on which he had relied, in the argument he formerly addressed to the Convention. What I say, observed Mr. Taylor, is, that our Government rests on the principle of equal rights, among all men who are worthy of political power; and I contend that on that principle rests the safety of our free institutions. If you fix the terms of qualification by a fundamental law, declaring who may vote, and who may not, then my position is, that there exists a perfect equality of rights, among all the voters thus qualified. If, in a district giving 300 votes, 250 votes shall not elect a representative, while the remaining 50 do elect him, I say that you destroy all free principle, and disguise it as you will, call it what you please, you do, in effect, establish an aristocra cy, an odious aristocracy of wealth. You all oppose the admission of such a principle within your county lines; and repudiate it as aristocratical in its character. Why is it less aristocratical or less odious, when extended to districts, or to the State at large? These were my positions, and this was my argument.]

Mr. Barbour resumed. He had never knowingly misstated the argument of any gentleman opposed to him: and with due submission, he still contended, that he had neither misstated, nor misunderstood the argument of the gentleman from Norfolk. His argument, said Mr. B. was based on the equality of all the voters within a given district, and went to show that the same principle of equality ought to be extended to all other districts; and, in reply to this argument, I was going on to show the difference between the cases of a representative elected (by whatever rule) from the district where he resides, and returning again to that district, responsible for his publ e conduct, and that of a representative, chosen in one part of the State, and who has by his public acts, oppressively injured another and a distant part of it, to which he is not responsible, and by which he cannot be punished. And though rich and poor men, have an equal vote in the same district, yet there is safety to property, not only because there is a community of feeling and interest, but because of the responsibility which the representative thus elected, owes to all his constituents, both rich and poor, and who are interested in proportion to their respective property. And here permit me to make an earnest and most sincere disclaimer of all intention to impute to my fellow-citizens of Virginia, any thing like an improper purpose. I have no such belief whatever, but give to them all that credit for integrity of motive, which I claim for myself. But while faith is the surest of all foundations in matters of religion, the very reverse of faith, is the true foundation of all free Governments. They are founded in jealousy, and guarded by caution; nor can the spirit of liberty long survive among any people where this jealous vigilance is not kept in perpetual vigour. In Monarchies, its action is against the Monarch. Here, in the United States, so fully is it known and recognized, that the people have written it on all their gates, and exercise it not merely against their official agents, but even against themselves. To prevent the people of Virginia from being carried away, by their own partialities, into a premature confidence, they have themselves declared, that the people shall not elect any man to the House of Delegates, who is under 25 years of age, nor to the Senate, who is under 30. Sir, I speak of human nature as it is. I "nothing extenuate nor aught set down in malice." I draw no lines of partial discrimination: but I take my stand on the great principle which I have mentioned, that not faith, but the reverse of faith, is the foundation of all good Government, and that no nation is free, unless they possess political liberty, by which I understand the power to secure their own

freedom.

We have heard much said against the principle of the amendment, as going in practice, to make an unjust discrimination in favour of the rich. But, gentlemen should recollect, that it proposes, within the electoral districts of this State, no distinction between the high and the low. But no man, Mr. Chairman, need to feel greatly alarmed, on the score of wealth among us. Those who have lived but for a few years, may see, from an inspection of the map of Virginia, how fleeting are all human possessions. The wheel of fortune never stands still, but is in a state of perpetual revolution. He who was on the summit yesterday, may be at the bottom to-day. It was well said that primogeniture, and the law of entails, are the two columns of Monarchy; and that the breaking down of entails, and passing the act of parcenary, secured a perpetual change in the possession of property. There exists not the slightest danger of a permanent concentration of wealth, in any one portion of our country, or among any particular class of our citizens.

