so, the seven members purchased, I may say, by the slave-holder, will be seized upon as common property, and divided between the east and the west. I ask gentlemen of the east, and more especially of the middle region, whether they are prepared for this?

And if not, what do they propose to do? Insert an article in the Constitution forbidding it? Gentlemen from the west may say we will promise you not to take from you the representation in Congress which your slaves give you. I know not whether they will be willing to do this. Some gentlemen may think that this is a common fund, and may have this very thing in view, as a consequence of the measures they are now pursuing. If such are their views, they will no doubt avow them. But suppose such an article to be inserted in the Constitution, I doubt very much its efficacy. I will not undertake to say that it will not be efficacious. But I will say that reasons may be found strong enough for those whose inclinations and interest lead them to disregard it. Less plausible reasons have in practice been found suthcient to justify violations of what we consider the spirit, if not the letter of the Constitution of the United States.

The power to prescribe the times, places and manner of electing members of the House of Representatives, is, by the Constitution of the United States, given to the State Legislatures, subject to the control of Congress. Not to the people of the States assembled in Convention. When we have constituted a State Legislature, this power, it may be contended, is not conferred by us, but is derived from a higher source, the Constitution of the United States. We have given it being, and a capacity to receive this grant of power, but the grant is not from us, but another, and the extent of the power cannot be regulated by us, but is regulated by the instrument which confers it. The argument may not be strong, but if we judge from experi ence, it will be found sufficient for those who seek power. I ask, are we willing to put this interest at hazard on no better security? I answer no. I will not be satisfied with the bond, I must have a surety.

There are other interests to protect, and other abuses of power to be guarded against, of greater importance than those to which I have called the attention of the Committee. The different divisions of the State are not more strongly marked by geographical features, than are the different interests of the people who inhabit them. The Committee must at once perceive, that I refer to the subject of internal improvement. Those different, and in some respects conflicting interests, cannot safely be confided to the people of any one division. The people below the head of tide-water do not stand in need of turnpike-roads and canals. The improvements which are suited to the country between the head of tide-water, and the Blue Ridge, will embrace the Potomac, James River, and Roanoke, as far as the Ridge, the branches of these streams which rise below that range of mountains, and the various branches of the Rappahannock. The scale of improvement of the larger streams, suited to the wants of the middle region, is much inferior to that demanded by the western people; they would therefore, be but partially benefitted by the improvements which the interests of the people of the middle region, would lead them to make. Those demanded by the people of the Valley, will afford for the most part, no benefit to the people of the middle region, and little to those west of the Alleghany. They require that the Chesapeake shall be united with the Ohio, the James River with the Kanawha. The scheine of the people of the Valley, as we learn from the sages assembled at Charlottesville, is, as soon as the Chesapeake and Ohio canal, shall reach the mouth of the Shenandoah, to improve that river for two or three hundred miles, and when it shall reach the mouth of the south branch of the Potomac, to improve that stream for some one or two hundred miles: and when all these improvements shall have been accomplished, some small attention is to be paid to the Roanoke. To shew that the scale of expenditure demanded by the western people, greatly transcends any thing that we of the middle region have any occasion for. I will beg leave to call the attention of the Committee to the project which was before the last Legislature. It proposed to subscribe for stock of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal Company, to the amount of four hundred thousand dollars: a farther sum to make a lateral canal to the town of Alexandria in the District of Columbia, and to improve the navigation of James river the distance of twenty-four miles, in the county of Alleghany, at an expense of $260,000. This would have been a mere donation, for no man can pretend that the tolls would have been any equivalent for the expenditure. It was also proposed to subscribe the sum of $60,000 towards the improvement of the various branches of the Rappahannock. Unconditionally? No, Sir: whilst the appropriation of $260,000 to be expended in the county of Alleghany, was to be an unconditional gift, stock of the Rappahannock Company was to be subscribed for to the amount of $60,000, upon condition that individuals would subscribe for and secure the payment of a like sum. Near half a million was to be allotted to the Potomac interest; $260,000 to be given to the county of Alleghany, paying a tax of $600; whilst $60,000 only, is conditionally allotted to the counties of Spottsylvania, Stafford, Fauquier, Culpeper, Orange, and Ma

