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of opinion, so natural to man; and am ready to abandon these resolutions the moment I shall be convinced of their fallacy. To have committed, and to have proclaimed, what shall afterwards prove to have been an error in judgment, is a venial offence; an offence, fully expiated by the mortification of confessing it (which I am ready to endure :) but to persist after the judgment is convinced of its error, is an unpardonable sin.

Four of the resolutions refer to the elective franchise: by the leave of the House, I will read them.

[Here Mr. T. read the first four resolutions.]

The Committee will perceive that all these several propositions grow out of one principle, and refer but to one object, the elective franchise, and the mode in which it is to be exercised. Permit me to preface what I have to say respecting them, by a very few general remarks.

All our institutions, whether State or Federal, in their character, are founded in the assumption of three political truths: 1. That a free Government is the best calculated to promote human happiness, if not universally in all countries and in all times, at least in the American States: 2. That the sovereignty resides, of right, and in fact, in the people: 3. That the best mode of administering Government is by agents, instead of the people personally. I shall not stay to enquire whether these assumptions be false or true: I do not indeed, for myself, hesitate to declare my unqualified belief that they are consonant with all the, dictates of reason and of truth; and I believe that I express the sentiments of every individual in this Convention, when I make the declaration. But I allude not to these principles, either to justify or to condemn them; I only call the attention of the Committee to the fact, that all our institutions rest on these great principles of Representative Republics: Republican in this, that they repose the sovereignty solely in the people: Representative in this, that that sovereignty shall be exercised through the administration of agents, of representatives; and not personally, by the people. Nor is it my intention to enquire who are the people, in whom this sovereignty is supposed to reside? Some gentlemen think that they include every individual in the community, without regard to age or sex: others maintain that the people are, all who fight and pay; all who defend their country in the hour of peril, or contribute to supply its purse in "the piping times of peace :" while others, again, insist, that "people" means those only on whom the Constitution confers the right of exercising political power! (I used a wrong word; I will correct the language; I should have said not those on whom the Constitution confers, but in whom it recognizes the right of exercising political power.) Gentlemen may entertain as many different opinions on this point as they please; I meddle not with them now; the resolutions do not even approach these opinions. On the contrary, they pre-suppose that the Constitution has already determined by whom the elective franchise is to be exercised, and only attempt to regulate the mode of its action. The principle of the resolutions is as applicable to one suffragan (I know not if the term be strictly proper,) to one voter, as to another; and will be equally just, whether you shall adopt the plan of freehold suffrage, or any other, in its stead.

it;

I have made these general remarks with a view of shewing that the elective franchise is an essential part of our system; that it furnishes the mode, and the only mode, whereby effect can be given to the principle of representative administration. The elective franchise looks to two objects: first, the persons who are to exercise that is, suffrage: secondly, to the effect of suffrage; that is, representation. Suffrage, then shall it be uniform throughout the State? or shall it be diverse in divers parts of the State? so that, one man shall have a right in one part of the State, which, in circumstances exactly similar, shall not be enjoyed by another, in a different part of the State? This question, it is the purpose of the first resolution to settle. The Bill of Rights declares that all elections shall be free: I would farther add "and shall be uniform." Convenience recommends it. It will avoid the confusion of having different rules in different places; rules local and personal; instead of universal and uniform. Justice and equal rights require it. There can be no departure from the rules of uniformity, without conferring on some, immunities and privileges which are denied to others, in direct opposition to two other articles in this same Bill of Rights. The propriety of inserting such a resolution in your Constitution, arises from the fact, that the present Constitution has not so provided; but, on the contrary, establishes the very reverse. Its basis of representation, is the possession of freehold. In this, its rule may have been thought uniform; but there are portions of the State, in which the Constitution establishes a local rule, applying to that portion alone. In West Augusta, the existing Constitution recognized the right in “landholders" who were not freeholders. West Augusta, at the time the Constitution was adopted, comprehended a large extent of territory, from which many counties have since been formed. It then formed a barrier against Indian warfare; and their titles, founded on occupancy only, were held by the tenure of the rifle, and not by parchment. There were others, who were incapable of perfecting their title by the

