fer no other right than this: the right in every creature to use the powers derived from nature, in such mode as vedet Is Wit imppiness. it uus be not the law of nature, she is certainly but little obeyed in any of the living departments of her empire. Throughout her boundless domain, the law of force gives the only re of right. The lion devours the ox; the ox drives the lamb from the green pasture; the lamb exerts the same law of power over the animal that is weaker and more tim than itself; and thus the rule runs, throughout all the gradations of life, until at la the worm devours us all. But, if there be another law independent of force, whe a gives to a greater number a right to control a smaller number, to what consequence does it lead? Gentlemen must themselves admit, that all men are by nature equal, for this is the very foundation of their claim of right in a majority. If this be so, each individual has his rights, which are precisely equal to the rights of his fellow. But the right of a majority to rule, necessarily implies a right to impose restraints, in some form or other; either upon the freedom of opinion or the freedom of action. And what follows? Each one of three, enjoys the same rights with each ong ---of four, and yet it is gravely said, that because four is a majority of the seven, th majority has a right to restrain, to abridge, and consequently, to destroy all the rigias of the lesser number. That is to say, while all are by nature equal, and all derive from nature the same rights in every respect, there shall yet be a number, only one less than a majority of the whole, who may not by the law of nature possess any rights at all'

If, Sir, it be possible to carry our minds back to such a state of existence, let us sup一十 pose that the wild children of nature are for the first time, assembling together for the purpose of forming a social compact. Each one of them would bring with him all the rights which he derived from nature, and among these rights, would be found the right to say whether a majority should rule him or not. And, suppose a civil compact should be entered into by every member of the savage assembly, save one, Is that one bound by what the rest have determined? If he has originally a right to say whether he will agree to the compact or not, at what time does that right cease to exist, and by what authority is it taken away? Until the compact is formed, there is no majority in existence; and after it is formed, he is no party to it; and therefore not bound by its majority.

Again.-How is this majority to be ascertained? Who shall appoint the tellers, and who shall announce on which side the majority is? All these are necessary operations, without which the idea of a majority, is indeed, an abstraction;" and yet these very operations presuppose a degree of order and arrangement inconsistent with a state of nature, and which cannot exist except in a state of society.

Again-Within what limits is this majority to act? Is it a majority of the whole world, or only of a part of it? If of the whole world, then two millions of savages who range the forests of America, may prescribe the law to one million who inhabit the Asiatic Islands; two millions who live by hunting the elk and the buffa oe with a bow and arrow, have authority to say that one million, among whom these animals of the chase may not be found, shall not draw their subsistence from the ocean which surrounds them! Is this the law of nature? Has the Creator really ingrafted upon the nature of man, a principle which gives sanction to such monstrous cruelty and in-, justice?

But suppose, instead of looking to the whole world, you limit your majority to particular districts of it. It is impossible to do this, according to any fixed rule, except by supposing that the world is divided into separate and distinct communities, possessing separate and distinct interests. And this is precisely what we understand by a state of society, as contradistinguished from a state of nature; and of course, the majority which is to be found there, is not the majority which the proposition supposes. But again. If nature really gives this right to a majority; if as the clear-minded gentleman from Frederick (Mr. Cooke) supposes, there be impressed upon us by nature, a principle of this sort, which is mandatory upon us, and which we are not at liberty to disregard, in what does the right consist? Is it in mere numbers? If so, every creature must be counted, men, women and children; the useless as well as the useful; the drone who lives upon the industry of others, as well as the most profitable member of the human family. The law of nature knows no distinction between these classes, and indeed, one of the very postulates on which gentlemen rely, is that "all are by nature equal." In point of rights, nature does not own any distinction of age or sex. Infancy has equal rights with nature age; and surely it does not consist with the gallantry of the present day, to say that the ladies are not at least the equals of ourselves. Nay, more Sir, nature as strongly disowns all invidious distinctions in complexion: in her eye, there is no difference between jet and vermilion, A distinction does indeed prevail here, Sir, and a wide one it is. But the same rule of taste would not answer in Africa; for the African paints the devil white. According to your rule of numbers, all these various classes and descriptions of persons must count. And if so, what estimate have gentlemen themselves put upon their

