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with a view, therefore, to the accommodation of the gentleman, as well as to allow the Committee time for further reflection, he moved that it now rise.

The motion prevailed, the Committee rose, and thereupon the Convention immediately adjourned.

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1829.

The Convention met at eleven o'clock, and its sitting was opened with prayer by the Rev. Mr. Sykes, of the Methodist Church.

Mr. Fitzhugh, from the Committee on Compensation, reported, in part, as follows: The Committee appointed to enquire into, and report on the compensation to be allowed the officers of the Convention, have agreed to the following resolution: Resolved, That five dollars per day be allowed each of the Clerks of this Convention, for every day's actual attendance on said Committees. Which was agreed to by the Convention.

On motion of Mr. Doddridge, the Convention then proceeded to the Order of the Day, and again went into Committee of the Whole, Mr. P. P. Barbour in the Chair; and the question still being on the following amendment, proposed by Mr. Green of Culpeper, to the first resolution, reported by the Committee on the Legislative Department of Government, which resolution reads as follows, viz:

Resolved, That in the apportionment of representation, in the House of Delegates, regard should be had to the white population exclusively, viz: to strike out the word "exclusively," and to insert in lieu thereof " and taxation combined."

Judge UPSHUR continued his argument.

Mr. Chairman, I have to express my acknowledgments to the Committee for the indulgence extended to me on yesterday; an indulgence which I should not have asked, had it not been necessary.

And now, it may perhaps, be proper, before entering further into the discussion, that I should recapitulate, and I will do it in as few words as possible, the leading propositions which it has been my object to prove. And I do this only that the continuity of the argument, may be preserved in the minds of such gentlemen as may have been pleased to attend to it. I commenced with the broad proposition that there is no original, abstract, a priori right, in the majority of any community, to control the minority. That if such a right did exist at all, it must be either by positive agreement, or by the law of nature. As it was not pretended that it existed by agreement, I then endeavored to demonstrate that it was not derived from another and a higher source. I admitted as a general proposition, (an abstract proposition, if gentlemen prefer the term,) that it might possibly be a safe general rule, that the majority should govern. But here permit me to remark on the doctrine I subsequently advanced, that the allowing a portion of political power to property, does by no means violate that rule. This may perhaps appear somewhat paradoxical, but it is susceptible of proof, without going very deeply into metaphysics. The question is as to what time the principle shall apply. If it applies only after the Government has been established, then those who established the Government, have already determined in what form the right of the majority shall be exerted; and, if they have said, that the majority which governs shall be constituted in part by wealth, and in part by the number of people, the rule, that the majority shall govern, is not violated. But prior to the existence of any Government, the question is, what rules it is wisest to adopt. I am willing to admit, that after the Government has been established, and put into operation, it is a safe and proper rule, that the will of a majority shall regulate the administration of its affairs; but this admission leaves the question still open, as to the materials of which that majority shall be composed.

I further endeavored to prove, that it was a fair and just principle that property is entitled to protection: first, because it is an important constituent element of society; without it, society could not exist for a moment, and if it did exist, could not move a single inch: Secondly, because, in the operations of Government, as they are concerned in legislation, the most numerous and most interesting class of subjects, on which the power is to be exerted, are all derived from property, and intimately con nected with it. It must, therefore, necessarily receive protection, both in the form, and in the fundamental principles of Government, of which, property is always a part.

I will now proceed to the further development of this part of the subject. Sir, it is worthy of inquiry, in what the principles for which we contend differ from those, in defence of which, our ancestors of the American Colonies, felt themselves authorised to enter into that great and arduous struggle, by which they shook off the yoke of the mother country. What was, in the early days of the Revolution, the topic of