dison, which, united, pay a tax of more than $30,000. This is the measure proposed to be dealt out to the middle country, by our western friends, who ask us to place all power in their hands. I ask gentlemen representing this middle country, if they are willing to grant the demand. If we turn our eyes farther south, we find that at the instance of western men, a scale of improvement has been commenced on James river, which has resulted in the completion of twenty-nine miles of canal, near Richmond, and about six miles in the Blue Ridge, which, together, cost one million of dollars; and we have the authority of the Charlottesville Convention, for saying that this money has been thrown away, unless another million is expended, to connect these detached works. What ber efit have the people, living iminediately under the Ridge, derived from this expenditure? None. Worse than none. When the law passed, authorizing this large expenditure, a pledge was given them that no additional tolls should be demanded for the transportation of their produce, until, by the improvement of the navigation, the cost of transportation should be lessened. And how was that pledge redeemned? By a repeal of the law, and an increase of tolls upon their tobacco.

Whilst upon thirty-one miles of canal, to subserve western interests, one million of dollars have been almost thrown away, the improvement of the Rappahannock is estimated to cost about twelve hundred dollars a mile, including the great falls; and it is believed that it can be accomplished within the estimate. That of the Roanoke has actually cost about $1,500 a mile, including the purchase of a number of slaves now employed upon it."

I do not make these statements to throw odium on the scheme for internal improvements, but to shew that the different sections of the State have separate interests, and that the interests of one, cannot safely be confided to the absolute control of another. I do not ask you to give to the region, which I in part represent, power to control any other; I ask you so to apportion representation in the two Houses, as to guard and protect the interests of all. I do not ask you to give us power to do mischief, but to avert eril.

Mr. NAYLOR then addressed the Chair to the following effect:

Mr. Chairman: If those gentlemen who have been long accustomed to legislative debates; gentlemen who were well able to sustain a distinguished station at all times when thus engaged heretofore, felt embarrassed in addressing that Chair before this Convention, how much more ought to feel embarrassment in making the attempt, who, I may say, have never been accustomed to debate in an ordinary Legislature.

Yes, Sir, and I do most sensibly feel it; and nothing but the solicitude I experience, arising from the importance of the question now to be decided, which creates a still stronger sensation, could have overcome that repugnance which might have deterred me from arising to address this body.

But I cast myself with confidence on its benignity and indulgence, while I occupy a short space of time, while no other gentleman seems disposed to occupy the time of the Committee. I would premise the few observations I have to make, by stating, that though conflicting opinions on a matter in controversy may appear to coincide with the interests of those respectively, who maintain those opinions, yet they may be held on each side with all the honesty and sincerity which a conviction of their truth can produce. This I believe to be the case on the present occasion. With this persuasion, and with the highest respect for the opinions of those gentlemen from whom I am constrained to differ, I beg leave to state a few of those reasons which thus constrain me to differ from them.

In attempting to remedy that glaring defect in the existing Constitution of Virginia, whereby the citizens of one section of the State have so much weight on the floor of the Legislature, and the c tizens of another section have so little, (which is in the extreme as twenty to one,) it is contended on the one side that representation in the Legislature ought to be based on white population and taxation combined; because, as it is urged by the advocates of this basis, that property or wealth is of so much importance in civil society, that it ought to be protected, by giving to it a voice through its owners in the Legislature; diminishing by so much the voice of the people. This, on the other side, is resisted, because it is interior in its nature to persons, in the same ratio that persons are more valuable than property in a community, and that it would thus be substituting the inferior for the superior, and usurping the place of and taking from persons their natural rights; and farther because wealth is adventitious, incidental, and too fluctuating in its nature for the basis of a fundamental law, which ought to be founded on well ascertained and unchangeable principles. But it is denied by the gentlemen who contend for this mixed basis, that there are any fixed principles to govern us in this case.