existing law. In 1752, it was the policy of the Colony, to erect a barrier against the Indians, on our western frontier. With a view to this object, we invited within our boundary "foreign Protestants;" aliens, who could neither hold nor transmit lands. So, in the Borough of Norfolk, and in the City of Williamsburg, the right of suffrage was extended to individuals, in a manner different from what it is in the other portions of Virginia. These rights I hope to see extended to others similarly situated. The object of my resolution is, to remove these anomalies, and to establish one law, and one rule, for all who enjoy the privilege of voting at all. To establish such uniform rule, is the only object of the first resolution.

Suffrage being established, whether uniform or diverse, another enquiry presents itself of great delicacy and importance. What shall be the effect of suffrage? I mean not as it regards representation, but as between the voters themselves. Are all to be units? all of alike value? or, will you graduate the votes given? Will you regu late their value by the excess of the property the voter may own, over and above the standard which you shall have erected?

The resolution proposes, when you have fixed the qualification to be possessed by all voters, to make all the votes equel, without regard to any disparity of fortune among the voters and I pray the House to indulge me, while I attempt the development of the principle I advocate, by a particular application of it. But I premonish the House, that I offer an explanation on this subject, not because I suppose there exists among us any diversity of opinion, as to creating this uniformity within the same district. My object is, to ascertain principles, with a view to their ulterior application. Imagine a county containing three hundred qualified voters; of these, two hundred and fifty vote for A; the remaining fifty vote for B? Tell me which ought to be the representative of that county? The question may seem strange. Yet the House will perceive, that the decision of this question depends upon another, viz: whether you will graduate the votes given by the wealth of the voters, or whether you will make all the voters count as units, all of equal value. For explanation? Suppose of the two hundred and fifty voters for A, each owns a freehold worth one hundred dollars, and that the fifty who vote for B, besides possessing this qualification, own besides, each a large estate, say worth one thousand dollars. If numbers are to elect, A is elected, by five to one: but, if wealth is to elect, if property is to be taken into view, not merely for the safety, but for the effect of elections, then B is elected; fifty thousand dollars is on B's side; but twenty-five thousand dollars on A's. If numbers elect, A is chosen, five to one; if wealth, then B is chosen, two to one. But, suppose you adopt a compound ratio, produced by multiplying wealth into numbers; what will then be the result? While A gets but twenty-five thousand two hundred and fifty, B gets fifty thousand and fifty. So that the result is still precisely the same; the effect is just what it would have been, if reference had been had to wealth alone.

Perhaps I may be told, this is a subject about which it is impossible for gentlemen to differ. Excuse me : it is the subject on which alone there is any great difference of opinion in the House. For the contemplated ratio, the compound of numbers and taxation; so earnestly insisted on as the true basis of representation, is neither more nor less, however it may be disguised, than this very thing. Let me imagine an argument on this subject. Let me suppose the question between A's right and B's to come up here, and you to be the umpires between them; and then let me endeavour to imagine the argument in behalf of B, (having fifty votes.) The advocates of B would tell you that Government was formed chiefly, if not solely, for the protection of property: That there is a natural, inherent enmity between capital and labour: That the contest is interminable between persons and wealth, (for, strip the subject of the mystification, by which it is usually surrounded, and labour and capital mean no more!) That the two hundred and fifty voters who voted for A, though individually honest, are, through the ignorance and infirmity of human nature, not worthy of being intrusted with political power: Will they not appeal to experience, and insist that that touch-stone has tried what the nature of man is, and has decided that when the many possess the power of exercising rapine upon the few, it has ever followed that they exercise such power and commit the depredation: That, if the Government were so constituted as to give the power of representation by numbers only, and so admit the two hundred and fifty to elect their representative, the effect would be, that as he would be bound to obey his constituents, the rapine would still take place, with this only difference, that it would be accomplished by the forms of legislation, instead of force, without any form at all: That there can be no guarantee against the effect: That the guarantee afforded by the power of law, the sanctity of the Constitution, and the force of moral principle, however they may be found sufficient for the protection of life and of reputation, prove totally inadequate as a safeguard for property: That the only effectual, only sufficient guarantee, is to give to the fifty votes for B more effect than the two hundred and fifty votes for A: That, in a word, the only means of guarding property is to place the power of Government in the hands

of those who possess most property? Would not these be the topics of argument by which the cause of B would be advocated on this floor?