With proper deference, I would take leave to suggest, that throughout a great part of this discussion, gentlemen have confounded civil rights with political power. An argument, which goes for the security of civil rights, involves considerations of one kind; while an argument for the distribution of political power, involves considerations of a very different description. All the individuals of the discarded classes, to which reference has already been made, are fully entitled to the enjoyment of civil rights. Minors, women, (for, in this respect, the ladies are as fully in possession of these rights, as any of the lordly sex,) and even aliens, except as to the tenure and transmission of real estate; and even that distinction has been gradually frittered

DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION.

away to a mere form. When the question has respect to civil rights, no distinction can take place from age, sex, or any of the other causes which operate in the other case, unless, indeed, under circumstances of an extraordinary kind; but, when the question has reference to political power, then we must have respect to age, to sex, to birth; and a variety of circumstances, which go, in practice, to exclude from the possession of it, a large majority of every community. Here we must of necessity look at the condition of the individual, and determine whether he has the requisites for the enjoyment and exercise of that power. Some items of qualification, all must admit, the payment of tax, and some residence within the State, are required by the gentlemen themselves: they call the possession of these qualifications, a fitness for the elective franchise; while some of them have so far extended the qualification, as to require permanent residence, and either nativity or naturalization.

Now, then, the question comes back upon us; if it be right, because Government operates on persons, that persons ought to be represented; is it not equally right, that because it operates on property, property ought to be represented? Take the converse of this position; and how will it work? What would the gentlemen say to a Government where property only was represented and persons excluded? None of them would accord to it; yet we have an example of such a state of things in the Roman Government.

It is the distribution of the State into centuries, where property alone was taken into view. Afterwards, indeed, according to their usual course, that people went into the opposite extreme; and then the State was divided into tribes, in which people alone were considered, and property was wholly disregarded. In the State of Massachusetts, as I have already stated, they go to the extent of making property the only cri terion in voters for one branch of their Legislature. But I ask, neither for Comitia by centuries, nor Comitia by tribes. I ask for a compound ratio of both. Both are equally at the command of the Legislature, and both need security against an abuse of power. A priori indeed; as it is conceded by all, that because the Government acts upon persons, they should be represented, so in like manner, as Government acts upon property, the owners of that property ought to have some representation in reference to it, as between the different districts of the Commonwealth. If this be true as a general principle, it applies emphatically to the particular condition of Virginia; in the eastern part of which, there is almost half the population, which, as such, would be excluded upon the white basis, whilst at the same time, that population as property, pays an enormous disproportion of the tax; thus presenting the striking fact, that the very cause which would forever keep down the eastern representation, much below its standard, would forever aggravate their taxation, far beyond a just standard. The amendment under discussion, proposes some remedy for this great injustice.

It is the natural desire of us all, to lay the foundations of this Constitution in such a manner, that it shall stand and endure. If that be our purpose, we must rest it on these two great columns: Persons and property. Withdraw either, and you have a weak and tottering edifice, which never can endure the shocks of time. If I might venture upon a simile, I would compare our Constitution to an extensive and delicate piece of machinery. If the engineer who devised its structure, shall so arrange its internal wheels, that they act in opposite directions, and on antagonist principles, the result must, of necessity, be, that its works can easily be put out of order, and that the machine itself is not likely to last. But, if, on the contrary, he shall so arrange the various parts, that all its wheels shall move in one direction; that all the principles of its action shall be harmonious and uniform; that there shall be no clashing of wheel against wheel, but all shall move by one law, and to one end; then the machine, while it reflects credit upon the skill and ingenuity of its author, will accomplish the beneficial purposes for which it was designed, and will continue to work, without needing any material repairs, to an indefinite period of time. We have an instructive warning on this subject in the history and fate of the Ancient Republics. Whenever, in any of their Constitutions, persons and property, were set in opposition to each other, the result invariably was found to be, heart-burnings, conflicts, confusion, bloodshed, civil war, anarchy, and finally, the utter and disastrous downfall of liberty, and the establishment of Despotic Government. I would place these two principles side by side, in perfect harmony. I would encourage nothing like distrust, or conflict between them; but would blend their action into perfect concert, and thus produce lasting tranquillity. If persons remained safely protected, beneath the overshadowing power of the State, I would have property protected too. On the other hand, the safety of property was put under the guarantee of the Constitution; I would build upon the same organic basis, the perfect security of persons. It is the interest of this great community to keep the provisions of its Government, safe and inviolate: make those provisions just, and then they will abide long; and the edifice of State, subject only to that infirmity which is the inheritance and the characteristic of man, shall stand for posterity, secure from internal danger, and equally safe, as I trust and believe, from external violence.

