It is manifest, from this review, that the ratio of representation in Congress, was adjusted less upon considerations of what was just and right, in relation to the persons represented, or of what was wise and proper, for the protection of property, than upon principles of concession and compromise-and it follows, that the example cannot be proper for our imitation, till that day shall arrive; which, may God, in his mercy, forever avert!-when the large districts of our State, having separated from each other, and formed independent Governments, shall have sent deputies to form for them, a Federal Constitution. That the apportionment of representation according to Federal numbers was not intended to afford protection to the slaves of the Southern States, is plainly to be inferred from the utter inadequacy of the means to the end. It could afford no such protection, because it left the five Southern States, the principal slave-holders, in a decided minority, in the House of Representatives, while they were in a still smaller minority in the Senate. The protection to that property, from the power of Congress, is to be found, in the absence of all authority to legislate concerning it, except by the imposition of taxes, and in the restraint upon the power to lay any capitation or other direct tax, unless in the proportion of the Federal numbers. The provisions of the Constitution of the United States do not warrant the conclusion, that it was intended to apportion representation, in the popular branch of the Legislature, to the contributions of the respective States. The contributions of the States are drawn essentially from imposts and duties, and there is no attempt to apportion representation to them. It was manifest that the revenue from this source would furnish the ordinary income of the Government, and that direct taxes would be the subject only of occasional resort. Yet the representation is the same whether direct taxes are levied or not. In truth, direct taxes and representation are not apportioned to each other; they are only referred to a common standard, the Federal number, which is to govern the one always, whether the other exist or no, and govern that other casually when called into existence. But suppose it conceded, that it was the object of the Federal Constitution to apportion representation and contributions, to each other; and conceded, moreover, that such apportionment was right upon principle; is there nothing due to the consideration, that while to the General Government is committed the conduct of our external relations alone, the State Governments have charge of all our internal affairs-while the Federal Government acts in the general upon great and common interests, and upon large masses, the State Governments act upon the minor sub-divided interests and upon each individual, in every relation which he bears to society? Is there no fair inference from this consideration, that while a representation appor tioned to taxes, might fairly embody the public will, in the Federal Councils, and give sufficient protection to the various interests on which they act; a representation in proportion to the number of free men, might be required in Virginia, to express fairly the will of her people, to represent and protect all the various interests on which her Government continually acts? The Constitutions of Massachusetts, New-Hampshire, South Carolina and Georgia, are referred to, as furnishing examples of a representation of property in Republican Governments; and the gentleman from Orange, (Mr. P. P. Barbour,) particularly commends to our attention the experience of Massachusetts, who, after thirty or forty years' trial of her Government, has approved this representation, by refusing to alter it, at a late revision of her Constitution. In Massachusetts, the representation in the Senate is based upon the ratio of taxes, with a provision that no district shall send more than six members; and in the House of Representatives, it is based on the number of taxable polls, each election district being entitled to one for the first one hundred and fifty polls, and one in addition for every two hundred and twenty-five above that number. The election districts are large, and have become populous, so that each is now entitled to many representatives-Boston, for example, to about seventy. But the districts are not required to elect the whole number; each sends such proportion of its whole delegation as it thinks proper-and generally they send but a small proportion of them. It is this Constitution which the experience of Massachusetts has not induced her to alter. Would any gentleman recommend the constitution of both branches of her Legislature, as a model for our imitation? Would he give to our election districts the power of electing from one to seventy members, as they thought fit? If he would not be governed by the experience of Massachusetts, as to one branch of her Legislature, why should he desire us to be governed by it, with respect to the other? But if we are to be governed by it, what does it teach us? Sure'y, not that a check upon the power of the people, should be introduced into the popular branch of the Legislature, by giving representation to property there; but that such check should be introduced into the Senate: it teaches s to reject the amendment of the gentleman from Culpeper, which it has been invoked to support. The Constitution of New-Hampshire is similar to that of Massachusetts, and requires no particular cominentary. That of South Carolina has been most relied on, as furnishing a more appropriate example. South Carolina, a slave-holding State, by her Constitution adopted in the year 1790, had a prescribed number of Representatives and Senators from each election district, not varying with the changes of popu lation, and not apportioned thereto. In 1803, the constitution of her House of Representatives was changed, by introducing into it the precise compound basis, now proposed to us by the gentleman from Culpeper-the Senate was left as formerly, composed of a prescribed number of members from each election district. The precedent, as it regards the popular branch of the Legislature, seems to be in point, and how far we shall respect its authority, it is for the good sense of this Committee to decide. The slave population, I learn, abounded in the lower districts of South Carolina, as it does in the lower districts of Virginia; there, as here, the slave population was small in