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own rule? If in the estimate of numbers, all are counted, why exclude any from the right of suffrage? Why are not women, and children, and paupers, admitted to the polls? The rule, even if it exists in nature, is worth nothing, unless its fair analogies will hold in a state of society. And how can gentlemen venture to limit themselves to white population alone, and yet found their claim on a law of nature which knows no distinction between white and black? By their rule, we are entitled to representation of every slave in our land; and if they will give us this, we shall dispute with them no longer. The majority will then be with us. God forbid, Sir, that I should propose this seriously. I am as ready as any gentleman here, to disclaim every idea of the sort. I use the argument only to shew to what consequences this demand, founded on a supposed law of nature, must inevitably conduct us. Gentlemen may not claim the benefit of a rule, which will not bear to be pushed to its legitimate results; a rule which they themselves are compelled to abandon, at the very first step which they take into practical Government.

If then, there be no inherent virtue in numbers which confers this right, in what else does it consist? I have heard elsewhere, of another ground on which gentlemen have been pleased to rest it, and it is now distinctly announced by the able gentleman from Frederick. It is physical power. I do not understand the gentleman from Fre derick in the objectionable sense, of which his language was probably susceptible. He did not mean that this power in a majority would or ought to be applied, in the actual Government; it is impossible to attribute to the clear head and sound principles of that gentleman, any meaning so uncourteous as a threat. I understood him, as he meant to be understood, in this sense only: Every law implies the necessity of some sanction; force is the only sanction in the case before us, and as this force is presumed to reside in the greatest degree, in a majority, it follows that a majority only can apply the sanction, and of course that a majority ought to give the law.

Here, Sir, we are under the necessity of looking back upon the preceding proposi tion. From what sources are we to derive this majority? I have endeavored to shew that by nature, all are equal and possess equal rights. Then women and children must be counted here also, as well as men. Now, we learn from good authority, that throughout the universe, the sexes rank to each other as thirteen and fourteen. Suppose then, the females to be all ranged on one side of the question, with a few children in their laps, and a few superannuated and decrepid men, at their sides. They may thus very well constitute a majority of the whole number; but will the physical power be with them? No Sir. That power has ever been found with personal strength, and intrepidity and skill. These qualities have at all times, and in all places, been an overmatch for mere undisciplined numbers. Here then is a case in which the majority do not possess the power of applying the sanction; and of course, the right to rule, which is supposed to follow the sanction, is in this case, with the minority. The case is quite as apt to occur, and quite as easy to be supposed, as that state of existence to which it refers, and from which gentlemen borrow their argument. And the necessary conclusion, upon the hypothesis assumed, is, that in one state of things a majority may have a right to rule, and in another state of things a minority may have that right; and this too, by the very same fixed and uniform law

of nature!

To such absurdities are we inevitably driven when we attempt to apply principles deduced from a state of nature, to a state of society; a state which pre-supposes that nature with all her rights and all her laws, has been shaken off! Indeed, Sir, the whole reasoning is fallacious, because it is founded on a state of things which in all probability, never had existence at all. It goes back to a state prior to all history, and about which we know nothing beyond mere conjecture. The first accounts which we have of man, are of man in a social state. Wherever he has been found, and however rude his condition, he has been bound to his fellows by some form of association, in advance of a state of nature. If we may indulge any conjecture upon such a subject, the pro ility is that he was first urged into society, by a strong feeling of property implanted in his nature; by a feeling that he had, or at least, that he ought to have, a better title than another, to whatever his own labour had appropriated. The necessity of securing this right and protecting him in the enjoyment of it, in all probability, first suggested the idea of the social compact. Although property therefore, is strictly speaking the creature of society, yet a feeling of property was proba bly its creator. The result would be, that at the very moment that two human beings first came together, the social compact was formed. And gentlemen have fallen into another error also, of a kindred nature. They build their systems upon the notion of an abstract equality, for which there is no warrant in any thing we know of the history of man. Sir, I am about to use a borrowed idea; but it is valuable for its truth, and perfectly applicable to the subject. The first account that we have of man, is that contained in the Bible; and how will this notion of original equality stand, when tested by that orthodox book? Adam was the first of created beings;