It is not my purpose to fatigue the Committee or occupy its time by giving, in reply, the answers which might be adduced in A's behalf. This question is settled in the mind of every gentleman in the Convention: it is settled by the general sentiment of this nation: by the deep, the universal, and, I trust, the changeless feeling, which attaches us all to our free and happy institutions; a feeling which has its source in the conviction of the equality they maintain among the citizens of the Republic, and the justice which flows from that equality.

If I am right in this, can the House have any difficulty in adopting the resolution ? What does it ask? Nothing but what, in the practical administration of the Government, already actually exists: But it proposes to give a Constitutional sanction to what does indeed exist in fact, but which the Constitution does no where guarantee and secure. I pray you to refer to the existing Constitution. I say, that although in fact equality of suffrage does exist, it rests on sufferance merely. I wish it not only to exist, but to have a Constitutional consecration.

The only clause in the Constitution which bears upon the subject is this brief sentence: "The right of suffrage shall remain as it is exercised at present." I would not be hypercritical in examining this declaration; but to me it does appear to provide against taking away any rights already possessed and exercised, and not to regulate the equality of suffrage among the voters. All it prohibits is the stripping those of the right of suffrage, who now hold it; no more: it does not take from the Legislature the power of determining the relative effect of votes between the voters themselves. Yet, surely in a matter of such vital importance, nothing ought to be left to doubt and uncertainty. If the existing Constitution does what this resolution purports to do, all the effect of the resolution will be to confirm the declaration of the Constitution but if it does not, then this resolution will supply the deficiency, and it is proper that the question should be settled now. Such are some of the considerations which unite to recommend the adoption of this resolution.

There are two others, the third and fourth, which have reference to representation ; that is, to the effect of the electice franchise, when exerted.

The third resolution seems to be only a corollary from the first: it affirms, especially as now modified, nothing more than that the uniformity of individual suffrage shall be extended to its effect, that is, to representation.

The fourth resolution is nothing more than a corollary to the second. It is only the expansion and application of the same principle to representation, which is proposed to the voters themselves: i. e. that representation shall be uniform, that like numbers shall confer like rights of representation, without regard to the disparity of fortune which may exist in the aggregate.

One would think there could be no difficulty in admitting a conclusion like this. Representation is but the effect of a number of suffrages. If, then, the suffrages are all equal, it would seem perfectly plain that equal numbers of equal suffrages should produce an equal aggregate amount; and so equal representation. Would any gentleman here hesitate to adopt such a principle, except in a particular mode of its ope

ration?

I stated a case supposed to exist in one county. Now imagine the same case to exist in every county. Is there any reason why fifty voters should outvote two hundred and fifty in one county rather than in another? Locality cannot alter right. If fifty voters are to do this in the county of Norfolk, then fifty voters should do the same in the county of Brooke; and in every other county in the State. There is no difference of opinion as to making the effect equal within any one county or district. On this, all are agreed. Where, then, does the difficulty arise in assenting to the principle? When you consider its operation not within any district, but between different districts, then only do gentlemen differ from me. But shall any one district, by any arrangement whatever, introduce a principle which you all repudiate within a county? Shall it give an effect to property when in extensive combinations, which is denied to property in a more limited field? Suppose you divide your district into three counties, containing each nine hundred voters. There is not one gentleman here who will hesitate to say, that a majority of qualified voters shall give the rule of election within each of these counties. But suppose, again, that in laying out your district boundary, you take the other rule, and say that property shall elect: what will the operation of such a principle be?

.