the Western districts, the white population rapidly increasingits representation very unequal-the people of those districts insisting on a more equal representation-and the people of the Eastern districts fearing, that if the power passed into the hands of the Western people, their property would be endangered. The Eastern districts anticipating the time when they would not be able to resist the demands of the growing population of the West, and availing themselves of their great ascendancy in both branches of the Legislature, adopted the amendment which fixed the basis of representation in the popular branch upon the compound basis of taxes and white population. Their Constitution authorised amendments, by majorities of two-thirds of both Houses of the Legislature, at two successive sessions. It was by such a concurrent vote that this amendment was adopted, and there can be no stronger evidence of the ascendancy which at that time the Eastern districts had in the Legislature That an overwhelming majority then, should have imposed such terms upon the minority, can, in my humble judgment, furnish no good reason, why the minority here should impose like terms upon a majority. But the subsequent history of South Carolina furnishes the strongest refutation of the argument which upheld the policy of this measure there, and now recommends it to us; for, notwithstanding this expedient of the compound basis, the political power, in the popular branch of the Legislature, has passed from the Eastern slave-holders to the Western freemen, and yet the Government proceeds in perfect harmony, and I am well informed, that danger to the property of the East, is in no wise threatened, and is no longer feared. Why then should danger be feared, from permitting the Western freemen of Virginia, to acquire political power in the popular branch of the Virginia Legislature? By the Constitution of Georgia, adopted in 1798, their Senate is composed of one member from each county, and their House of Representatives has a graduated representation based upon the Federal number. How this operates in the practical distribution of power, or upon the interests of society, we are not informed. We cannot therefore appreciate the example. But, if this question were tried by the example of our sister States, surely the weight of authority would greatly preponderate against the limitation which is proposed, upon the power of the free inhabitants. Among the slave-holding States, while Maryland and North Carolina have a county representation without regard to numbers, Louisiana has its House of Representatives apportioned according to the qualified voters, and a Senate with fixed numbers from prescribed districts-Kentucky, its representatives apportioned to the qualified electors, and Senate to the free male inhabitants above twenty-one years-Mississippi has representatives apportioned to free white inhabitants, her Senators to the free white taxable inhabitants-Alabama has both Houses based upon free white inhabitants-Missouri, both based upon free white male inhabitants-and Tennessee upon the taxable inhabitants—that is, as I am well informed, free inhabitants, on whom taxes may be imposed. Here are six slave-holding States, in most, if not all of which, the slave population is very unequally distributed. In none of them has it been deemed necessary to protect their slaves by restraints on the power of the free inhabitants, and in none of them do we learn that there has been the least cause to apprehend any danger to this property from the exercise of that power. Of these States, Kentucky and Tennessee has each had between thirty and forty years' experience. In States where there are no slaves, and where political power is distributed among the different districts essentially in proportion to the number of inhabitants, we have the examples of Pennsylvania, New-York, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, in which there has been no attempt to guard property by giving it representation. In the old Constitution of New-York, there was a distinction made between the qualification of voters for members of the two Houses; a higher property qualification being required for the voter in elections to the Senate; but this has been abandoned in the recent change of their Constitution. I profess, however, Mr. Chairman, to pay but little respect to any of the examples from the Constitutions of our sister States, quoted on the one side or the other. None of them can be very well understood by us; all of them have been subjected to the test of but a span of time, compared with the life of nations; and all of them are taken from the infancy of our institutions, where our sparse population, the facility of acquiring property, and our agricultural pursuits, secure to us more virtue, and more freedom from temptation, than, in future times, we can reasonably hope to enjoy. Having disposed of the precedents which are supposed to bear on the question in debate, let us consider the two propositions with reference to their practical operation--and in approaching this subject, I must express my deep regret at the appeal which has been made to the spirit of party politics. We are told by the gentleman from Chesterfield, that one of the objects of this Convention is to change the policy of this State in reference to the measures of the General Government; and he has endeavored to alarm the party politician, with the apprehension that his favorite doctrine of State Rights would be endangered, by a transfer of power from the East to the West. Mr. Chairman, has not the subject under consideration intrinsic difficul ties enough? Are there not prejudices, naturally, perhaps inseparably belonging to it, which present almost insuperable obstacles to candid discussion, to just and wise conclusions respecting it? Shall we, by invoking the demon of party spirit, multiply these difficulties, inflame these prejudices, bring discord into our ranks, and confusion to our councils? Has it come to this-that public opinion is to be controlled, by retaining political power in the hands of the minority? Do our brethren of the East mean to deny us freedom of opinion respecting the affairs of the General Government? Do they insist upon the privilege of thinking for us, as well as legislating for us? The generous feelings of my friend from Chesterfield, when the excite ment of ardent debate has subsided, will disclaim, I am sure, all aid from blind party zeal; and I trust that