Eve was created next: and the very fiat which brought her into existence, subjected her to the dominion of her husband. Here then was no equality. Cain was the first born of men, and at what period did he become the equal of his father? Was it at the moment of his birth, while he was yet scarcely conscious of his own existence, a helpless dependent upon the care of his parents? And if not then, at what age did this equality first attach? Was it at ten, or fifteen, or twenty-five, or thirty-five years of age? Where is the law, or the doctrine of nature, which enables us to say with certainty and precision, at what age the child becomes the equal of his father? Sir, the true meaning of the equality of men, as applicable to this subject, was happily expressed by the gentleman from Culpeper (Mr. Green) when he said that" all men are so far equal by the law of nature, that when they enter into a state of society, no one can claim a natural right to rule over another." And for the same reason, no ten men can claim a natural right to rule over any nine men.

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The subject, Mr. Chairman, is scarcely worth the examination it has received. I will pursue it no farther, since I have no intention to give you a treatise on natural law, instead of an argument upon the practical subject of Government. I have thought it necessary to go thus far into an examination of the subject, because gentlemen have founded themselves upon what they are pleased to consider an axiom, that there is in a majority, an a priori, inherent and indestructible right to rule a minority, under all circumstances, and in every conceivable condition of things. And one of them at least has been understood by me, as referring this right to the law of nature; a law which he supposes, no society cannot repeal, and which therefore, is of original and universal authority. Surely this is a very great mistake. Nay Sir, there is proof enough before us that gentlemen themselves, who claim this right, and who seek to give it solemnity by referring it to the very law of our being, do not venture to carry it into the details of their own system. If there be a right in a majority of persons or of achite persons, to rule a minority, upon what principle is it that the right of suffrage is restricted? All are counted, in making up the majority; and each one of the majority, ought of consequence, to possess a share in its rights. Why then do you not admit women to the polls? Nature has stamped no such inferiority upon that sex, as to disqualify it under all circumstances, for a safe and judicious exercise of the right of suffrage. And why exclude minors? Infants who have not acquired language, or whose intellects are not sufficiently unfolded to enable them to understand their own actions, may be excluded from the necessity of the case. But at what time, in the ordinary course of nature, do these disabilities cease? Gentlemen say, at the age of twenty-one years. And why so? Not certainly because nature declares it; for the faculties attain maturity at different periods, in different latitudes of the earth. In one latitude we are ripe at sixteen; in another, not until 30; and even among ourselves, we see many, under the age of twenty-one, who possess more wisdom and more power of general usefulness, than can be found in others of fifty; far more than in those who have approached their second childhood. What is! there then, which indicates the precise period of twenty-one years, as the earliest at which these members of the ruling majority, may exercise the rights which belong to them? This, and this only: that the rule which is furnished by nature, is unfit for a state of society, and we are compelled, in our own defence, to adopt an arbitrary rule of our own, which is better suited to our actual condition. There is no one among us so wild and visionary, as to desire universal suffrage; and yet it is perfectly certain that, at the moment when you limit that right, in however small a degree, you depart from the principle that a inajority shall rule. If you establish any disqualification whatever, there is no natural necessity, nor even a moral certainty, that a majority in any given community, will not come within the exception. And this state of things may by possibility, exist within every election district in the Commonwealth and thus you establish a rule, with reference to the entire body, which is rejected in every constituent member of that body. Surely, gentlemen cannot claim the benefit of a principle, which will not bear to be pushed to its practical consequences; a principle which they themselves are obliged to desert as unwise, unsafe and impracticable, in the details of actual Government.

