Imagens das páginas
PDF
ePub

guarantee is offered us by that majority who claim to possess all power, and who have a direct and strong interest to violate their own pledges. In effect, it amounts to this. Gentlemen are indeed, ready to give us their bond, provided we will permit them to say whether they shall pay it or not. No guarantee can be worth a rush, if the very men who give it, have the power to take it away. Suppose your guarantee shall be violated, to whom are we to look for redress? Will the majority hold themselves responsible to the minority, for an abuse of their powers? To whom shall our complaints be addressed; on whom shall we call to relieve us from the unjust burthens which bear us down to the earth? On none, Sir, but the very men who have imposed them. We may appeal from Cæsar to Cæsar himself, and that is the only sanction which is given to this law for our security.

But let us examine the guarantees which are offered. The first is a Constitutional provision, that personal property shall never be taxed, except in a given ratio to land. The first objection to this is, that it is wholly unphilosophical; and must depend altogether upon accident for its fitness, so far as slaves are concerned. There is no fixed and uniform ratio between the value of slaves and of land. So far as labour is concerned, there may be indeed, something like a ratio: for the value of land itself, and of the labour which renders land productive, depend very much upon the same causes; and of course are subject to like fluctuations. But the value of slaves as an article of property; and it is in that view only, that they are legitimate subjects of taxation; depends much on the state of the market abroad. In this view, it is the value of land abroad, and not of land here, which furnishes the ratio. It is well known to us all, that nothing is more fluctuating than the value of slaves. A late law of Louisiana reduced their value 25 per cent. in two hours after its passage was known. If it should be our lot, as I trust it will be, to acquire the country of Texas, their price will rise again. Thus it appears, that their value depends on causes wholly extrinsic to us, and in no degree connected with the value of our soil.

But, even if this ratio were suitable, it may be useful to inquire in what manner we are to arrive at it, and what would be its operation upon society. You must either value the whole personal property of the country, or only such parts of it as you propose to tax. Let us view the subject in each of these aspects. I venture to affirm, that there cannot be a measure more directly hostile to the genius of free Governments, than that which proposes to value the whole property of every citizen who lives under it. Who is there that would submit to the exercise of such an inquisitorial power? Nay, can any measure be more unrise among a people essentially commercial in their character. Credit is necessary to the very existence of trade. It will not do to proclaim to the world, the uttermost farthing which a trading man is worth. It is not his interest that it should be known: this might, and in most cases, would frustrate the best planned speculations. But is it practicable to make this valuation? Will you permit the assessor to go into your chambers; to search among your wife's apparel for concealed treasure; to demand your purse, that he may count the dollars it contains? And, if you will not give him authority equal to all this, and more, what assurance can you have that his valuation is correct? You will compel the tax-payer to swear. And suppose he will not swear? Are you to excuse him from paying his tax because he will not tell you how much it ought to be; or will you punish him for not telling? Subject him to peine forte et dure, for resisting the impertinent exercise of an inquisitorial power? But suppose he will swear, and what then? The humble farmer who owes no man a shilling, and who is silently laying up his little gains from year to year, careless of the reputation of wealth, has a direct interest to put the smallest possible value, upon his taxable property. The less the assessor thinks him worth, the less will he have to pay. The merchant who lives by credit, and whose profits depend on the opinion which others may entertain of his wealth, has a direct interest to make the amount as large as possible. Here then is an invitation to perjury on both sides; a fiscal law whose direct tendency is, to corrupt the purity of the main channel of public justice! Nay, this is not all. Even if the citizen be disposed to swear to the truth, it is not always possible for him to do so. Suppose that A holds the bond of B for a thousand dollars, and that B holds the property for which the bond was given; to which of the two shall that sum be assessed? Not to B, because it is a debt which he owes; not to A, because the debt may never be paid. B may indeed, be taxed for the property which the bond has purchased, but A cannot be taxed for its equivalent, unless he will swear not only that the debt is due, but that the debtor is able to pay it. Who is there that would venture to do this? Not one.