Mr. BALDWIN, of Augusta, after assigning his motives for addressing the Committee at that period of the debate, and his intention to present his views of the subject with as much brevity as practicable, proceeded to state the question under consideration. The resolution reported by the Legislative Committee, and the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Culpeper, present the question, whether representation ought to be apportioned equally amongst the citizens of this Commonwealth, who shall be admitted to the right of suffrage, according to numbers, or whether it shall be apportioned amongst them unequally, by adopting a basis compounded of numbers and taxation. It is a question, so far as relates to numbers, between equality on the one hand, and inequality on the other; and after the admissions made by gentlemen opposed to me in this debate, I may surely venture to assert, without much fear of contradiction, that according to the genius of our political institutions, whenever a question arises concerning the distribution of power, amongst the people themselves, the source of all power, the rule of equality ought to prevail, unless some good reason be shewn to the contrary. The gentleman from Culpeper (Mr. Green) and the gentleman from Northampton (Mr. Upshur) have both conceded, that under a Republican Government, it is correct, as a general rule, that the power of the State ought to be placed in the hands of the majority of its citizens; but they contend that peculiar circumstances may exist, which would render the application of that rule unjust and unpolitic. On this occasion, they conceive that a sufficient reason to justify an exception, may be found in the contrariety of interests prevailing in different sections of this Commonwealth. If all the various portions of Virginia were entirely assimilated in territory, population, wealth and resources, neither of the gentlemen referred to, nor I presume any member of this Committee, would hesitate for a moment to approve the basis of representation proposed by the resolution we are now considering.

Notwithstanding the conflicting interests which some gentlemen suppose to exist between different sections of the State, none, I presume, are disposed to treat this controversy as a mere struggle for power. If it were so regarded, all discussion of the subject would be worse than useless. It would be mischievous. It would only serve to inflame our own minds, and scatter throughout the community, the fire-brands of discord. No, Sir, we all profess, and I trust sincerely, to be desirous of arriving at a correct conclusion, and to be engaged in this comparison of sentiments, for the purpose of obtaining light from the spirit of our institutions, the character and feelings of our people, the precepts of experience, and the dictates of sound policy. It has been said by several gentlemen in this debate, that all men are actuated by self-interest; and I have no objection to the proposition, when understood to embrace that noble and enlightened self-interest, which teaches us the love of truth and justice, and the sacrifice of all sordid and contracted prejudices, upon the altars of duty and patriotism.

In asserting the principles which in my opinion elucidate this subject, I shall not incur the imputation of indulging in abstract discussion; a mode of argument so much deprecated by some of the gentlemen who have preceded me, and which I acknowledge is less remarkable for its utility, than its intricate and almost interminable character. For my own part, Sir, having always regarded Government as practical in its very nature, I do not expect that we shall derive much useful information from the best constructed theories, though sustained with all the powers of intellect, and adorned with all the charms of eloquence. I was delighted, Sir, with the logical and beautiful abstract reasoning employed by the gentleman from Northampton (Mr. Upshur,) with the avowed object of proving that abstractions cannot be safely relied upon, in matters of Government. Let us leave, then, to school-men and sophists, all the theories concerning the origin and nature of Government in general, and save ourselves the trouble of enquiring whether it should be traced to patriarchal supremacy, physical force, or social compact. I would not dispute with any people, the propriety of any political system which they have thought proper to sanction by their approbation or acquiescence; even though they acknowledge the Divine right of Kings, and the duty of passive obedience, or boast the privileges and immunities extorted from the fears or conceded by the clemency of monarchs, or cherish the aristocratic notions of noble birth, subordination of ranks, and hereditary authority. And yet, Mr. Chairman, I am far from admitting the broad proposition which has been asserted and reiterated in this debate, that there are no principles in politics. If, indeed, gentlemen mean only by this assertion, that there are no abstract principles of Government which must be regarded as true in all nations, in all ages, and under all circumstances, I should consider it a waste of time, to enter into any controversy with them upon the subject. But surely, Sir, there are principles of a practical nature, without which, no free Government can exist, and a frequent recurrence to which is indispensable, in order to justify and illustrate its institutions. A Government which rests upon public opinion, cannot be sustained without the aid of such principles; the result, if you please, of observation and experince, but sanctioned by