complaint, which filled every mouth, and troubled every heart in these Colonies? It was the attempt to tax the people of the Colonies, without allowing them any voice in the matter. Here, then, is our doctrine already established: a doctrine testified, at the utmost hazard, by all the people of this country, that those who pay the taxes, ought alone to have the power of imposing them. They declared it to be oppression of the very worst kind, that they should be compelled to pay a tax, while they had no voice in imposing it. But why was this doctrine any more true, when applied to America and England, than in its bearing on matters now before us? If it be a dietate of eternal justice, that those who pay a tax ought to have a voice in the imposi tion of it, why is it not as just now, and here, as it was then, and there? This is that protection which property claims, and insists upon: and which it has always enjoyed, under every Government, which has proved either lasting or wise. And why does it require this particular form of protection? In reply, I ask, when you lay a tax, by what rule is it to be imposed? By the ability of the taxed party to pay; and that ability is regulated by the extent of his property. But, who can ascertain the extent of that ability, but the party himself?" What right has another to judge of it? What right has the man who owns no land, to say to his neighbour, " you own a large and splendid farm, well stocked with slaves; you ought to pay a tax of a thousand dollars?" Would you not call it very presumptuous in him to undertake to measure the extent and value of your property, and to fix the price at which you ought to purchase the protection of it from Government? Would you not reply to him, you cannot tell the labour, care and anxiety, attending the possession of this property, nor form any idea at what cost it is, that I derive the little income I receive from this soil. You do not know how small that income is; and would, no doubt, be surprised to learn, that splendid as it seems to you, it does not yield me one half the sum at which you say it ought to be taxed?" And would not this be a fair answer? It is an admitted principle, that property must pay for its own protection; but who can tell what that protection is worth, so well as he who receives it? Another man knows little, or nothing about the matter. He may impose upon it a tax which is greater than its annual income; and if it be an annual tax, the owner would of course rather surrender his property, than consent to pay it.

Again: I must remind the gentlemen, that they have admitted the principle, that property must be protected, and protected in the very form now proposed; they are obliged to admit it. It would be a wild and impracticable scheme of Government, which did not admit it. Among all the various and numerous propositions, lying upon your table, is there one which goes the length of proposing universal suffrage? There is none. Yet this subject is in direct connexion with that. Why do you not admit a pauper to vote? He is a person: he counts one in your numerical majority. In rights strictly personal, he has as much interest in the Government as any other citizen. He is liable to commit the same offences, and to become exposed to the same punishments as the rich man. Why, then, shall he not vote? Because, thereby, he would receive an influence over property; and all who own it, feel it to be unsafe, to put the power of controlling it, into the hands of those who are not the owners. If you go on population alone, as the basis of representation, you will be obliged to go the length of giving the elective franchise to every human being over twenty-one years; yes, and under twenty-one years, on whom your penal laws take effect: an experiment, which has met with nothing but utter and disastrous failure, wherever it has been tried. No, Mr. Chairman: Let us be consistent. Let us openly acknowledge the truth; let us boldly take the bull by the horns, and incorporate this influence of property as a leading principle in our Constitution. We cannot be otherwise consistent with ourselves.

I was surprised to hear the assertion made by gentlemen, on the other side, that property can protect itself. What is the meaning of such a proposition? Is there any thing in property, to exert this self-protecting influence, but the political power which always attends it? Is there any thing in mere property alone, in itself considered, to exert any such influence? Can a bag of golden guineas. if placed upon that table, protect itself? Can it protect its owner? I do not know what magic power the gentlemen allude to. If it is to have no influence in the Government, what and where is its power to protect itself? Perhaps the power to buy off violence; to buy off the barbarian who comes to lay it waste, by a reward which will but invite a double swarm of barbarians to return next year. Is this one of the modes alluded to? This, I am well assured, never entered into the clear mind of the very intelligent gentleman from Frederick (Mr. Cooke.) How else, then, may property be expected to protect itself? It may be answered, by the influence which it gives to its owner. But in what channels is that influence exerted? It is the influence prevents the poor debtor from going against the will of his creditor; which forbids the dependent poor man from exerting any thing like independence, either in conduct or opinion; an influence which appeals to avarice on both sides, and depends for its effect on rousing the worst and basest of passions, and destroying all freedom

which

of will, all independence of opinion. Is it desirable to establish such an influence as this? an influence which marches to power through the direct road to the worst, and most monstrous of aristocracies, the aristocracy of the purse? an influence which derives its effect from the corruption of all principle, the blinding of the judgment and the prostration of all moral feeling? and whose power is built on that form of aristocracy, most of all to be dreaded in a free Government? The gentleman appeals to fact, and says that property always has protected itself, under every form of Government. The fact is not admitted. Property never has protected itself long, except by the power which it possessed in the Government. There may, indeed, exist in some part of the world, a form of Government like that which the gentlemen wish to establish in the amended Constitution, where this influence is excluded; but it there does, it is utterly unknown to me.