At this rate, the money thrown away on James River, would, if applied to the improvement of the streams which rise below the Ridge, have given us a navigation of near 1930 miles,

sen

It is contended by them, that Government is just what you can make it, (and therefore a struggle in which the most powerful may succeed; a game at which the most skilful may win;) that it is altogether conventional, to be regulated entirely by expe dience. Therefore, the whole effort of those gentlemen has been to disprove the existence of those principles which we contend for, and, indeed, of any principles whatever to regulate us in this case. It was necessary that they should do this, as they have denied the primary right of the majority to rule. This principle is a barrier in their way, and if they do not remove it they cannot get on. But this is not the only one to defend us, although we might rely upon it with safety. Nay, we have no cause to fear to meet them hand to hand in the open field of expediency. But if they had even carried this barrier, there is another just behind it which I think they never can pass; that is the public sentiment, and universally received opinion, not only of the people of Virginia, but of the whole United States. If there is any political ser timent common to them all, it is, that the majority ought to rule. You may travel any distance you please in Virginia, and ask the question of every man you meet, whether he thought the majority have a right to or ought to rule in a Republican Government; and if he did not laugh at what he thought so simple a question, he would unhesitatingly answer in the affirmative. Yes, Sir, and this would be universally the case, from the man of grey hairs down to the stripling of tender years. And it has been truly said by a wise and experienced statesman, that he was most unwise in framing a Government, who disregarded the fixed opinions, and even prejudices of the people. But by the proposed amendment it would be provided in the Constitution, that the minority might rule. Can it be supposed that a fundamental lay like this, so much at war with all those political opinions which have grown with the people's growth and strengthened with their strength, and have become interwoven with all their thoughts, could prevail with them or be endured by them? Certainly not. A Republican Government can only be sustained by public opinion: erect it on any other foundation, and you build upon the sands: when the rain descends, and the storms beat upon it, it will fall. But the gentleman from Hanover (Mr. Morris) seems to` think that we have given it up as a principle in a Republican Government, that a majority have an inherent right to rule. I, for one, have not given it up, and I do not know, nor am I persuaded that any other gentleman has. I do contend that there are fixed principles in the science of Government, as well as in other sciences, and that this is one of those principles, and a leading one. To stop now to prove that there are such principles, would be a work of supererogation, especially after what the gen tleman from Frederick (Mr. Cooke) has said on that point. It would, indeed, be attempting to prove axioms or self-evident propositions.

I would as soon believe that there was no truth, no justice, no rule of right or wrong, as to believe this. If there is no undeniable truth here, such as are called first principles, we have nothing to reason from; we have no premises and can never come to any conclusion. If each is at liberty to choose their own premises, they must/ always come to different conclusions.

We would be thus at sea without star or compass to guide us, veering about to eve-y ry purpose, on the great deep of expediency. But, that there are such first principles, the Bill of Rights declares, and in so many words recommends a frequent recurrence to them, and this has been the political creed of Virginia ever since she became a Republic, unless we have abandoned this creed and departed from the faith. And since the existence of these first principles is indisputa! le, the only enquiry now is, what are they? and how are they to be discovered? The answer is, that they are to be discovered in the same way as in all other sciences, that is, by tracing back those sciences to their primary elements. We must then, in this case, refer to inan in his primitive condition. I know that the idea of man ever having been in what is called a state of nature, is ridiculed as being imaginary only, and as being a state that never had an existence in fact. It is not necessary to dispute about this, though more instances than one of this kind can be referred to in history. But in reasoning upon the subject, we have a right, for the sake of the analogy, to pre-suppose it, just as a mathematician pre-supposes a line and a point before he proceeds with the demonstrations which carry conviction with them, and cannot afterwards be disproved, by saying that the mathematical line and point were only imaginary, and that they never had a real existence. We cannot, indeed, divest ourselves of the idea of the state which man must have been in previous to the formation of the social compact. This was a treaty to which every member of the community became a party, by which they unanimously agreed to form one body, and so became incorporated as such.

This was formed not only by the consent of the majority, but by the consent of the whole. And when the compact was formed, it resulted from the very nature of the ! case, without any formal stipulation, that it could only act, move or be guided by the consent of the majority. True, they might afterwards by the consent of that majority, agree that a minority should rule, or they could agree to create a monarchy; but still the act that created the oligarchy or the monarchy, was the act of the majority.

