subject of the mind-body relation is a book by McDougall (12). After giving a comprehensive survey of the history of the development of animism from the earliest ghost theories to modern times and of the modern rejection of all animistic hypotheses, the author subjects these modern theories to a searching criticism. In general "in spite of the efforts of many philosophers to provide alternate solutions, we are still confronted by the dilemma, materialism or animism." The issue "between the rival doctrines cannot be solved by metaphysical reasoning, but only by appeal to empirically established facts." These facts not only support the animistic hypothesis but are explicable in no other way. Hence the author frankly adopts the soul-hypothesis. The influence of neo-vitalism and in part also of Bergson is explicitly admitted. In Carr's article (2) the influence of Bergson is complete. The problem of the mind-body relation has arisen from the impossibility of measuring psychical facts. They are purely qualitative. The solution of the problem offered in parallelism "involves an ineradicable dualism and this dualism involves a radical contradiction," the fundamental contradiction, as Bergson has shown, of asserting "that the part is the whole." Moreover, "it obscures the true distinction between the immediate data of consciousness and our knowledge of the real world of practical activity." Meyer's (16) argument is directed especially against McDougall. Why do psychologists such as McDougall appeal in despair to the ghost theory for help? "The answer is simple. They attempt in vain to conceive of a nervous process as being capable of forcing another nervous process from its own path into a new path." But we do not need a ghost to explain this. "When a nervous process is forced to stream over a path other than that of least resistance, it is forced most probably by another nervous process." Hence the conclusion: "We must try to establish definite nervous correlates for all the specific mental states and mental functions which are used in and seemingly cannot be spared from our descriptions of human life in the mental and social sciences." Marshall (14) distinguishes between the concept of efficiency and the concept of causation "in the sense of unconditional invariableness of succession." To the behavior of animals the latter and not the former concept may be held to apply, provided we study them quite objectively; but when we study consciousness, efficiency and not causation appears to apply. When we carry over either concept, as we often do, into the opposite field where it may not apply, the question arises at once whether we have the right to do so. In the mind-body relation the succession of changes is not unconditional or causal. Hence we should not attribute "a direct causal relation," but postulate "a causal influence beyond both." Dodge (3) finds "the principle of psychophysical parallelism inhibiting rather than stimulating" to the psychologist. Moreover, this theory certainly needs to be limited and modified before it fits the phenomena of inner psychophysics. "Our consciousness is obviously not correlated with the subthreshold intensity of action of the nervous system, but only with a nervous activity of definite, i. e., of supra-threshold intensity." Again this theory breaks down when we really use it. "We are utterly unable to reason successfully either from known nervous facts to consciousness, or from consciousness to its nervous correlates." Finally, parallelism is "at least a confession of scientific impotence." We cannot set aside the problem "what characteristics of the nervous processes are essential to our normal consciousness." Against Yerkes' "psychical causation" Dunlap (5) maintains that unless it means mere description it does not seem to mean anything intelligible or verifiable. To explain anything we have to get beyond description, we have to bring in logical symbols as, for example, in explaining the connection between the flash and roar of a cannon by means of the notion matter. But even if we could explain anything purely in terms which we observe, the question would still remain whether such an explanation should be called "physical" or "psychical." REFERENCES I. ALEXANDER, S. Foundations and Sketch-plan of a Conational Psychology. Brit. J. of Psychol., 1911, 4, 239-267. 2. CARR, H. W. The Theory of a Psycho-physical Parallelism as a Working Hypothesis in Psychology. Proc. Aristot. Soc., 1911, 11, 129-143. 3. DODGE, R. A Working Hypothesis for Inner Psychophysics. PSYCHOL. REV., 1911, 18, 167-185. 4. DUMVILLE, B. The Standpoint of Psychology. Proc. Aristot. Soc., 1911, 11, 41-79. 5. DUNLAP, K. Dr. Yerkes' View of Psychical Causation. PSYCHOL. BULL., 1911, 8, 400-403. 6. HICKS, G. D. Mr. G. E. Moore on the Subject Matter of Psychology. Proc. Aristot. Soc., 1910, 10, 232-288. 7. JENKINSON, J. W. Vitalism. Hibbert J., 1911, 9, 544-569. 8. JENNINGS, H. S. Vitalism and Experimental Investigation. Science, 1911, 33, 927-932. 9. JOTEYKO, J. La vie des éléments psychiques. Rev. psychol., 1911, 4, 20-45; 317-327. 10. LOVEJOY, A. O. The Import of Vitalism. Science, 1911, 34, 75-80. 11. MACDOUGALL, R. Mind as Middle Term. PSYCHOL. REV., 1912, 19, 386-403. 12. MCDOUGALL, W. Body and Mind. London: Methuen, 1912. Pp. xix + 384. 13. MARBE, K. Die Bedeutung der Psychologie für die übrigen Wissenschaften und die Praxis. Fortschritte der Psychologie und ihrer Anwendungen, 1912, 1, 5-82. 14. MARSHALL, H. R. The Causal Relation between Mind and Body. J. of Phil., Psychol., &c., 1912, 9, 477-490. 15. MESSER, A. Husserls Phänomenologie in ihrem Verhältnis zur Psychologie. Arch. f. d. ges. Psychol., 1911, 22, 117-129. 16. MEYER, M. The Present Status of the Problem of the Relation between Mind and Body. J. of Phil., Psychol., &c., 1912, 9, 365-371. 17. MOORE, G. E. The Subject Matter of Psychology. Proc. Aristot. Soc., 1910, 10, 36-62. 18. SEASHORE, C. E. The Consulting Psychologist. Pop. Sci. Mo., 78, 283-290. 19. STRONG, C. A. The Nature of Consciousness. J. of Phil., Psychol., &c., 1912, 9,533-544; 561-573; 589-603. 