Let us now take the other alternative. Instead of valueing all the property of the Commonwealth, let us suppose the valuation to be made of such articles only, as you propose to tax. Unless property is to have a fixed, permanent, and unalterable value: a value which is to experience no change among all the changes which are going on around us you will be driven to the necessity of making your valuations so frequent, that the expenses of collection would add seriously to the burthen of taxation. And you could not do otherwise, than make them frequent, for property is continually

changing hands; and he who, to-day, is liable to a heavy tax, may not, to-morrow, possess a single taxable subject. This Sir, must necessarily prove a fruitful source of discontent and murmuring. There is no man, whose justice is so unimpeachable, or whose skill is so great, as to satisfy every one, in the discharge of this delicate duty. Even in this view, the plan must be pronounced altogether unwise. But at what tiine is the valuation to be made? You must make it either at the moment of passing your tax law, or before, or after it. If at the same time, the Legislature themselves must be the assessora? Here then you have all the play in your own hands. It is the same to me, whether you value my property at two hundred dollars, and tax me five per cent. or value it at one hundred dollars, and tax me ten per cent. I pay the same sum in both cases. Of what value then, is your guarantee, if the same power which taxes my property, shall possess the right to calue it? But, suppose your valuation to be made by a different power, and before the tax law is passed? What articles shall be valued? There is no law to guide the assessor; no law which declares what articles you mean to tax, and what you do not mean to tax. The consequence is, that every thing must be valued: the same impertinent scrutiny which I have already supposed, must be made in this case also; a scrutiny which would not fail to raise up more than one Wat Tyler in every county of the Commonwealth. But there is yet another horn of the dilemma. Suppose your valuation made, after the tax law is passed. It is the peculiar office of that law to fix upon the taxed subject, an ad valorem value: and this I presume, must always be regulated by the wants of the country. But how can you tell what rate per centum on property, is necessary to raise a given sum, unless the value of that property is previously ascertained? Either way, therefore, this scheme must be abandoned as wholly impracticable.

The next guarantee which gentlemen offer us, is a check on the power of appropriation. Much of the reasoning which has already been urged, would tend to prove that this also, would afford us no protection whatever. For myself, however, I desire no such guarantee; I should regret to see such a restraint imposed upon the power of the Legislature. My principle is this: As the payer of the tax, I have a right to be the judge of my ability to pay, and of the value of that protection for which I pay. But when my money has gone rightfully into the public fund, God forbid that it should not be applied wherever it may be most needed. It would rejoice me personally, to see every cent of it contributing to useful improvements beyond the mountain. I do not want any part of it back again; let it go wherever it will do the most good.

These, Sir, are the only Constitutional provisions which are offered us, in lieu of that power which we claim, as belonging of right to our greater stake in the Government, and as rendered necessary by the hazards to which our property is exposed. The conclusion to which I have arrived, (and I congratulate the Committee that I am fast drawing to a close,) is this: It is necessary to the well being, and even to the very existence of society, that property should be protected; it cannot in any case, and least of all, in our own case, hope for protection, except in the power of protecting itself; and no adequate substitute for that power, has been, or can be offered, in any other form of Constitutional provision. And now, permit me to ask, with whom can this power be most safely deposited? I grant, Sir, that gentlemen opposed to us, are equally patriotic in their feelings; equally just in their purposes, and equally sincere in their declarations, with ourselves. Still, I ask, even upon the very principle of this equality, where can the political power of this Commonwealth, be most safely deposited? So far as rights of person are concerned, we are all precisely equal, and the slave-holder can have no imaginable motive to do injustice in that respect. In the exercise of the tax-laying power, from which alone, injustice is to be apprehended, he has not the power to make any injurious discrimination. Among all the articles which have ever yet been made the subjects of taxation within this Commonwealth, which of them is not found on this side of the mountain, in just and fair proportion, at least? How, then, can we tax the west, without also taxing ourselves, in the same mode, and in just proportion? But reverse the case. There is not in the west, in any considerable degree, one species of property which constitutes the full half of our wealth, and which has always presented a ready subject for taxation. Give the power to the west, and will there be no temptation to abuse it? no temptation to shake off the publie burthens from themselves, and throw an unjust proportion of them upon the slaveholder? Sir, there is much in this view of the subject. I am not indulging in mere speculation and conjecture. The experiment has been actually tried. For fifty-four years, the taxing power has been with with us, and who can say that it has ever been abused? The gentleman from Frederick (Mr. Cooke) himself, has admitted that we have never abused it. I heard the admission with great pleasure; it was honourable to his candour, and valuable to us, for the source from which it sprung. Why, then, change this deposit of power, which has been thus justly and safely exercised for more than half a century? Shall we, for the sake of mere theoretical principles, or speculative doctrines, throw our interests and our safety, upon new and hazardous experiments? Let us not forget, Sir, that after all, Government is a practical thing,