This majority was still the fountain of the delegated power, which proves what I contend for, that there was an original, inherent right in the majority. For this, I have the authority of as great a political philosopher and constitutional jurist of the last or present age, viz: John Locke, Esq. A passage from his work on civil society, I beg leave to quote : "For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority. For that which acts any community, being only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary to that, which is one body, to move one way, it is necessary the body should move that way, whither the great force carries it, which is the consent of the majority; or else it is impossible it should act or continue, one body, one community, which the consent of every individual, that united into it, agreed that it should; and so every one is, bound by that consent, to be concluded by the majority. And therefore, we see, that in assemblies empowered to act by positive laws, where no number is set by that positive law, which empowers them, the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole, and of course determines, as having, by the law of nature and reason, the power of the whole. And, thus every man, by consenting with others to make one body politic, under one Government, puts himself under an obligation to every one of that society, to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it." And, I think, it further goes to prove that man had an original, inherent right of suffrage, because it was by the exercise of this suffrage, that is consent, that he formed the social compact. He did not derive it from the social compact, for it existed previous to the existence of the compact, and by it he formed the compact; it was the cause of the compact, not the effect of it; it was, therefore, original and inherent. Property could not be regarded in this compact, for it was not recognized, and did not exist previous to it. There must, then, have been a second compact formed, before any one could claim representation for property. But if the majority of persons had and has an inherent right to govern, upon what principles can you give that right to a minority because they possess a majority of wealth? None certainly of justice, none according to the eternal fitness of things. This is what the gentleman from Northampton denominates a majority of interests; that is, the rich man and man of wealth: but this is the principle on which all aristocracies and oligarchies have been, and the Holy Alliance is founded, and therefore has tendencies to which that gentleman would be averse. But it is pressed upon us in answer to this, by the gentleman from Orange, why were not women and children, and all other persons taken into this majority, or counted as meinbers having a right of suffrage? We answer that these are exceptions to the general rule, and that the Creator who gave the rule, formed the excep tions to it. He created women with all the tenderness, softness and delicacy of that sex, and when he placed them under the protection of man, he gave them an influence of another kind, more powerful than the right of suffrage; an influence which I have no doubt the gentleman from Orange will acknowledge. If suffrage at the polls had been added, they would have been entirely too powerful. They would have had all the Government in their own hands. And, therefore, I think it would have been difficult to form a society in the present day, like the Amazons the gentlemin has mentioned; and I venture to say, that if ever such a society did exist, it did not exist long. It is not necessary to inention, why children are not taken in, or idiots, &c.; these exceptions do not impugn, but they prove the rule. Give a person one vote on his account, and another on account of his wealth, (which is ostensibly the amount of the demand embraced in the amendments under consideration,) and give another person one vote only, because he has not wealth, and it is the same thing as if you would give to the first person one vote only, and the latter none. For, by one of his votes, the rich man could annihilate the one vote of the poor man; and by the other, he could reign over him. It cannot be denied, that if a majority is to rule, a minority cannot; but if wealth is to be represented, a minority will rule, and if a majority of persons ought to rule, then wealth cannot be represented. [According to the standard proposed, the value of a vote will rise and fall from year to year, according to the taxes. If, in one year, the rich man pays twenty dollars tax, and the poorer man only ten, the rich man or his friends on his account, will have two votes, and the poor man only one; and if the taxes should be so lessened that the rich man the next year would have to pay only twenty cents, and the poor man only ten cents, still the rich man would have two votes to the poor man's one; so that the price of a vote would one year be ten dollars, and the next year only ten cents; a great variance in the price of that which ought to be above all price.] This would be throwing the elective franchise of men to the winds of uncertainty, to be driven about as something of no value.

