§ 8.-In nature, we find magnet A, that will suspend a weight of twenty pounds, and magnet B, that will suspend but an ounce. We find the polarity of a magnetick needle, with its variations, its wanderings, and its dip, &c.; and while we apply correctly the word magnetism to these and as many other phenomena as we deem sufficiently homogeneous to be included under a common name, we gain nothing but delusion in attributing to them a oneness like that which is implied by the name. Their true oneness is the homogeneity that we discover in them, and which induces us to call them all magnetism. The verbal oneness is a property of our own creation.

§ 9.—Medical science is probably embarrassed by our imputing to diseases and their incidents, the oneness which pertains to their names only.

The medical question of contagion is embarrassed by not discriminating the oneness of language from the plurality of nature. The contagiousness of cholera generally is less a unit than the contagiousness of a single case. Even the contagiousness of a single case, during its whole continuance, is less a unit than its contagiousness on any given moment:—hence, to investigate the contagiousness of cholera, and to proceed by supposing that the contagiousness possesses the oneness which the word contagion imports, is like seeking for magnetism as a unit among the numerous magnetic phenomena. It is seeking in nature for a unit that exists in language only.

10. But cholera itself is not a unit. Whether medical science suffers not by the implied oneness of each disease, merits the consideration of physicians. Many medical theories seem to owe their origin to this errour. But not only is cholera in general not a unit, the particular cholera of Thomas is not a unit. It consists of many feels, sights, and other phenomena. I admit the propriety of combining them under one name; but if we would escape delusion, we must construe their oneness by nature, and not by the oneness of their name.

§ 11.-Our moral speculations also are embarrassed by imputing to nature the oneness which exists in language only.

Is a man a unit, as strictly as language implies? Should I attempt to discover wherein his oneness consists, (and volumes have been written on the subject,) I might seem to discuss humanity very profoundly, but I should discuss it very ignorantly. I should seek in nature for what is merely a contrivance of language:—for instance, amputate one of Peter's arms, will the remainder of Peter be a man? How much excision of his body must occur, before the remainder will cease to be a man? Such questions are not deemed trifling. We interpret nature by the oneness of the word man, instead of interpreting the oneness of the word man by the exhibitions of nature. The errour seems to me so gross, that I should doubt its existence, were not the evidence too explicit to be mistaken.

12.-In what consists the consciousness of a man? in what consists his identity? have been debated, and they are still debated, with the most surprising ignorance of the delusion which gives to the questions their perplexity. Consciousness is supposed to possess as much natural oneness as it possesses verbal oneness; while, in truth, the consciousness of a man is the many phenomena to which the word refers,-precisely as the wealth of a man is the various items of his property to which the word wealth refers.

§ 13.-What governs the will?-how acts volition on our limbs ?—how is the soul united to the body?—and how mind acts on matter, and matter on mind?-are questions which derive their perplexity from severally implying the existence of some unit. The search after the unit is the delusion.

§ 14.-Gravity, which effects so much in astronomical theories, which has displaced Atlas, and equals him in oneness,is still, so far as relates to its oneness, but a delusion of language. The word gravity names many interesting and important phenomena; but if, in addition to these, we look for gravity itself,

we act as ignorantly as the child at the opera, who, after listening with impatience to the musick, singing, and dancing, said, "I am tired of these; I want the opera."

§ 15.—The delusion by which we look for the unit gravity among the various phenomena of which gravity is the name, and for the unit man among the various parts of our formation, is analogous to the ancient puzzle denominated sorites:-A heap of wheat is exhibited to a person, and you proceed with him among the individual grains, to look for the heap itself. You take up a grain, and ask him if that is the heap. You proceed thus with every grain, till the whole will be exhausted without finding the heap.

§ 16.-Some units are a sensible aggregation, and some a verbal aggregation.

The word heap signifies a sight and a feel, and hence possesses an existence and a oneness without reference to the separate grains of which the heap is composed;-while the unit gravity possesses in nature no existence independently of its constituent parts. Gravity, as a unit, is a verbal aggregation; while the heap, as a unit, is a sensible aggregation. This distinction is highly deserving of consideration. Language disregards the distinction; the verbal oneness being equally complete in both cases.

17. We invent theories to supply the unit which we suppose must exist, but which we fail from finding in nature.

To the mistake by which we transfer to nature the oneness that exists in language, we owe a large portion of our theories. The theories supply the unit that we vainly seek in nature, but which we erroneously suppose must exist:—for instance, the unit magnetism is alleged to be some subtile and invisible emanation or fluid;-the unit temperature is another radiating and insensible fluid;-gravity another. The unit vitality is an irritability of fibre, and the unit sound is a vibration of the atmosphere. The unit is sometimes deemed an undiscoverable

essence; sometimes an agitation of the brain; sometimes an insensible repulsion of insensible parts; sometimes an internal combustion; and sometimes an external explosion.

18. So far as theories are useful, they are of course desirable. I wish to merely show that we attribute to nature the oneness which exists in language; and that we usually invent a theory to supply the exigency created by our mistaken appre hensions of nature. The practice will continue till we shall learn to interpret and qualify words by the revelation of our senses; instead of interpreting and qualifying the revelation of our senses by the implied oneness of words.

LECTURE V.

LANGUAGE IMPLIES IDENTITIES TO WHICH NATURE CONFORMS NOT.

§ 1.—HAVING, in my last two lectures, shown that we impute to nature a oneness which belongs to language only, I shall now show that we impute to nature an identity which belongs to language only.

§ 2.—Language is a collection of general terms, but creation is a congregation of individual existences.

Nine hundred and ninety-seven millions of beings exist, to whom we apply the word man. Amid the varieties of their complexion, stature, hair, features, age, sex, structure, habits, and knowledge, enough similarities are discoverable to make the word man appropriate to all. No two are, perhaps, identical in their general appearance, nor in the appearance of any particular part. They differ, also, individually from each other, in many qualities besides the appearance.

The word man, therefore, refers to a mass of dissimilar individuals. Every word is equally general in its signification. By means of their generality, a few thousand words comprehend all created existences. Nature is a congregation of individual existences, and language a collection of general terms.

§ 3.—We interpret the identity of existences by the identity of their name.

When we wish to disparage Napoleon, we say, he was but a man; and when we wish to exalt a simpleton, we say, he is a man as well as Napoleon. The alleged identity is correct, if we interpret it by the similarities that we discover in the compared individuals; but the identity is alleged to imply a similarity