this Committee will not for a moment submit to its influence. It has been objected to the resolution of the Select Committee, that by transferring the power to the West, it will endanger the basis of representation in the House of Representatives of the United States; that is to say, that if the basis of white popu lation should be established for the House of Delegates, the people of the West, following the precedent, will insist on arranging the Congressional districts in this State upon the same basis, instead of the basis of Federal numbers, upon which they have heretofore been arranged. I do not believe, Sir, that any such danger exists; the propriety of arranging the Congressional districts upon the Federal basis is so obvious, and has been so long practised, that I do not believe the change would ever be attempted. But if you fear it, provide against it in the Constitution, by an express declaration that the Federal number shall forever govern in arranging these districts. But the gentleman from Fauquier tells us, he does not know that such a provision would be regarded as obligatory; he does not know but that the Constitution of the United States would be appealed to as paramount to the authority of the State Constitution on this subject. Does the gentleman from Fauquier entertain the least doubt that such a provision in our Constitution would be obligatory? Can he doubt that the State Legislature is imperiously bound by the State Constitution, in all things not contrary to the Federal Constitution? And can he find any thing in the Constitution of the United States upon which to rest a doubt, that it is lawful to prescribe that the districts for electing members to Congress, shall be formed upon the basis which the Constitution of the United States itself has established for the whole representation of the State. If we are to be driven from the path of duty by such scepticism, our labours are at an end; for, why prescribe a qualification of suffrage? The gentleman from Fauquier does not know that in this age of metaphysical abstraction, it will be held obligatory upon the people. Why prescribe any basis of representation at all? The gentleman from Fauquier does not know that the Legislature will hold it obliga tory upon them. Let us not, Sir, deliver ourselves up to the blind guidance of what we do not know; but rather let us be governed by what we do know, or might know, if we would consult our reason. We ought to know, that it is our duty to settle this question of representation without influence from imaginary dangers. We ought to know that the Legislature of Virginia would never incur the risk of losing its whole representation in Congress, by electing all its members in direct violation of the State Constitution; that they would never incur the reproach of mankind by so palpable a violation of duty. We are threatened with another danger, in relation to the Federal Government, from adopting the basis of white population. We are told that if Virginia, the largest Southern State, disregards her slave population, in apportioning representation in the State Legislature, it will weaken the argument, by which the Southern States support their right to representation for that property, in the Government of the United States, and may endanger the loss of power, which that representation gives us, It should be recollected, that the power which this population gives us, in the General Government, does not rest upon argument, but upon compact-was not allowed us upon principle, but upon compromise-and cannot be taken away from us, but by a total departure from the spirit of the compromise and an amendment of the compact agreed to by three-fourths of the States, in the Union-and the gentleman from Loudoun (Mr. Mercer) has shown how utterly impracticable any such amend ment would be. But, Sir, this argument, that the slave population was not regarded in the representation of those States where slavery existed, was in full force when the Constitution of the United States was adopted-it was then urged and repelled. The argument is noticed, in the fifty-fourth number of Publius. The fact on which it rests is admitted, and the argument ably repelled by a clear exposition of "the compromising expedient of the Constitution"-" which regards the slave as divested of two-fifths of the man." By adopting the basis of white population, then, we furnish to our adversaries no new and fearful argument-but we leave the old refu ted argument in the quiet grave which has covered it for forty years. We come now to consider this question, with reference to the protection of property. By adopting the basis of white population, shall we expose to danger that peculiar property, in which the Eastern districts have so deep an interest? I am perfectly satisfied, Mr. Chairman, that you would more effectually protect this property by granting us the simple basis, than by imposing on us the compound basis, proposed by the gentleman from Culpeper. Let us attentively and impartially examine this question. The whole danger apprehended, rests upon the supposition, that the basis of white population will carry the power of the Government into the hands of those, who will be, comparatively, but little interested in this property: And if it can be shown, that this supposition is not correct, then it must be admitted, that the danger is unreal. I do not believe that it is correct-and will submit to your candid consideration, the reason of that opinion. I have already shown you, that taking the Auditor's estimates of the present population, and apportioning the representation according to the whole white population, there would be a majority of eight members in the House of Delegates, on the East of the Blue Ridge; and apportioning it according to the qualified voters, there would probably be a majority of twenty. If the basis of qualified voters should be adopted, there is no definite period of time, within the present century or the next, at which any person could say, with confidence, that this majority of twenty would be overcome, by the increasing population of the West. Indeed, it is very doubtful whether the majority of qualified voters will ever be West of the Blue Ridge. Any one, who will carefully examine this subject, in his closet, with reference to the tables of population; the number of square miles in each district; the quantity of mountain and arable land in each; their capacity to sustain population; their distance from market; the