In truth, Mr. Chairman, there are no original principles of Government at all. Novel and strange as the idea may appear, it is nevertheless, strictly true, in the sense in which I announce it. There are no original principles, existing in the nature of things and independent of agreement, to which Government must of necessity conform, in order to be either legitimate or philosophical. The principles of Government, are those principles only, which the people who form the Government, choose to adopt and apply to themselves. Principles do not precede, but spring out of Government. If this should be considered a dangerous novelty in this age of improvement, when all old fashioned things are rejected as worthless; let us test the doctrine by reference to examples. In Turkey, the Government is centered in one man; in England, it resides in King, Lords, and Commons; and in the Republics of the United States, we profess to repose it in the people alone. The principles of all these Governments are essenti

ally different; and yet will it be said that the Governments of Turkey and England are no Governments at all, or not legitimate Governments, because in them, the will of a majority does not give the rule? Or, will it be said, that our own Governments are not legitimate, because they do not conform to the despotic principles of Turkey, nor recognise the aristocracy of England? If there be these original principles at all, we must presume that they are uniform in themselves, and universal in their application. It will not do to say that there is one principle for one place, and another principle for another place. The conclusion resulting from the reasoning of gentlemen will be, that there is one Government in the world which is really a Government, rightful and legitimate; and all other forms of social compact, however long, or however firmly established, are no Governments at all. Every Government is legitimate which springs directly from the will of the people, or to which the people have consented to give allegiance. And I am not going too far, in asserting that Governments are free or otherwise, only in proportion as the people have been consulted in forming them, and as their rulers are directly responsible to them for the execution of their will. It mat ters not what form they assume, nor who are the immediate depositories of political power. It may suit the purposes of the people, as it once suited those of Rome, to invest all authority in a Dictator; and if the people choose this form of Government; if their interest and safety require that they shall submit to it, what original principle is there which renders it illegitimate? If the majority possess all power, they possess the power to surrender their power. And if it be just and wise that they should do so, it is still their own Government, and no one can impugn its legitimacy.

I have thus, Mr. Chairman, endeavored to prove, that there is not in nature, nor even in sound political science, any fundamental principle applicable to this subject, which is mandatory upon us. We are at perfect liberty to choose our own principle; to consult all the circumstances which attend our cordition, and to mould our Government as our interests and necessities may require. We are now to ascertain what rule of representation, those interests and those necessities suggest, as wise, just and expedient.

I admit, as a general proposition, that in free Governments, power ought to be given to the majority; and why? The rule is founded in the idea that there is an identity, though not an equality of interests, in the several members of the body politic: in which case the presumption naturally arises, that the greater number possess the greater interest. But the rule no longer applies, when the reason of it fails. And here we should be careful to remember, that the question does not relate to the administration of an actual Government. It is not contended that the Legislature, when the Government shall go into operation, ought not to adopt the rule of a majority in acts of ordinary Legislation. The question before us, is prior to actual Government: it is not whether a majority shall rule in the Legislature, but of what clements that majority shall be composed. If the interests of the several parts of the Commonwealth were identical, it would be, we admit, safe and proper that a majority of persons only should give the rule of political power. But our interests are not identical, and the difference between us arises from property alone. We therefore contend that property ought to be considered, in fixing the basis of representation.

What, Sir, are the constituent elements of society? Persons and property. What are the subjects of Legislation? Persons and property. Was there ever a society seen on earth, which consisted only of men, women, and children? The very idea of society, carries with it the idea of property, as its necessary and inseparable attendant. History cannot show any form of the social compact, at any time, or in any place, into which property did not enter as a constituent element, nor one in which that element did not enjoy protection in a greater or less degree. Nor was there ever a society in which the protection once extended to property, was afterwards withdrawn, which did not fall an easy prey to violence and disorder. Society cannot exist without property; it constitutes the full half of its being. Take away all protection from property, and our next business is to cut each other's throats. All experience proves this. The safety of men depends on the safety of property; the rights of persons must mingle in the ruin of the rights of property. And shall it not then be protected? Sir, your Government cannot move an inch without property. Are you to have no political head? No Legislature to make laws? No Judiciary to interpret them? No Executive to enforce then? And if you are to have all these departments, will they render their services out of mere grace and favor, and for the honor and glory of the thing? Not in these money loving days, depend on it. If we would find patriotism thus disinterested, we must indeed, go back to a period prior to Bible history. And what are the subjects upon which the law-making power is called to act? Persons and property. To these two subjects, and not to one of them alone, is the business of legislation confined. And of these two, it may be fairly asserted that property is not Tonly of equal, but even of more importance. The laws which relate to our personal actions, with reference to the body politic; which prescribe the duties which we owe to the public, or define and punish crime, are comparatively few in number, and sim