Mr. Chairman, I will submit to the gentlemen; not tauntingly, but respectfully, and by way of illustration, this proposition. Will they agree to pay all the taxes and to take all the representation? Sir, they will not accept the offer; nor ought they to accept it: it is not seriously made. But still it may serve in some degree to show how necessary is the connexion between the duty of paying the tax, and the right of imposing it; at the same time that it will indicate the caly point on which we feel alarm. Every view, Mr. Charman, which I am capable of taking of this subject, has led me to the conclusion that property is entitled to its influence in Government. But if this be not true as a genera proposition, it is true as to us.

Gentlemen have fallen into a great error both in their reasoning and in their conclusion, by considering the subject before us, as if we were now for the first time, entering into a social compact. If we stood in the nakedness of nature, with no rights but such as are strictly personal, we should all come together upon precisely equal ground. But such is not the case. We cannot now enter into a new compact upon the basis of original equality; we bring more than our fair proportion, into the common stock. For fifty-four years we have been associated together, under the provisions of an actual Government. A great variety of rights and interests, and a great variety of feelings dear to the heart and connected with those rights and interests, have grown up among us. They have grown up and flourished under a Government which stood pledged to protect them; that Government itself, was but a system of pledges, interchangeably given among those who were parties to it, that all the rights and all the interests which it invited into existence, should be protected by the power of the whole. Under this system, our property has been acquired; and we felt safe in the acquisition, because under the provisions of that system, we possessed a power of self-protection. And by whom was that system ordained? Not indeed, by the saine men who are now here assembled, but by the same community, which is now here represented. It was the people of Virginia who gave us these pledges; and it is the people of Virginia who now claim a right to withdraw them. Sir, can it be fair, or just, or honourable, to do this? The rights and interests which you are now seeking to prostrate, you yourselves invited into being. Under your own distributions of political power, you gave us an assurance that our property should be safe, for you put the protection of it into our own hands. With what justice or propriety then, can you now say to us, that the rights and interests which you have thus fostered until they have become the chief pillars of your strength, shall now be prostrated; melted into the general mass, and be re-distributed, according to your will and pleasure? Nay, Sir, you do not even leave us the option whether to come into your measures or noɔɔt. With all these rights, and all these interests, and all these feelings, we are to be forced, whether willing or unwilling; we are to be forced by the unyielding power of a majority, into a compact which violates them all! Is there not, Sir, something of violence and fraud in this? Gentlemen are too courteous to suppose me capable of charging iniquity of this sort, upon them. They have too just an estimate, both of themselves and of me, to attribute to me so offensive a thought. If I really intended to express it, it might indeed expose me to just censure; but it would be worthless as an argument. I urge this view of the subject, because I feel entirely assured, that if gentlemen can discern either fraud or violence in their measures, they will themselves, be the first to abandon them.

I am sensibl, Sr, that there is nothing in this view of the subject, unless the rights and interests to which I have alluded, are of a peculiar and distinctive character. What then are they? I purposely wave all subjects of minor importance, as too inconsiderable to give any rule. But a peculiar interest, and a great, and important, and leiding interest, is presented in our slaves; an interest which predominates throughout the Eastern divisions of the State, whilst it is of secondary consequence West of the Blue Ridge. And what, let us now inquire, are its claims to consideration?