probable growth of their towns; the pursuits of their people, whether commercial, manufacturing, or agricultural; planting, farming, or grazing; will, I think, be satisfied, that if that time should ever come, it is too distant to have the least influence on our deliberations. The period is not so distant when the majority of the white population, will probably be West of the Blue Ridge; but when that period will arrive, is exceedingly uncertain. The tables of population show us, that the relative increase of the different districts, heretofore, has been very irregular; and we shall find our calculations of their future increase, in a great measure conjectural. The ratio of increase of the white population, from the year 1790 to the present time, appears by these tables, to be as follows: In the first district, from 1790 to 1800 83 3-4 per cent. 2 per cent. 5 1-2 per cent. Thus you see, that in the Western district, the ratio having decreased between the years 1790, and 1820, from 834 per cent. to 27-appears by the Auditor's estimate to have risen in the last nine years, to 36 1-5 per cent. which is equivalent to 40 per cent. for ten years-this may be owing to some error in the Auditor's estimate, or it may perhaps be accounted for, upon the supposition that emigration from that district diminished, within the last nine years, and migration to it increased. It is certainly, however, not according to the usual course of things, that the ratio of increase in a newly settled country should rise, as the population becomes more dense. You will observe, that the Valley district having remained nearly stationary for ten years from 1800 to 1810, increased 113 per cent. for the next ten years, and 14 2-5 per cent. for the last nine: that the middle district remaining ne rly stationary for twenty years, from 1800 to 1820, appears to have increased upwards of 5 per cent. for the last nine; and that the tide-water district being nearly stationary for twenty years from 1790 to 1810, increased in the next ten years 5 per cent., and in the last nine, about 2 per cent. There can be no doubt, that these irregularities proceed in a great degree from the difference of emigration from all the districts in the State, fast diminishing, as the Western States and territories are becoming populous, and Western lands rising in price. The time, therefore, is probably not distant when the increase of our population will be left chiefly to its natural causes, and when the ratio in each district will be nearly the same. I have made a calculation of the prole ble white population of the several districts, in the year 1850, upon the supposition, that the Auditor's estimates are correct, that the Western district will increase 20 per cent. for the next ten years, and 10 per cent. for the succeeding ten; that the Valley district will increase 10 per cent. for each period of ten years; and that the two Eastern districts will increase 5 per cent. for each period of ten years. The result of this calculation is, that in the year 1850, the white population of the Western district, would be about 234,000-that of the Valley 167,000 of the middle district 217,000—and the tide-water district 178,000—giving to the West of the Blue Ridge, about 406,000, and to the East, about 395,000. This I am persuaded is a calculation more liberal to the West than they are entitled to, and it results in giving them a small majority of white population in 1850. From thence. forward they can have no reason to expect that their population would increase more rapidly than that of the East. Look for a moment at the comparative extent of the two districts, and at some of the causes which would affect the increase of their population. The two districts West of the Blue Ridge, contain 38,896 square miles :-the two East of the Ridge, contain 26,774 square miles. Considering the vast extent of mountains beyond the Blue Ridge, it would be giving to the West a most liberal estimate of its arable lands, to suppose them equal in quality to the arable lands East of the mountains. Reflect, then, on the circumstance, that the whole lands of the East must be always employed in planting and farming, while a very large proportion of those of the West, the whole extensive district from the North Mountain to the Western boundary, with the exception only of those narrow valleys which lie convenient to the navigable waters, must for ages to come, be in the hands of the grazier :-recollect too, that if we should ever have large towns and extensive manufactories, they will seek the marts of foreign commerce, and probably be found about the falls of the Eastern rivers-and I think you will find strong reason to believe, that the Eastern side of the mountain will always maintain a greater population than the West, and can never be much inferior to it in white population. I h heard it said, that the Eastern districts contain already, nearly as much population as they could sustain. Nothing can be more erroneous. The middle district counting all its inhabitants, has a population of about twenty-eight, and the tidewater district, a populatiof about thirty-two, to the square mile. Compare this with the population of older countries. In 1811, Scotland had a population of about sixty-four-Wales, seventy-nine-England, one hundred and ninety-six, to the square mile-France, about the beginning of this century, had a population of one hundred and seventy-nine, to the square inile. Can any one doubt, that the country between the Blue Ridge and the ocean, is capable of sustaining more population than Scotland or Wales:-and can any good reason be assigned, why it may not be as populous as England or France? If I am right in my estimate of the future progress of white population, and we can be satisfied, that in the course of twenty years, there will be a few populous counties beyond the mountains, essentially slave-holding counties, having a kindred interest with the East, in the good government of that property, and its exemption from unjust burthens, then you have assurance that the basis of white population will not carry the power of the Government, into unfriendly hands. Referring again to our tables, we find that the tide of slave population has been setting strongly to the West, and that it is now swelled to its greatest height, at the very base of the Blue Ridge: That in due time, it will find its level through the passes of that mountain, there can be little reason to doubt. We have seen by |