But the proposed compound ratio wholly disregards this principle of equality of right in the organization of districts. Let me illustrate this:

Three counties in Eastern Virginia, such as I have described before, are

formed into a district, and the nine hundred qualified voters become entitled to one representative. In another part of the State, nine hundred other qualified voters claim similar representation. But it is found that in

the first district the nine hundred voters pay each say $1 tax, And that there are one hundred and fifty persons among the nine hundred who pay beyond the others the sum of

Making an aggregate of taxes

The other nine hundred persons who claim a representative, are also (like the seven hundred and fifty of the first district) all qualified voters, and pay $1 each,

Leaving a difference of

$ 900 600

$1,500

900

600

This difference is wholly produced by the superior wealth of the one hundred and fifty persons in the first district. To equalize the district, the compound ratio proposes to throw a qualified voter into the scale to counterbalance this wealth.

Thus, then, said he, one county will contain nine hundred men, the other fifteen hundred; you add six hundred men to make up for the difference of property. And is the evil less, because it is disguised? Disguise it as you will, this is not equal representation; and if the principle of all our free Republican institutions cries out against fifty men electing a candidate against two hundred and fifty in a single county, why not in more extended portions of the State? You give to wealth in a district a power you refuse to it in a county, though the district is but a collection of counties. While there, it lies dormant; exerts no power at all: but the moment you go beyond the county line, it then receives vigour and effect; I fear, a pernicious vigour, and an effect fatal to freedom. Pray, let me be understood. I disclaim, in these remarks, the least possible disrespect toward gentlemen, who differ from me in sentiment: but in my judgment it is an oligarchical principle; it gives the minority power to control the majority, although admitted to be equal participants in political power. And, if you would consider this as an oligarchical principle, if introduced into counties, I conjure you to consider how you give to wealth, when in large masses, what you refuse it in the elements of which those very masses are all composed. If the principle be wrong in itself, it is only the more dangerous from being concealed. The danger which I know, courage may enable me to brave, or skill to elude; but if the danger approach unseen, if it assails me unwarned and unprepared, it only the more certainly destroys. Masses of men act with an effect not in exact proportion to their numbers. The effect increases more rapidly than the number. A single grain of gunpowder may explode in a lady's boudoir, without producing any effect sufficient to wave one of her lightest plumes; but when aggregated masses of those grans are exploded, castles topple to their foundations, and towers fall before its resistless power. Do not say the principle is harmless, because it operates on masses only as you aggregate men into masses, instead of diminishing, you increase the mischief. I say that this principle, of giving the power to wealth, corrupts and vitiates the very persons it is intended to benefit. The safety of our free institutions, consists in the profound conviction of their justice and equality of operation. Destroy this conviction; weaken it; lead the people to doubt the salutary operation of those principles, and what will be the result? You have taken the first step in the downward road that has conducted all the free nations in the world, first to faction; then to convulsions; and finally to the sword, and a monarch, for protection. Oh, then, let no consideration induce us to weaken, in the slightest degree, that feeling of sacred regard towards free institutions, which is the best safeguard of their perpetuity. When you say, that nine hundred men in one district, and fifteen hundred men in another, shall have but the same representation in the Government, you bribe and tempt the honest simplicity of your fellow-citizens, to commit a fraud upon their brethren. You make them the instruments, willing instruments, if you please, by winch the influence of property is brought to bear upon political power and civil liberty. Thus, you prepare them more readily to yield, whenever the influence of wealth, within their own county, shall advance its claims to the same power, it enjoys without the county line.

Men of property within all our counties, are deeply interested in this question. Let me remind such men, that the Chieftain in the border war who tempted their kinsmen and retainers, to pass the line and foray for spoil upon the land of their neighbours, destroyed their loyalty, corrupted their fidelity, lost their attachment; and a last have been actually compelled to pay black-mail to their own vassals for protection. We are all interested in preserving the great principles of Republican freedom: Men of property not less than others: It is to these principles that our most valuable institutions owe their being and preservation, and our people their national happiness. Give me leave to ask of gentlemen one question. Representation; what is it? It is the effect of suffrage. Suffrage is the cause, representation the effect: Suffrage is the parent, representation only its offspring. What then ought to follow? What ought the relation to be between the cause and its result? What the similitude between parent and child? Should there be no family likeness? No correspondence between him