the reason and cherished in the affections of the people, and which may be confidently appealed to, on all important questions, affecting their safety or happiness. Ours, Mr. Chairman, is emphatically a Government of principles: principles es tablished by the wisdom, and consecrated with the blood of our fathers. It is certainly not our purpose to tear up the foundations of our political system, and establish a new one out of the ruins; our object is to reform and amend, but not to revolutionize. Without, therefore, indulging in abstract theories, or referring to the systems of other nations, let us resort to those fundamental truths which constitute the basis of our own system. We shall find them all-sufficient for every useful purpose; they will serve as " a lamp to our feet, and a light to our path," upon this or any other subject of our duties.

In this country, highly favoured, as we believe, by Heaven, and distinguished for its civil and political liberties, we recognize the sovereignty of the people, the fiduciary character of all public agents. We consider the people not only as the objects and subjects of Government, but as the governors themselves in the last resort, and the only safe depositories of unlimited power. We regard the organs of legislative authority as representatives of the people, accountable to them, and constituted for the purpose of expressing their will. We acknowledge that this general or public will must prevail, whether in the ordinary legislative enactments, or in the construction and alteration of the fundamental laws. As unanimity in the operations of such a Government, is in the nature of things, impracticable, the general will is to be expressed by the voice of the majority. This, as the gentleman from Frederick (Mr. Cooke) has correctly stated, is a rule founded upon necessity; for otherwise, the public will would be nugatory, or would be expressed by the voice of the minority, the absurdity of which is manifest.

None of these principles have, as yet, been controverted in this debate. It has not even been denied, that the will of the majority ought to prevail; the only controver sy is in regard to the application of the rule; some gentlemen contending that a majority does not mean, necessarily, a majority of numbers alone. On this point, it is only necessary that reference should be had to the language employed in our Bill of Rights, which asserts that a majority of the community hath an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right, to reform, alter, or abolish the Government. It is impossible that any one can doubt the majority here spoken of, is a majority of numbers, and not a majority of interests, or of interests and numbers combined. It is true that this clause in the Bill of Rights was not intended as a declaration, that in all cases whatever, in which a conflict of opinions may occur, the question in controversy is to be decided by a majority of numbers; and the gentleman from Orange (Mr. Barbour) has stated various examples in which the rule is not applicable. The principle declared, is obviously in reference only to the sovereign right of the people, to establish or change the fundamental law; and it cannot be doubted, that the majority of the people may, if they so determine, give an ascendancy in the Government to the minority. But is it reasonable that they should do so? and would not such a transfer of power be a gross violation of the duty which they owe to themselves? The majority have the unquestioned right to change the very foundations of Government, and distribute political power according to their own discretion; and yet they are asked to subject themselves and their posterity, by their own voluntary act, to the control of the minority. Should they do so, they will shew themselves well worthy of becoming “hewers of wood and drawers of water." I would ask, Sir, if there is any one here who would venture to propose, that when the Constitution, which we are engaged in preparing, shall be submitted to the people for their approval or rejection, the question shall not be decided by the majority of qualified voters? And should there be reserved to the people, as undoubtedly their right, a veto upon the enactments of the Legislature, would they not, in the exercise of that direct power, decide according to numbers? The purpose of representation, is the delegation of power to agents, which the people cannot, with convenience, immediately exercise themselves, and no inequality ought to prevail, in regard to the delegated authority, which would not be admitted amongst those from whom it is derived, if retained by them in their own hands.

