word white by what we discover in the floor; but in speculation we reverse the mode of interpretation-instead of examining the floor to ascertain the meaning of the word white, we investigate the word white to ascertain the colour of the floor.

§ 3. We mistake verbal criticism for an investigation of

nature.

My hand is in my glove, the moon is in the sky, hardness is in iron, heat is in the fire, sweetness is in sugar, colour is in grass. The word in is employed differently in each of the above cases. When I say my hand is in my glove, the in names a feel; when I say the moon is in the sky, the in names a sight; and when I say heat is in the fire, the in names a feel which is different from the feel to which I refer when I say my hand is in my glove. A perfect language should perhaps not use one word to express so many different sensible revelations. It should possess a separate word for each. Such, however, is not the nature of our language. We apply a word to numerous cases which we deem homogeneous or analogous. Practically, no evil arises, for we interpret the word by the sensible revelation to which it is applied,—deeming Cæsar at one moment a dog, and at another moment a Roman emperor. In speculation, however, we interpret the natural existence by its name. If I say heat is in fire, you will estimate the meaning of the word in by perhaps what you allude to when you say your hand is in your glove; hence, you will deny that heat is in the fire. You are thus investigating the meaning of the word in, to determine the relation which heat bears to fire; instead of examining heat and fire to ascertain the meaning of the word in.

66

§ 4.-"A few moments' reflection," says Professor Stewart, must satisfy any one that the sensation of colour resides in the mind only; yet our constant bias is to connect colour with external objects." Suppose, then, a man should assert that the colour of baize is connected with the baize, must I interpret his assertion by what I discover in the baize and colour? No, says speculation. What you discover in them must be subjected to the meaning of the word connected; and when you find that the colour and the baize exhibit phenomena that are different from what the word connected is applied to in some other cases, (the links of a chain, for instance,) you must say that the colour and the baize are not connected. We thus

interpret the information of our senses by words, instead of interpreting words by the information of our senses.

5.-Again, we say iron is hard, and the hardness is in the iron. Must I interpret these assertions by what I discover when I touch iron? No, says speculation; you must estimate what you discover when you touch iron by the meaning of the word in; and when you find that the iron and hardness produce feelings that are different from what the word in is applied to in some other cases, (as when you say your hand is in your glove,) you must say that hardness is not in iron.

§ 6.—Again, when we apply a spark to a mass of gunpowder which explodes, we say that the explosion is caused by the spark. The spark is the cause, and the explosion is the effect. We say, also, that a connexion exists between the cause and the effect. But must I interpret the meaning of the word connexion by what I thus discover in the spark and explosion? No, says speculation; what you discover in the spark and explosion you must subordinate to the meaning of the word connexion; and when you find that the spark and the explosion exhibit appearances that are different from what the word connexion is applied to in some other cases, (the links of a chain, for instance,) you must say that the spark and the explosion are not connected:-"they are only associated together," says Hume. "One succeeds the other, but they are not connected."

§ 7. To interpret nature by language causes frequently much

amazement.

A thread passes through the eye of a needle; a bullet passes through a board; light and colours pass through solid crystal; sound passes through a block of stone; electricity passes through a bar of iron; a thought passes through the mind; a pain passes through our head; a bird passes through the air; and perspiration passes through the pores of your hand. These expressions refer to diverse existences, though they possess a sufficient analogy or homogeneity to make the phrase "pass through" applicable to them all. Practically, we interpret each