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beyond what we discover in the two individuals, and even to control the differences that they exhibit. This is an insidious errour, and it constitutes the subject of the present discourse.

We disregard the individuality of nature, and substitute for it a generality which belongs to language.

§ 4.-The identity which language implies has embarrassed medicine.

Medical science long suffered by the delusion which we are investigating. It still suffers measurably. Diseases possess sufficient resemblances to be classed under general names; hence we possess the words peripneumony, pleurisy, rheumatism, &c. I censure not physicians for constructing the names, nor for deciding that Thomas and Henry are severally afflicted with pleurisy; but their diseases are not as identical in nature as in language.

§ 5.—Individuality is characteristick of nature.

The identity which language implies is responded to by nature very nearly, or we could possess no medical science; but the most skilful physician is often defeated by the individualities of nature. Physicians have long detected these individualities, and deemed them anomalies of nature. The anomaly is, however, in language, which unites under one name, as identities, what is only partially identical. Individuality is no anomaly of nature. It is nature's regular production, and boundless richness.

§ 6. No two parcels of calomel possess the perfect identity which the sameness of their name implies. No two men possess the perfect identity which the sameness of their manhood implies; nor possesses any one man, at all times, and under all circumstances, the complete identity with which language invests his individuality.

§ 7.—The identity which language implies is always complete, but nature approximates in various degrees only to a perfect identity.

cases.

Language implies always a perfect identity; nature exhibits, in some cases, a greater approximation to identity than in other For instance:-in two flakes of snow, the snow presents an identity which is almost complete; but in a whale and anchovy, the fish of both animals presents a very incomplete identity. The fish of the whale and anchovy is, however, as identical verbally, as the snow of the two flakes.

§ 8.-Again, a polypus and an elephant are animals, and the animality of both is identical in language; in nature, the identity is less than even the identity of the fish.

§ 9.-Iron is matter--a sunbeam is matter. Their materiality is identical in language, while in nature we discover in it less identity than we discover in even the animality of the polypus and elephant.

§ 10.—We should not confound the verbal identity with the realities of nature.

I complain not of language for its implied identities. We can construct a language on no other principle. A whale and an anchovy present sufficient similarities to render the word fish appropriate to both: still we need not confound the verbal identity with the realities of nature. In nature, the identity is just as we discover it to be. It must not be measured by names, but ascertained by observation. We reverse this rule: we interpret the natural identity by the verbal.

§ 11.-Failing to discover in nature the identity which language implies, but believing that it must exist somewhere in nature, we mistake it for a mysterious property of creation.

No man observes so superficially as not to discover in natural productions an endless diversity. Children say, that no two

blades of grass are alike. Still, the difference in the blades we estimate as not effecting their identity as grass. But what is the identity of grass, beyond the sensible resemblance, &c., of the different blades? Nothing but the name grass. We deem the identity a hidden property of nature, while it is only a property of language.

§ 12. We transfer to nature a generalization which belongs to language.

Botanists say, that oats, barley, and wheat, are also grass; and when we become botanists, we see that the name is appropriate. We are, however, deceived, if we suppose that in these different existences some property exists, which is as identical as the identity of the word grass. We are transferring to nature a generalization of language.

§ 13.-The diversity which we discover among natural objects, &c., that possess the same name, should teach us to correct the identity implied by their name; but we employ the verbal identity to excite wonder at the natural diversity.

The question is deemed profound which asks how the soul is united to the body;-how the movements of a man's limbs are united to his volition;-how heat and light are united in flame;-how coldness and hardness are united in ice. The union, in these cases, is deemed identical with the union of the arm to the shoulder; and hence the wonder and the fallacy. Should a man ask how the arm is united to the shoulder, we could show him the ligatures, &c., and he would be satisfied. He would be equally satisfied with what he discovers of light and heat in flame, did he not believe that the word union, as applied to the light and heat, meant the same as the word union when applied to my arm and shoulder. The diversity which he finds in nature between the two unions, fails to teach him that the verbal identity is fallacious. He employs the verbal identity to show that the natural diversity is mysterious.

14.-Light passes through solid crystal. This many persons deem a standing miracle. What we see excites no sur

prise. The passage through the solid crystal is the marvel. We know the difficulty which would attend the passage of our hand through the crystal, and we deem the passage of the light identical with the passage of the hand. Nothing is more fallacious than thus to construe the word passage in these different uses of it. The two operations possess the requisite analogy to make the word passage applicable to both, but its meaning in each application is what our senses reveal, and not what the identity of the word implies. The passage of the light through crystal is a sight only; the passage of my hand is a sight and a feel.

§ 15.-A spark causes gunpowder to explode. This is curious. But speculation wonders not at the explosion, but that we cannot discover the connexion which exists between the touch of the spark and the explosion. Mankind would not have attached the word connexion to the spark and explosion, if the word was not appropriate; but if we infer that the connexion is identical with the connexion exhibited by two links of a chain, and seek in nature for such a link, we are deluded. Nature is boundlessly diverse; and all that we can accomplish is, to group the diversities under such general terms as alone can compose a finite language.

§ 16.—Language, in its ability to designate individual existences, is like colours in their ability to depict the variety of

nature.

When a painter undertakes to represent nature, he finds an infinity of natural tints, while he possesses only a finite number of artificial colours with which to effect the representation. So, when he undertakes to discourse of nature, he finds an infinity of phenomena, while he possesses only a finite number of words with which to form his discourse.

$ 17.-The colour which on one occasion the painter employs to portray the moon, he, on another occasion, employs to represent water; so the word which on one occasion a speaker employs to designate the relation that exists between two links

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of a chain, he employs on another occasion to designate the relation that exists between a spark and an explosion.

§ 18.—The painter and the speaker act from a kindred principle; the painter discovers in the moon and the water an analogy which makes one colour appropriate to both; and the speaker discovers in the links, and the spark, and explosion, an analogy which makes the word connexion appropriate to both.

§ 19.-Verbal disquisitions will be erroneous till we cease from imputing to nature the identities which belong to language.

But in one point the painter differs from the speaker. The painter knows that the identity of colour [between the water and the moon], exists only in the imperfection of his materials; while the speaker knows not that the identity of "connexion" [between the links of a chain, and the spark and explosion], exists only in the imperfection of language. Yet this truth must be learnt before we can extricate ourselves from the errours in which nearly all verbal disquisitions are involved.

§ 20.—The meaning of the word identity varies with the object to which it is applied.

The word identity itself is merely a general term, expressive of a multitude of varying existences and relations. A man who is blind from his birth, knows roundness by the feel. Should he attain sight and see a ball, he will not recognise it as the round object of his former amusement. When, however, he shall have learnt roundness by the sight, he may inquire how the visible ball and the tangible are identical. Their identity is different from the identity of his person now, and his person a few moments previously. The identity of John when an infant, and the same John when a decrepid old man, differs from both the other identities. The identity which exists between an acorn and the oak from which it originated, differs from all the other identities. To seek in each of these cases for something that is common to them all, and as similar in all as the similarity

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