have thus endeavored, by referring to well established principles, to shew that no inequality ought to exist in the exercise of the elective franchise. It is true that the right of suffrage itself, may, and ought to be limited. All those are to be excluded, who cannot be expected to exercise it discreetly; that is to say, in such manner as will promote the safety and happiness of themselves and the rest of the community. It is upon this principle, that various classes, embracing many individuals, are excluded; of which, obvious and familiar examples have been stated in the course of this debate. It is upon this principle alone, that any freehold or other property qualification can be required from the electors. The qualifications, of whatever nature, are the subjects of a sound and wholesome discretion, and ought to be fairly and impartially adjusted, with a view only to the public good, and not for the purpose of elevating

or depressing any portions of society. But when once established, all those entitled to the right of suffrage ought to be admitted upon terms of perfect equality. We cannot with propriety, distinguish amongst individuals, or masses of individuals. There is no doubt a wide difference between the merits of individuals, intrinsic or adventitious. Moral integrity, talents, learning, reputable connections, the fruits of industry, acquired or inherited, always give the possessor an influence over the opinions and conduct of others; but those advantages are sufficient in themselves and require no artificial distinctions. Neither justice nor good policy requires that authority should keep pace with influence, and be in like manner unequally distributed. If the rule of equality for which I contend, be departed from, in order to distribute political power, in any degree, according to wealth, then I agree with the gentleman from Norfolk (Mr. Taylor) that the Government must, to that extent, be regarded as a monied aristocracy.

Having thus presented some of the considerations which, in my opinion, justify the resolution reported by the Legislative Committee, I shall now submit a few remarks upon the basis of representation proposed by the amendment. So far as taxation is a constituent, it is a scheme of property representation; and one of the arguments urged by its advocates is, that property ought to be represented, inasmuch as it is one of the great objects of Government. I beg, Sir, that the purposes of Government may not be confounded with the principles upon which it is to be organized. The protection of the people in the enjoyment of their property is doubtless an important duty of Government. But the samne duty exists in relation to all the innocent and legitimate enjoyments of which they are capable. Those enjoyments are not, however, the proper subjects of representation. In a representative democracy, which is founded upon the supposed intelligence and virtue of the people, the purposes of Government are to be effected by a representation of the people themselves; and we have been taught to believe, that under such a system, none of the important interests of society will be prostrated or neglected. It can throw no light upon this subject to distinguish between personal rights and the rights to property; they are all equally entitled to the protection of Government; their relative importance cannot be graduated; nor is there any scale by which we can determine how much relative political power ought to be enjoyed by a citizen in order to ensure to him protection.

The advocates of the proposed amendment avow, that it is intended to operate upon the relative political power of different portions of the Commonwealth; and it is obvious that the only security which it can afford to property is by protecting it against the partial and unjust legislation, which may arise out of conflicting sectional inte rests. It can have no effect in securing proprietors throughout the State against the assaults of the indigent. Power would be unequally apportioned amongst the electoral districts, but in each district every elector would be entitled to an equal vote. If, therefore, a combination should be formed amongst the indigent against the affluent, property would find no protection in the basis of representation proposed by the amendment. If gentlemen are correct in the supposition that property ought to be represented in order to afford it protection, they ought not to stop short of their principle, and provide only a partial safe-guard; but should propose giving political power to each proprietor in proportion to the value of his property or the amount of his taxes. Now, 1 ask, Sir, what would be thought of a proposition that one elector should have twice, or thrice, or ten times as many votes as another, in consideration of his owning property to a greater extent; and yet the principle is the same, whether it be applied to individuals or masses of individuals.

Several gentlemen have urged upon us, that taxation ought to be regarded in the apportionment of representation, because it furnishes the means by which Government is supported; and we have been told, that those who pay the taxes ought to lay the taxes. If by this assertion is meant, that all who pay taxes ought to be admitted to the right of suffrage, it may be true as a general proposition, and will receive the consideration of this Committee when another resolution of the Legislative Committee shall occupy our attention. If the idea intended to be expressed is, that none but those who pay the taxes ought to have a voice in laying them, then the rule would amount to nothing more than an exclusive property qualification. But if we are called upon to believe that political power ought to be unequally distributed amongst the qualified voters, from a regard to the sums of money which they respectively contribute to the support of Government, it remains to be proved why contributions of that character confer a better claim to political power than those of any other description. There is no good reason why the aid which a citizen furnishes in the support of Government, in the form of taxes, should be placed on higher ground than that which he yields in personal services. He who devotes the energies of his body and mind to the welfare of his country, labours to promote her best interests, or defends her rights upon the battle field, may surely claim the merit of having contributed to the support of Government. He is not entitled to political power merely in consideration of such services, but his right is not inferior to that of him whose aid is furnished from his