In the scheme proposed, there appears to be no equivalents, no justice. It is the object of all good Governments, to produce the greatest possible good. In doing this, a choice of evils is often presented, that is of two evils, one of which is unavoidable,

to choose the least. Now, it is said, to be an evil, that the poorer man should have an equal voice with the rich man, in laying the taxes of which the rich man has much the larger portion to pay; and this can only be avoided by another evil; and this is, by giving the rich man a decided control in making or passing all the laws, whereby the most valuable immunities of the poor man will be subjected to the will of the rich man. Now, from which of these two evils, is it possible, for the greatest degree of human misery to result? Certainly from that which might fall upon the poorer man in his personal safety and personal liberty, by so much as these are above all equivalents in money; and this proves the impolicy, injustice and total inadmissibility of the scheme proposed. But those who have the wealth, assure that those who have it not, are in no danger; that they will not abuse it. those who have not the wealth, as much to be trusted? They have as much right to But why is not the virtue of this confidence, as the wealthy; especially as the security required of them is so severe. But it is said, that the wealthy can pass no laws affecting the poor, which will not affect them: this is not so, for the cottager now, who is not wealthy enough to own two slaves, must work on the roads, while those who have two slaves, are exempt. They might also be taxed with double duty in the militia, poll taxes, &c. There is a further injustice in it than this. man can be endangered, and these are in proportion generally to other laws passed, as It is only in money bills, that the rich one in fifty; and so to have the control of the one money bill against the poor man, he must have the control of the other forty-nine against him.

In examining any thing which has been advanced by the gentleman from Culpeper, it is with diffidence in my opinion, in perfect unison with that high respect and esteem which is accorded to him by all his fellow-citizens, as well for his own personal worth, as for the manner in which he executes the duties of the office which he fills with his compeers on the highest seat of justice in the State. That gentleman admits, that all men are equal in their natural rights, but says, they are unequal in their political rights. It may then be enquired, at what point does the equality of natural rights end, and the inequality of political rights begin? And of what avail can the equality of natural rights be to a man, if the inequality of political rights may destroy them?

If personal liberty and personal safety, are natural rights, he must have a sufficient share of political power to preserve them; for political rights resolve themselves into the power which every man must have to preserve his natural rights; and it is a contradiction in terms to say, that he could hold his natural rights at the will of another, because that which is held at the will of others is no right at all. man from Northampton, (Judge Upshur,) denied that there was any inherent right in The gentlethe majority, derived from nature, to bind the minority in any case. that gentleman has said, that there was but one single right derived from nature, and To illustrate this, that is, the right of all the creatures of God to use their powers in such mode, as may best promote their own happiness. That the lion devours the ox; the ox drives the lamb from the tender grass; and the lamb drives the creatures more timid than itself. This, then, is the right which superior strength gives, and according to this, they who have obtained illegitimate power, may keep it, if they can, and add to it if they are

able.

But, perhaps, this was not exactly what the gentlemnan means; otherwise, we need not hope to adjust the matters in difference between us, as far as power could go. But I know he possesses more liberal sentiments; though we differ materially as to the points on which we should meet so as to agree. Indeed the fascinating strain of that gentleman's eloquence, was such, that I was sometimes astonished to find where it had carried me, by which I was imperceptibly led to substitute the truth of one proposition which could not be denied, as the proof of another which was still to be demonstrated. Most powerfully has the political doctrines which we contend for, been assailed, but I feel them to be a rock which torrents of eloquence cannot move, and we stand in no need of their adventitious aid. Thrice is he armed who hath his quarrel just. Truth is all powerful and must prevail. He has further said that property is one-half the compound in the social compact, and persons the other. Again, that it is not property, but the rights which grow out of it, which is to be represented. The conclusion, forcibly drawn from these propositions, is, that a certain proportion of the suffrage ought to be given to property, which would be so much taken from persons; for just in proportion as you give weight to property in the Government, you lessen that of persons. Now, wealth is defined to be the power, which he who possesses it has to command the labor of others. But the gentleman from Northampton would add to this power, by giving it Legislative power: that would be adding power to power, and according to the state of the case, it would be increasing one of the component parts of the social compact, so much as to destroy the whole equilibrium and proportion. Yes, Sir, wealth is power; and wherever wealth is, there power will exist independent of Legislation. Wealth is the object which keeps the world in motion; it is the supreme object of desire amongst men; they are dispersed every where to seek