who represents, and him who confers the power of representation? Is there to be in the Delegate no principle of resemblance to the individual who sends him? Surely the representative is but the mirror, which, if true, throws back the just image of the voters who gave him his place. Representation, to be perfect, must throw back such an image of the people represented, in all their proportions, features, and peculiarities. I hope gentlemen will excuse me for a remark, which may not correspond with their views and feelings; but to me it appears inconceivable, how there can be a representatire without constituents: and how can there be constituents, without power to delegate? How can a man be a constituent, and him he creates not be his delegate. Property cannot vote; it cannot delegate power; and yet we are told that it is to have a representative. The roter surely, and the voter only is the representative, when we speak of representatives.

I hope, said Mr. T. that the Committee will perceive, that I have had no other object hitherto but merely to explain the nature and the effect of the resolutions I have proposed; that I am offering but little argument; relying as I do upon their own innsic truth. I have purposely avoided all answer to the objections, which may be urged against them: and I am led to adopt this course by two considerations: First, my object in only explaining, is that the undivided attention of the House might be drawn to the principles themselves: but I have another reason; I thought it decorous, fair and honorable, to allow to gentlemen who differ from me in sentiment, the advantage of presenting their own views in their own form; that those views may produce their entire effect upon the House. If in the progress of debate, it shall become necessary, I may pray the House to indulge me in reviewing the most important objections, when they shall have been made; and in fortifying my original resolutions, if I shall be able. To my course in this respect, there is but one exception; and that has reference to the fifth resolution :

[Here Mr. T. read the resolution.]

It refers to taxation; and I will own that I introduced it in connexion with the other subjects for the purpose of asserting what the true principle of taxation is; but I combined this principle of taxation, with the resolutions respecting representation, to show that one should have no influence in regulating the other. The one looks to property only; the other to qualified voters only. In the resolution, a proposition is affirmed in the first member of it; then, a fact is affirmed; and the last clause is an inference from the two, though not in strict syllogistic form. Some may think the premises are false; but none will deny that it is unjust to require each citizen chargeable with taxes, to pay an equal amount. What would be the effect of such a principle! Evidently this; that in time of foreign war or domestic need, be the exigencies of the State what they may, no greater sum can be raised by taxation, than the amount which the very poorest man in the community is required to pay, multiplied by the total number of the citizens of the State. You can lay nothing more on the richest man, than on the poorest; if each is to pay an equal sum; and thus the wealth of its citizens would be totally useless and unproductive to the Commonwealth, though the Republic be in danger.

Whence does the obligation to public contribution arise? Whence but from the consideration that each individual is bound to pay to the public for the protection of his property. The Government itself, I mean by its moral as well as physical force, is in fact the underwriter of all the property in the community; and each individual should pay for the general protection in proportion to the risk incurred; that is, according to the amount of property he has to be insured. The principle is founded in the eternal nature of justice; which requires that contribution should be in proportion to the good received. I think that even if my resolution should be convicted of false logic, and that neither the major nor the minor members of the syllogism were true, and that the conclusion did not follow; still, the proposition itself, contained in the conclusion, must be acknowledged by all to be true and evident. None doubts the fact, that property is unequally distributed; nor do I see how any can deny the principle, that each man ought to pay to the State in proportion to his ability to pay. "I do not say in proportion to his capital, or to the profits upon his capital; but in proportion to his "ability to pay." I put the proposition in the broadest terms: and in such a form as will apply to any system of political economy, gentlemen may respectively think fit to adopt.

If the ground I have taken, be tenable, then we have arrived at the true sources of representation and taxation; they are not two twin streams, which have their common source in the same distant glen; which chance may have separated for a time, and which afterwards re-unite: they issue from different fountains; flow to different oceans, and never can be united but by some power which perverts the object for which nature destined them. When you look to representation, you look to men : when you look to taxation, you look to the ability to pay, and to the property from which this payment is to be made.

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