and that Government is best which is best in its practical results. There is no end of speculative systems. The world has been full of them, from Plato, down through Harrington and Moore, and a host who succeeded them, even to the prolific bureaux of the French revolutionists. Of all their schemes, not one has ever been reduced to practice, in any part of the world. Experience is the best guide in Government. That guide we have; let us not shut our eyes to the lights which it affords us. For more than half a century, the political power of this Commonwealth, has been in the hands which now hold it. During all that time, it has not been abused. Is it then without cause, that I ask for a good reason why it si, uld now be taken away?

Mr. DODRIDG now rose and addressed the Committee in answer to Judges Green and psrur, as follows:

Mr. Chairman, Although I had not the least expectation of embarking in this discussion, at the present time, yet seeing no one disposed to reply to the argument just concluded, (Judge Upshur's) I feel myself irresistibly invoked to subunit a few remarks, in answer both to the gentleman from Northampton (Judge Upshur) and to the gentleman from Culpeper (Judge Green.) From want of proper time for arrangement, my remarks will be more desultory than I could wish, and I fear too diffuse for my own purpose, which is brevity in this debate. Having been the mover of the resolution under consideration in the Legislative Committee, I should not feel my. self justified in permitting a vote to be taken until further discussion, which it is both my wish and my hope to elicit. In pursuing this subject, I feel myself both relieved and delighted, by the frank and friendly course of the gentlemen from Northampton and Culpeper, and particularly by that sincerity which the former displayed towards those opposed to him. Both gentlemen have furnished an example to us which I hope to imitate, while they have lessened our labours by such a candid statement of the principles relied on to support the amendment under consideration, as leaves us no room for doubt.

I

The gentleman from Northampton, yesterday, carried us back to the original state of man, in order, thence, to deduce the elements of the social state. His remarks were of such a general character, as not to require from me a close or critical examination. So far as the natural or supposed savage state of man has been referred to, the effort is entitled to the reproof of the late Judge Ashurst, in which the gentleman from Northampton more forcibly seems to concur. By both, this course is condemned as a vain effort to end our researches into the present rights and condition of society, in that rude chaos from which society is supposed to have originally sprung. agree with the gentleman from Northampton, that if man ever existed in a savage state, in which he was under no control of Government, we must go back to a period anterior to Bible history, to find him. Although the barbarous tribes on our borders obey no written code, they have their unwritten laws, to which they yield obedience; which they not only permit to exist, but assist to execute. In our wilderness, we find not that supposed state of savage life, to which in disquisitions of this kind, reference is so often made. If this forced state of man ever existed, I will agree with the gentleman from Northampton, that, what he calls a " feeling of property," may have been one of the strongest inducements for leaving it, and for seeking in social life, and under a social compact, security for that property. This security consisted in the force of society, and it was for this, that man subjected himself to the restraints of the social compact; and as, in the nature of things, this force abides with the majority, man and his property became subject to their will. Of this position, I will say more hereafter, when I shall notice the gentleman's views of the rights of majorities, and contrast them with, what he supposes to be, those of minorities.

The gentleman from Northampton has said, that our Constitution is a compact made by all, for the benefit of all; that if there was in the majority a right to govern and control society, it must be derived, either from the law of nature, or from a Conventional source; and if from the latter, we must look for it in our written Consti

tution.

Here the gentleman first touched Virginia ground, and alluded to Virginia history; and here it is my purpose to meet him, and to follow him with frankness through each postulate maintained in his most able and eloquent argument.