ple in their provisions. And one half of these few find their best sanctions in public opinion. But the ramifications of the rights of property, are infinite. Volume upon volume, which few of us, I fear, are able to understand, are required to contain even the leading principles relating to them, and yet new relations are every day arising, which require continual interpositions of the Legislative power. If then, Sir, property is thus necessary to the very being of society; thus indispensable to every movement of Government; if it be that subject upon which Government chiefly acts; is it not, I would ask, entitled to such protection as shall be above all suspicion, and free from every hazard? It appears to me that I need only announce the proposition, to secure the assent of every gentleman present.

Sir, the obligations of man in his social state are two-fold; to bear arins, and to pay taxes for the support of Government. The obligation to bear arms, results from the duty which society owes him, to protect his rights of person. The society which protects me, I am bound to protect in retura. The obligation to pay taxes, results from the protection extended to property. Not a protection against foreign enemies; not a protection by swords and bayonets merely; but a protection derived from a prompt and correct administration of justice; a protection against the violence, the fraud, or the injustice of my neighbor. In this protection, the owner of property is alone interested. Here, then, is the plain agreement between Government on the one hand, and the tax-paying citizen on the other. It is an agreement which results, of neces sity, from the social compact; and when the consideration is fairly paid, how can you honestly withhold the equivalent? Indeed, gentlemen admit that property is entitled to protection; and that our property is entitled to it, when they offer us guarantees. I shall have occasion to speak of these by and by; at present I will only say, that although they are certainly offered in good faith, they would prove in practice, wholly unavailing.

Let us now inquire of what kind, this protection must be, if we would give it any value. I agree with the gentleman from Culpeper (Mr. Green) that it cannot be any thing short of a direct influence in the Government.

There is one consequence, supposed to result from our doctrine on this subject, which all the gentlemen opposed to us, seem to contemplate with a sort of horror: "What," say they, "will you balance money against the bone and sinew of the country? Will you say that fifty men on this side of the mountain, shall be counted against one hundred and fifty on the other?"

Sir, no man supposes that property should be represented eo nomine; it would be grossly absurd to place a bag of guineas upon your table, and call it a constituent entitled to representation. We do not propose to represent money, but the rights and interests which spring from the possession of money. This is not a metaphysical refinement, an unmeaning distinction. It is easily comprehended, and it ought to remove every shadow of odium from our proposition, considered in this view. If men enter into the social compact upon unequal terms; if one man brings into the partnership, his rights of person alone, and another brings into it, equal rights of person and all the rights of property beside, can they be said to have an equal interest in the common stock? Shall not he who has most at stake; who has, not only a greater inter est, but a peculiar interest in society, possess an authority proportioned to that interest, and adequate to its protection? I certainly do not mean to say, that the right of suf frage in the individual ought to be in proportion to his property; that if a man owning one thousand dollars is entitled to one vote, a man owning two thousand is entitled to two votes. I do not expect to be so understood after the admission which I have already made, in announcing the precise limit to which my proposition extends. Where there is an identity of interest, no difference should be made in the rights of the voter, in consequence of a difference in the extent or degree of that interest. But where there is not this identity; where there are different and distinct interests, existing in masses sufficiently large to form important objects in the Government, (as I shall presently show is the precise case before us,) there the rule emphatically applies. The view which we are now taking, presents a sufficient answer to an argument urged the other day by the eloquent gentleman from Norfolk, (Mr. Taylor.) He told us that representative and constituent were correlative terms: that there could be no notion of a constituent without a power of choice, and that it would be absurd to attribute this power to a mass of metal. Sir, money is in no sense, the constituent. Man is the constituent, and money has no other concern in the matter, than to regulate and graduate the rights and powers, which man, the constituent shall enjoy and exercise. Such a constituent has more interest in the community than another, and therefore he has, a natural right, if gentlemen please; certainly a just right to a greater weight in the management of its concerns.

Here Mr. Upshur gave way for a motion of Mr. Taylor of Norfolk, that the Committee rise. The gentleman, he said, must feel exhausted, and it was not probable that he could finish his very able argument during the present sitting of the Committee: