and numerous classes too, who are not entitled to political rights. Many of these have been already enumerated by the gentleman from Northampton: females, minors, paupers, convicts; and I will add, aliens. Now, Sir, females alone constitute a moiety of the human race; if to these be added all the minors who have reached years of discretion, and all the other classes under the acknowledged ban of exclusion, there is an overwhelming majority of the whole population. But how come they to be excluded? Is it by the provisions of the social compact? If that were the principle, it would be intelligible. Is it by the laws of nature? I should answer no. For those laws, of all invariable things, are the most invariable: they are the same yesterday, to-day, and forever, (so far as human affairs are concerned,) until modified by the ordinances of society. They operate upon all persons, of all countries, at all times, and under all circumstances. For example: the rights to life, liberty, and the products of labour, are natural rights. Are there any persons in the world, who by nature are not entitled to these? (I speak not now of the influences growing out of the domestic relations.) I answer without hesitation, none, no, not one. How then can it be said, that the laws of nature refer to the subject, since those laws are uniform and invariable; and it is conceded, that these political rights, are neither uniform, nor invariable, but subject to great diversity and exception? Sir, the concession that gentlemen are constrained to make, that all are not equally entitled to these rights, involves inevitably, the further consequence, that they are not regulated by the laws of nature; for diversity cannot be the effect, where uniformity is the cause.

But it is said, that two of the enumerated classes, to wit, females and minors, are excluded, by the laws of nature, for the want of free agency in both, and the want of intelligence in the latter class. The want of free agency is founded upon the idea, that these two classes, are subjected to the dominion of men. Let us first examine the condition of females in a state of nature: I call upon any gentleman to shew me a principle of natural law, which will sustain their exclusion, to the extent which is thus laid down. I will suggest one case, in which surely they could not apply their principle. We read of a nation which once existed, (I refer to the nation of the Amazons,) in which there were no men: the society consisted of females alone. Here, beyond all question, the principle could not be applied. But suppose a nation made up both of men and women. Can any gentleman shew me a reason drawn from nature, which subjects females, as such, and because of their sex only, to the dominion of men? Men might indeed govern them by a greater physical force; but so also, might they govern in the same way, all men as well as women, who were weaker than themselves. I repeat, that if gentlemen have found any such principle of natural law, they have had access to fountains of information, which are inaccessible to me. A female may change her relations by entering into the married state, and impair her original rights, to the extent of the obligations contracted by this change. But a female who is of mature age, and unmarried, is in possession of all her rights; those rights are by nature the same with those of the other sex; and men, merely as such, have no natural right to exercise any control over her whatsoever. And yet the reason assigned, for excluding females from the exercise of political rights is, that they are under the dominion of men. When a female is married, and the relation of husband and wife exists, then the power of the husband, is co-extensive with his duties; but co-extensive only. The utmost bound, therefore, of the dominion of men, even over married women, is limited to the circle of domestic relations. Gentlemen would find it difficult to prove, that if a woman were the wife of a man, blindly attached to despotic Government, she would be obliged to sacrifice the enjoyment of all the blessings of civil liberty, to his whim, by being constrained to abide there against her will. It will not be contended, that females are to be excluded for the want of capacity. I will not fatigue the Committee, by quoting many examples to prove the contrary. History presents us the records of multitudes, who have been illustrious in literature, in arms, and in council. Writers have selected the reign of Elizabeth, as one of the brightest periods of English history; and with respect to the II. Catharine of Russia, I need only remind the House of a single incident, which occurred in years long past by, but which proves the prophetic grasp of her mind, and which is illustrated by the almost literal fulfilment of the prophecy, in the events passing in Europe at this very hour; I allude to the fact, of her having inscribed over a splendid gate, which she erected, near the frontier of her empire, "This is the road to Byzantium."

Let us look for a moment at the case of the minor: the father's power over him is precisely co-extensive too, and co-extensive only, with his duties, to wit, maintenance, education, &c.: from the moment that he is able to take care of, and provide for himself, he is by nature, utterly free from the control of his father; his subjection was only during his dependence; remove the one, and the other ceases.

Municipal laws have fixed arbitrary periods for the maturity of man, and his independence of paternal control: by some, it is fixed at twenty-one years; by others at twenty-three, and differently in others: nature has settled no period of months or of

years by her laws, whensoever he shall acquire strength of mind and body to provide for himself, from that moment, he is under no control on earth.

Is the argument consistent in another particular? Gentlemen say that taxation must in no degree, be permitted to form a constituent element of the basis of representation. Representation, say they, implies constituents; taxation does not. Well, Sir, does not the same reasoning apply, to exclude from the estimate of numbers, as a basis of representation, all who are excluded from representation itself? If you must exclude taxation, because it has no constituent for its correllative, does not the same reasoning apply to all, who do not possess the elective franchise? They, too, must be excluded from the basis; and so upon gentlemen's own grounds, that basis, instead of extending to all the white population of the Commonwealth, should be confined to voters alone.

The gentlemen have pressed upon us certain other positions from the Bill of Rights; the declaration that all power resides of right in the people, and that a majority, may alter, rescind, or new-model the Government at pleasure. I shall not call in question the truth of the doctrine, that all power resides in the people, nor is it necessary to enquire into the truth of the next proposition, that a majority of the people may alter their Government at pleasure. These two propositions, if I rightly understood the able argument of the gentleman from Brooke, were brought to shew that a majority must necessarily have the control in every free Government. I shall not retrace the ground so well occupied on this subject by the gentleman from Northampton, except so far as to confirm the truth of one of his remarks. As to any original and inherent right of the majority to rule, it could not exist, antecedently to Government. Majority is a relative term. It implies an interchange of opinion among persons convened for council, and whose decision is to control the action of the whole number so assembled, or of others connected with them. But this state of things could not exist in a state of nature. Nothing in the shape of Government belongs to that state. Each man stands upon his own intrinsic rights. Nay, so far does one writer carry this principle, as to maintain that, in order to form a social compact, which shall bind all those who enter into it, perfect unanimity is necessary among them all: and though the whole family of man were to enter into such a compact, if one single, solitary individual refuses his assent, the compact has no binding power as it respects him.

I do not say that to carry the doctrine to this length, meets my approbation. Permit me, while we are on this subject of majority, to make a few additional remarks. Some writers give us a very quaint and affected account of it. One of great celebrity, so defines the power of the majority, as to declare, that when a man is called upon to vote, he is not to vote according to his own opinion, but according to his notion of what is the public will: and if it shall turn out that the majority is against him, then it only appears, that he has mistaken the public will. such sentiment; but I mention this, as an example of one, among the infinite number I do not say that I adopt any of theories, which have been broached on the general subject. Sir, is there any rule, for the dominion of a majority, so invariable, as the gentleman seems to suppose? To test this, let us look at the history of our own country; both in the State and the Federal forms of its Government. Surely, if the gentleman is correct in supposing, that the right of a majority to rule, is derived from a natural law, it ought to have that character of uniformity, which distinguishes all such laws; and then it could not be subject to such multiplied exceptions, as we find to exist in fact, in its practical operation. Look first at the Federal Government, whether in its Executive, its Legislative, or its Judicial Department; and we shall find, that a majority is, in many instances, subject to the control of a minority, greater, but by a single unit, than onethird of the whole. If the President of the United States, shall refuse to sign a bill, passed by both Houses of Congress, and all return that bill to them with his reasons for such refusal, the consent of two-thirds of the members of both Houses is requisite before such bill can become a law.

The Senate of the United States hold a double capacity, being a branch, as well of the Executive, as of the Legislative Department of Government; and when it acts in its Executive capacity, two-thirds of the members present must concur, before any treaty formed by the President, can receive its due ratification. Here, again, and in concerns too, of the utmost importance, a majority is subject to the will of the minority. So, in the Judicial Department, (the quasi Judicial, at any rate, for the Senate when it sits to try impeachments, is, in fact, a Judicative power, and acts entirely in a Judicial character;) when the Senate thus sits, two-thirds of the members present are necessary to convict the party impeached. Here, again, is found a minority, cen-trolling the will of the majority.

Again, Sir-Let us now look nearer home. What is our system of elections, as it exists in Virginia, and in most of the States of the Union, when brought down to its actual practical operation? Is it a majority only, which in each election district, has the power of sending a Delegate, to either House of the Legislature? No, Sir, a simple plurality enjoys that power. If, then, in a certain district, there be ten candidates

set up, and neither one of the ten shall receive even one-fifth, (far less a majority) of all the votes given, yet, if he receive but a single vote more than either of the other candidates, he is returned to the Legislature as duly elected. And though so elected, he is to all practical purposes, the representative of all the people of that district; yet a majority of four to one was opposed to his election. Does the majority rule here, Sir? I need not refer to the well known case of our Juries, where the vote of one man balances the vote of eleren men; yet such an arrangement is thought wise, and has, for centuries past, challenged and received the admiration of all reflecting men. So far, then, from the rule's being a universal one, in all free Governments; in our own Government, the freest upon earth, a minority of one-third controls a majority of two-thirds: A minority of one-fifth may control a majority of four-fifths: Nay, Sir, a minority of one, does every day control a majority of eleven. It is not as gentlemen say, that a minority governs a majority; no, Sir, the minority under certain circumstances, not having the power of action themselves, are enabled to control the action of the majority in the language of Tully, in relation to the Tribunes of the people at Rome, they have not the power to do mischief themselves; they have only the power, to prevent it from being done, by others. Let us pursue the chain one link further, and let us bring the principle into the Halls of Legislation. It is susceptible of mathematical demonstration, that you can have no certainty of hearing the voice of a majority of the people of any State, unless that State votes by a general ticket. Much as that practice has been objected to, as applied in another election, it may be demonstrated, that in many, if not in most cases, a will prevails, which is contrary to the will of a majority of the people. For example: If all the people of Virginia should assemble on one day, I do not say in one place, but at their several polls, and should all vote for the same individual, a majority of their votes would, no doubt, express the will of a majority of the people. But on any system of practical election, your State must be cut up into districts, and as the fractional minorities of these seve ral districts, like the fractional minorities in different States, cannot be transferred from one district to another, it may happen, and does happen, that an individual may be elected contrary to the will of a very large majority of those who voted in the election; and then, of course, so far as representation is concerned, there is the will of a great majority against any measure which may be passed by Delegates so chosen. What, then, is the conclusion to which I am brought by this train of reasoning? It is this: that there exists no such thing as a fixed, invariable rule, on this subject. The parties to the civil compact, in establishing a Government, and organizing its various Departments, impart to the system which is the creature of their will, such principles as they have found to be prudent and just. In politics, as in morals, the best test of propriety is practical utility. There can be no other. No other has ever been successfully acted upon. If you go to mere a priori principles, then a pure, unmixed, democracy would seem the best form of Government: but the experiment has been, long ago, abandoned; and why? upon grounds of practical utility.

The next step, in theory, is, that every one should vote: but this plan is abandoned even by the friends of the present resolution: and why so? for the same reason as before, it cannot bear the test of practical utility. The same principle applies to any other subject of enquiry. A majority of the people have a right to re-model the Government, in any way they may consider as most promotive of the public welfare. We, Sir, are now the representatives of that majority. What do we judge most for the public weal? Even if the doctrine of the power of the majority be copceded, it is only necessary to point gentlemen to what is daily the fact, to shew that the people, though they may not act nominally by a majority, yet do so substantially, and in effect. Suppose we shall determine that a mixed basis of representation is to be preferred to a basis of numbers only; then whether the voters be, as individual units, a majority or not, yet there would, in truth, be a majority of the people acting: all the members of the community would stipulate with each individual member, and each individual would stipulate with all the rest, that this shall be their form of Government. Because whatever should be afterwards done, no matter by whom, if according to the Constitution, would be done by the will of the majority, because the Constitution itself, would have been ordained by that will. A Judge sentences a prisoner: the Judge is a solitary individual; but he acts by the force of law, which law is created by a majority of the people acting through their representatives, whom they have appointed their agents to make the laws. The effect, therefore, is precisely the same as if the sentence of the Judge had been pronounced by a nominal majority.

We

If I am right, we must discard mere theory, adopt nothing on the ground of mere speculation, but proceed to men and things as they are. In the language of Solon, we must establish not the best possible, but the best practicable Government. have our way open before us. There is no question as to our power to introduce what principles we please; the only question for us to ask is, whether the principle

be fit; whether it be mete and expedient; whether it will bear the test of practical utility?

In that view, let us then investigate the principle which is now offered for our adoption.

If, when men unite to form a social compact, they surrendered only their personal rights, it might very plainly be concluded, that numbers, and numbers alone, constituted the proper basis for representation. Upon the ordinary principles of contracts made between man and man. (for the social compact is only a contract of all the members with each individual member, and of him with them,) if the contracting parties surrendered only their personal rights, all would give, and, in return, ail would receive the same equivalent. But when they surrender, not only their personal rights, but their property, there the inequality commences. One man brings one amount of property, another man brings a different amount. I would put it on the principle of compensation; the principle of equivalents. Is it right, that he who has surrendered only his personal rights, should receive as much as he who surrenders much more? But, it is said, that the man who surrenders his property to society, receives, as an equivalent, the protection of that property, and that the two go on pari passu together. This argument is plausible; and it would be sound, if he could have an infallible security, that the society, or the Government, which is the same thing, should never demand from him a greater contribution from his property, than merely what is requisite for its due protection. But we know that Government claims the right (and exercises it too) of drawing on the purses of all the members of the community, and expends hundreds, yes, myriads, and millions of money, on schemes of internal improvement, and a thousand other objects connected with the internal police of the country. When we come to this consideration, does not the argument fail? It is conceded to be a good argument as far as mere equivalent for protection goes; but when you come to contribution far beyond such equivalent, the argument is good no longer, but ceases and is at a stand. The eloquent and ingenious gentleman from Norfolk (Mr. Taylor) compared the relation between the protection afforded to property on one hand, and the taxes levied by Government on the other, to the case of the underwriter and the insured. But, I need not to remind that gentleman of what has been so well and so justly said, that nothing is so apt to lead us into error as a simile. If we commence an analogy upon ject where it will not hold throughout, and where there are other and strong points subof discrimination, of all sources of error there is none so fruitful and so fatal as such mistaken analogy. Government, the gentleman tells us, is the underwriter: agreed. We, he proceeds, who pay taxes, are the insured. Sir, if in this case, as in ordinary cases of insurance, we were allowed to state the premium we are willing to give, and then hear on what terms the Government were willing to insure, there would be some such analogy as he supposes. But if the underwriter may first demand what premium he pleases, and after taking that, may confiscate what portion of the capital he pleases, besides, the case is altered. To a gentleman so well skilled in mercantile law, as I know that gentleman to be, it is unnecessary that I cite authorities. I admit that if we had the exact rate of premium fixed by compromise, as between buyer and seller, the analogy he gives might be tolerably accurate. But where the underwriter has the whole matter in his own hands, and the insured is neither consulted as to the rate of premium, nor can be sure of not forfeiting a large part of his capital into the bargain, the argument falls and comes to an end.

Mr. Chairman, the object to be attained by the amendment, has been spoken of in some parts of this debate, in terms which indicate that gentlemen consider us as aiming to perpetrate injustice. Sir, if I know my own heart, I would not contend for any object on this floor, which I did not conscientiously believe to rest upon the soundest principle. I may be wrong in my conclusions: I may mistake the causes from which the suggestions of my judgment have proceeded; but one thing I do know, that I shall never advocate here, (whatever be the supposed case elsewhere,) any principle or measure which I do not most sincerely believe to be right. Sir, is the principle for which the friends of the amendment are contending, a principle novel and unknown? One of the most ardent whigs that ever advocated the cause of free principles, a man who has done more to promote the cause of equal rights and of Parliamentary reform than almost any man of this day in England, a man who has pleaded for a more expanded right of suffrage in that country than any of his associates, sums up his doctrine, and his demand in this: that the most just and adequate representation would be, that which is in proportion to the contribution of the different portions of society to the public expenses. Yet this man was an enthusiast for liberty, burning with a holy ardour in her cause.

It is urged that numbers only are required, and a property qualification entirely disregarded in many of our sister States. So far as this argument goes, I answer that in North Carolina a property tax of some sort is required in the election of Senators; in South Carolina, the House of Representatives is founded upon just such a com

pound basis as this amendment proposes, and in Georgia, an allowance is made of three-fifths of all slave property, as in the Federal compact. And what is the fact in respect to our sister States to the East? In New Hampshire and Massachusetts, taxation, so far from being disregarded, is made the sole basis as respects elections to the Senatorial branch of the Legislature and in reference to Massachusetts particularly, I say that the example is pregnant with useful instruction. The experiment there has borne the test of forty years experience; and when, a few years since, an attempt was made to alter this feature of their Constitution, after solemn argument, it was retained in her code. We are referred to the experience of our sister States: Sir, so far as experience goes, it is in our favor; so far as experiment is concerned, it is against us: and let it be remembered that there is a strong and marked line between the two. Experience is like the light of the sun, bright, constant, and uniform. Experiment is a meteor, transient in its splendor, and uncertain and irregular in all its movements. Talk to me of the experience of States which came into being but yesterday! Why, Sir, I have myself, assisted in the creation of some half dozen of them. States in their pupillage or who have just escaped from it! tell the people of Virginia of an ignis fatuus like this for their guide! talk about the result of an experiment in Government which began but yesterday! Sir, I beg leave to decline to follow any such guide. If I must have guide and precedent, I had rather look toward the steady habits of Massachusetts, where the experiment has continued forty years and more: and where that experiment was in the full tide of successful progress, when those States, to whose experience we are so reverently referred, were naught but trackless wilds, roamed by savages in quest of game, and who have not had time even for an experiment. Admitting that there was some analogy between the condition of Virginia, and States, in circumstances so different, still I say, let me have experience, which, according to Lord Verulam, is the Mistress of the world," and not experiment, which is the worst of all possible guides. And why, Sir? There is not a farmer in your State, who will try an experiment, that is suggested to him, till he finds out that somebody else has tried it before him. Shall we trust to an authority like this, in laying the foundation of our Commonwealth?

A strong case was put by the gentleman from Norfolk (Mr. Taylor) to shew the injustice that might flow from taking property into the account, in fixing our basis of representation. He supposed a country to contain a few individuals of great wealth, and others who were in comparatively humble circumstances, where fifty rich men might, through the weight of their property, out vote two hundred and fifty poor men. We are far from contending for such inequality among voters, nor do we desire to see it prevail. In the same district, we would make all the voters equal, no matter how unequal their property. But how did the gentleman get to his conclusion, from such premises? I believe he would find himself puzzled to make out the middle term of his syllogism. His argument, however, has been already answered by the gentleman from Northampton, and the gentleman from Chesterfield, (Messrs. Upshur and Leigh,) and the answer is this, that there can be no danger of the rich oppressing the poor by Legislation, where both reside within the same district of the State, and, therefore, have a community of local feeling and interest. I have another answer to it. It is of the nature of a representative Government, that it stands on the basis of responsibility. The representative is answerable to those who gave him his power. But if we are to be taxed, as a people, by individuals, not responsible to us for their public acts, the Government is done from that moment.

may

I make a distinction between civil liberty and political liberty. Under a Government of an oligarchical, or even a monarchical form, civil liberty may, nevertheless, be enjoyed, and to a very considerable extent. For Princes, born to even a despotic throne, may perchance, be of a gentle and benevolent temper, and in no wise disposed to exercise the oppressive power with which the Constitution has invested them. Augustus, as we all know, swayed the sceptre of the world, during, at least a part of his reign, with clemency and forbearance. But this is not political liberty. enjoy a large measure of personal freedom under such a Government, but I enjoy it by permission, by sufferance merely. To convert this freedom into political liberty, it must be made mine of right, and I must have the means of securing it. Now, to apply this doctrine to the argument of the gentleman from Norfolk. The delegate, who resides in the same district with his constituents, returns back to them, and is responsible to them for his political acts; the citizens hold him by a strong cord; and if he has not been a good steward, he may certainly calculate on meeting his reward. But, how does this principle apply, when he who lays the tax, and they who are to pay it, reside in different portions of the State? He may vote ruin to his fellow-citizens in a distant part of the State, and never be called to account for it! They did not elect him, and they cannot call him to any account for his stewardship.

[Mr. Taylor here rose to explain: He said he had waited until the gentleman from Orange had completed his argument on this point; he had not risen to answer it; but solely for the purpose of stating the position he had taken, and the principle