Will you not be surprised to hear, Sir, that the slave population of Virginia pays 30 per cent. of the whole revenue derived from taxation? Did there ever exist in any community, a separate and peculiar interest, of more commanding magnitude? But

this is not all. It affords almost the whole productive labour of one half of the Commonwealth. What difference does it make whether a certain amount of labour is brought into the common stock, by four hundred thousand slaves, or four hundred thousand freemen? The gain is the same to the aggregate wealth; which is tut another name for the aggregate power, of the State. And here permit me to remark, that of all the subjects of taxation which ever yet existed, this has been the most of pressively dealt with. You not only tax our slaves as property, but you also tax ther labour. Let me illustrate the idea by an example. The farmer who derives his income from the labour of slaves, pays a tax for those slaves, considered as property. With that income so derived, he purchases a carriage, or a horse, and these again aie taxed. You first tax the slave who makes the money, and then you tax the article which the money procures. Is not this a great injustice; a gross inequality? No such tax is laid upon the white labourer of the West, and yet the product of h's labour is of no more importance to the general welfare, than the same product from the labour of slaves. Here then, is a striking peculiarity in our property; a peculiarity which sujects it to double impositions, and which therefore, demands a double security. There is yet Sir, another view of this subject which is not only of importance with reference to the immediate top c under consideration, but which furnishes a strong argument against the change which gentlemen contemplate. One eleventh of the power which we possess in the national councils, is derived from slaves. We obtain that power by counting three-fifths of the whole number, in apportioning representation among the several States. Sir, we live in times of great political changes. Some new doctrine or other is broached almost every day; and it s impossible to foresee what changes in our political condition, a single year may bring about. Suppose a proposition should be made to alter the Constitution of the United States in the particular now under consideration; what could Virginia say, after embracing such a basis as gentlemen propose? Would she not be told by those who abhor this species of property, and who are restive under the power which it confers, "you have abandoned this principle in your own institutions, and with what face can you claim it, in your connexions with us?" What reply could she make to such an appeal as this? Sir, the moral power of Virginia has always been felt, and deeply felt, in all the important concerns of this nation; and that power has been derived from the unchanging consistency of her principles, and her invincible firmness in maintaining them. Is she now prepared to surrender it, in pursuit of a speculative principle of doul tul propriety, at best, and certainly not demanded by any thing in her present condition? If you adopt the combined basis proposed by the amendment, this danger is avoided. You may then reply to the taunting question above supposed, ed our principle; on the contrary, we have extended it. Instead of three-fifths, all our slaves are considered in our representation. It is true, we do not count them as men, but their influence is still preserved, as taxable subjects. The principle is the same, although the modes of applying it may be different. We are not inconsistent with ourselves." To my mind, there is much force in this argument, and I think that the gentlemen opposed to us, to whom the influence of our common State is as dear as it is to us, cannot but feel and acknowledge it. The topic is fruitful of imposing reflections; but I will not pursue it farther.

66 we have not abandon

I have thus endeavored to prove, Mr. Chairman, that whether it be right as a geneprinciple or not, that property should possess an influence in Government, it is certainly right as to us. It is right, because our property, so far as slaves are concernVed, is peculiar; because it is of imposing magnitude; because it affords almost a full half of the productive labour of the State; because it is exposed to peculiar impositions, and therefore to peculiar hazards; and because it is the interest of the whole Commonwealth, that its power should not be taken away. I admit that we have no danger to apprehend, except from oppressive and unequal taxation; no other injustice can reasonably be feared. It is impossible that any free Government, can establish an open and palpable inequality of rights. Resistance would be the necessary consequence; and thus the evil would soon cure itself. But the power of taxation often works insidiously. The very victim who feels its oppression, may be ignorant of the source from which it springs.

Gentlemen tell us that our alarms are unfounded; that even if we should give them power to tax us at their will and pleasure, there is no danger that they will ever abuse it. They urge many arguments to prove this; and among the rest, they tell us that there is no disposition among them, to practice injustice towards their eastern brethren. Sir, I do firmly believe it. It gives me pleasure to say, that in all my associations with the people of the west, I have never had reason to doubt either their justice or their generosity. And if they can give us a sure guarantee that the same just and kind feelings which they now entertain, shall be transinitted as an inheritance to their posterity forever, we will ask no other security? But who can answer *Judge Upshur corrects a mistake in his calculation. The proportion is about one sixth.