Although not for the purpose of questioning its legal obligation, I deny the very first assumption of fact stated by the gentleman. The Constitution of Virginia is not a pact" made by all, for the benefit of all." It is well known, that the present Constitution was got up in a time of difficulty and danger. It was adopted as an expedient for existing circumstances, to serve the purposes of the time, and not looked upon as an instrument which would meet the wants and bear the test of experience for future ages. So far from all the members of society having had an agency in making this Constitution, none were, even, consulted except freeholders, and those only of a certain class, holding fifty acres of cultivated, or one hundred of uncultiva ted land; the property qualification then, being double what it is now. The Con

vention which made the election law under which that of 1776 was elected, was no other than the last House of Burgesses elected under the Colonial Constitution. When they were dissolved by an act of regal authority, they were reduced to the condition of so many private gentlemen freeholders. They possessed at least the confidence of the freeholding class of the community, of which their recent elections to the House of Burgesses was evidence. To the condition of private gentlemen they were constitutionally reduced; for the very act by which they were dissolved, was that by which the whole regal Government, of which they were but a part, was ended. Before their dissolution, they constituted only one of three legislative branches, yet when they met in March, and styled themselves a Convention, they assumed the exercise of all the powers of Government. In their March session, they passed many laws and resolutions, by the last of which, they declared that their powers were at an end. The country submitted to their authority, which it was wise to do, in the existing state of things. Seeing this, the members met again, and held another session, in the months of May and June, 1775; in the latter of which months, they passed an election law, which is the basis of that which now exists; and under this law, the Convention of 1776, who made our present Constitution, were elected.

When this election law was made, by whom was it made? to whom addressed? and by whom accepted and executed? The answers to these questions are plain, and are so many historical truths. The Convention of 1775, have certainly earned to themselves the thanks and gratitude of posterity; but this consideration by no means alters the facts. They were a body of freeholders, of a certain class, who, unauthorised by the whole, or any part of the people, assumed authority. They authorised that class of freeholders to which they belonged, to elect others of the same class, as their successors, and these latter made the present Constitution. The Constitution thus made is, therefore, not a compact, made by "all, for the benefit of all," as has been said, but by a part of society, for the benefit of that part, in a very great degree. Had there been but one class of men in Virginia at the time, holders of the necessary quantity of country or town property, the Constitution might have been considered as the agreement of all, for the common benefit; and for aught I know, might have been adapted to the wants and exigencies of future times. This, however, was not the case. The Convention of 1776, did little more than to continue the existing state of things. In the place of the old House of Burgesses, they erected the House of Delegates, while the Legislative Council gave place to the Senate; each new branch possessing precisely the powers, and privileges of its predecessor; and the members possessing the same qualifications respectively, and elected by the same electors. The Executive head was, alone, substantially changed.

Mr. Chairman: I have made the foregoing remarks, as I have already mentioned, not to disprove the legal authority of the present Government, but for another, and very different purpose. When we shall come at the discussion of the resolution concerning the right of suffrage, the foregoing remarks will serve to show who they were, who, not having been consulted in the formation of the present Constitution, will have a right to be consulted on the adoption of that which it is now proposed to make.

The greatest grievance proposed to be remedied, is the inequality in the representation, and this especially in the House of Delegates; the next, in point of magnitude and general concern, is the freehold restriction on the electoral franchise. The latter of these will claim more particular attention, when the third resolution of the Legislative Committee shall come under consideration. As to the first, the distribution of representation, as conferred by the Royal charter of Government, may have been tolerably fair and equal at the date of that charter. There were then but few counties or settlements, perhaps not more than six or seven, in the Colony. They were all contiguous; they had but one interest, and but one pursuit, which was agricultural. Each county had its frontier. When war existed on the border, it affected all; when peace reigned, all enjoyed it alike. In process of time, this state of things became materially changed. When the settlements extended far from the Capital, owing to the unprotected state of the country, and the sparseness of population, frontier counties were exposed to almost continual wars, while the interior enjoyed the blessings of profound peace. With few, and but short intervals, this state of things continued until Wayne's victory. Whatever may have been the justness, or equality of representation, at the beginning of the Royal Government, great changes were made before the Revolution. Around Williamsburg, the seat of Government, counties and settlements were sub-divided into sinall precincts, to each of which a representation of two members in the House of Burgesses was allowed, while no more was allowed to the large counties farther removed from the influence of Executive favor, and to those on the frontier. No more, indeed, was allowed to all West Augusta. Hence, if we look at the map, we will perceive representation distributed in double, treble, or even quadruple proportions round Williamsburg; and this representation grew up to be so unequal, and the consequent evils so intolerable, as no longer to be borne with.

[graphic]
« AnteriorContinuar »