for the generations that are to come. It is not for this day only, but I trust for distant ages, that we are now laboring; we are very unwisely employed, if we are not making provision for far distant times. And can gentlemen feel any assurance, that under no change which time may work in our political condition, there shall be found any clashing of interests, or any conflict of passions? Will they, who are just now be always just, under whatever temptations of interest, or whatever excitements of the feelings? Shall there be no jealousies in time to come? No resentments? Nothing to mislead the judgment, even if it does not corrupt the feelings? Even if no disposition to oppress us should exist, how can we be assured that the people of the west shall view their own acts in all time to come, in the same light in which they may appear to us? That which they may consider mere justice, may appear to us as the worst oppression. Surely it is not surprising that we should claim a right to say, whether we are oppressed or not.

Again. We are told that slave-holders cannot be in danger, because in point of fact, they comprise a majority of our white population. If so, it would seem to follow that no good objection could be urged to the basis proposed by us; it is the basis required by the interests of the majority, and therefore right by our opponents' own rule. But while the fact as stated, is literally true, the conclusion deduced from it, is not so. How is this majority made up? By counting the slave-holders in all parts of the State; by taking a few, scattered here and there, through the western counties, where slaves are scarcely considered at all, and if considered, are absorbed in other and greater interests, and adding them to the numbers on this side the mountain, where slaves constitute the leading and most important interest. I need not press this view of the subject. It must be manifest to all, that the slave-holder of the east cannot calculate on the co-operation of the slave-holder of the west, in any measure calculated to protect that species of property, against demands made upon it by other interests, which to the western slave-holder, are of more importance and immediate concern.

We are told also, that slave population is rapidly increasing to the west, and that in a few years it will constitute a predominant interest there. If so, Sir, the same few years will, upon the principles of our own basis, transfer to the west, the very power which they are now seeking through another channel. They cannot lose more by waiting for this power, than we shall lose in the same time, by surrendering it. But, Sir, although it is admitted that slave population is increasing to the west, yet its increase is by a continually decreasing ratio. In the period between 1800 and 1810, the ratio of increase was sixty-five and a half; between 1810 and 1820, it was forty-six ;, and between 1820 and 1829, it was twenty-eight. Whence is this? It arises from causes which cannot for ages be removed. There exists in a great portion of the west, a rooted antipathy to this species of population; the habits of the people are strongly opposed to it. With them, personal industry, and a reliance on personal exertion, is the order of society. They know how little slave labour is worth; while their feelings as freemen, forbid them to work by the side of a slave. And besides, Sir, their vicinity to non-slave-holding States, must forever render this sort of property precarious and insecure. It will not do to tell me that Ohio no longer gives freedom, nor even shelter, to the runaway; that Pennsylvania is tired of blacks, and is ready to aid in restoring them to their owners. The moral sentiment of these States is against slavery; and that influence will assuredly be felt, notwithstanding the geographical line or narrow river, which may separate them from us. And again, Sir, the course of industry in the west, does not require slave labour; slaves will always be found in the grain-growing and tobacco country alone. This is not now the character of the western country, nor can it be, until a general system of roads and canals, shall facilitate their access to market. And when that time shall arrive, the worst evils which we apprehend will have been experienced; for it is to make these very roads and canals, that our taxes are required.

I think Sir, it must be manifest by this time, unless indeed, my labour has been wholly thrown away, that property is entitled to protection, and that our property imperiously demands that kind of protection which flows from the possession of power. Gentlemen admit that our property is peculiar, and that it requires protection, but they deny to it the power to protect itself. And what equivalent do they offer to us? The best, I own, which it is in their power to devise; and it cannot be doubted that they offer it in perfect sincerity and good faith. It is due to them to say this, but it is also due to us to say that they can give us no security, independent of political power. They offer us Constitutional guarantees; but of what value will they be to us in practice? No paper guarantee was ever yet worth any thing, unless the whole, or at least a majority of the community, were interested in maintaining it. And this is a sufficient reply to an idea of the gentleman from Norfolk, (Mr. Taylor.) "Will you," said he, trust your lives and liberties to the guarantees of the Constitution, and will you not also trust your property!" Sir, every man in the community is interested in the preservation of life and liberty. But what is the case before us? A

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