20. THOMSON, J. A. Is there One Science of Nature? Hibbert J., 1912, 10, 110-129; 308-327. TERMINOLOGY BY PROFESSOR HOWARD C. WARREN Princeton University The fourteenth installment of the French "Vocabulaire Philosophique" (2) extends from Métaphysique to Nous. Among the definitions which pertain to psychology are Méthode, Mimétisme, Mnème, Moi, Moteur (type), Mouvement, Musculaire, Névrose, Notion. The discussion of the term "Nature" is particularly exhaustive; as many as eleven meanings are differentiated. In a report to the International Congress of Pedology held at Brussels in 1911, Dr. Ioteyko (1) summarizes the progress toward uniform terminology in the sciences of pedology and psychology. She repeats in outline the reports of Claparède and Baldwin to the last International Congress of Psychology (see PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, 1911, 8, 20). An original feature in Dr. Ioteyko's report is her modification of Aliota's classification of the quantitative branches for pedology. She proposes six divisions, educational anthropometry (anthropométrie pédagogique), psychophysics, psychochronometry, psychodynamics, psychometry, and psychostatistics, of which all but the first belong to psychology. Stern's notation for the age of children is approved; e. g., 2; 10 (15) would denote 2 years, 10 months, and 15 days. Psychologists will be interested in the attempts made by the American Philosophical Association to define consciousness and perception (4). Thirteen different uses of the term consciousness are mentioned, including consciousness as response, as an external relation between objects, as conation, and as psychic existence. The Committee makes no attempt to suggest different words for these radically different meanings. Professor Royce (3) expresses considerable dissatisfaction with the Committee's attitude toward perception. REFERENCES Ι. ΙΟΤΕΥΚΟ, Ι. Unification des termes, des mesures et des notations en Pédologie. Rev. psychol., 1912, 5, 44-76. 2. LALANDE, A. Vocabulaire philosophique. Bull. soc. franç. de phil., 1911, 11, 135-196. 3. ROYCE, J. On Definitions and Debates. J. of Phil., Psychol., &c., 1912, 9, 85-100. 4. WOODBRIDGE, F. J. E., etc. Report of the Committee on Definitions of the American Philosophical Association. J. of Phil., Psychol., Sc., 1911, 8, 701-708. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL BY PROFESSOR HOWARD C. WARREN Princeton University The new Italian review Psiche has started a new psychological bibliography in its first number (I). The new bibliography aims to select the literature for the use of students who are not specialists; titles of doubtful value are excluded, and each citation is followed by a few words about the contents of the work. The first installment, which deals with the most general topics, contains 41 useful references. The French philosophers have also inaugurated a bibliography of French philosophy. The bibliography for 1910 (4) contains 2,058 titles, all in the French language. Of these 479 belong to psychology and form a very useful reference list. The only criticism to be suggested is the inconvenience of referring to a bibliography confined to a single language. The Committee appointed by the Bibliographical Society of America to survey the field reports (2) the results of a circular letter sent to representatives in every field of science. Psychology appears to fare as well as any science, but there is a call for wider coöperation, especially in the less familiar languages. We have already quoted the compilation of the complete writings of Wundt. Professor Titchener (3) follows this up with a list of the publications of Professor James Ward, which includes book reviews as well as books and articles. REFERENCES I. ASSAGIOLI, R. Bibliografie psicologiche: I. Bibliografia delle bibliografie; II. Questioni generali e di metodo; III. La psicoanalisi; IV. Il metodo delle associazioni. Psiche, 1912, 1, 65-72; 140-148. 2. BAY, J. C., and JOSEPHSON, A. G. S. Special Report of the Committee on Survey of Bibliographical Literature. Bull. of the Bibliograph. Soc. of Amer., 1911, 3,3-4;27-33 3. TITCHENER, E. B., and FoSTER, W. S. A List of the Writings of James Ward. Amer. J. of Psychol., 1912, 23, 457-460. 4. [ANON.] Bibliographie de la philosophie française pour l'année 1910. Bull. soc. franç. de phil., 1911, 11, 197-319. CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE UNCONSCIOUS BY PROFESSOR H. W. CHASE University of North Carolina The Committee on Definitions of the American Philosophical Association has attempted to compile some of the recent definitions of consciousness as a factor in a perceptual situation (15). Thirteen types of definitions are distinguished, and a bibliography is appended. Pikler (13) states that in assuming opposition as condition of consciousness he means, not polar antithesis, but mutual exclusion, "what other psychological theories call difference of stimuli." Other psychologists, however, have not worked out the implications of the resulting conflicts in the subject. Strong, in a series of articles (18) reminds us that the term consciousness as used by the psychologist means "our feelings, emotions, desires and sensations, or rather the whole which these at any moment form," while to the logician the term means "the bare cognizing or being aware." Images (sensible data) are essentially psychic existences. Color and variety, considered as existences, are in the image or subject, and are projected into the outer world "much as the beams of a search-light are projected upon a distant ship." This psychology of awareness is that of "projectionism." Image plus motor promptings to response explains what we perceive. Perry (12), in his chapter on A Realistic Theory of Mind, holds that mental action is a property of the physical organism, that mind "consists primarily in interested behavior," that mind is "behavior or conduct together with the objects which those employ and isolate." Dewey (3) regards consciousness as "an adjective of behavior," а quality attaching to it under certain conditions. Thilly (19) tells |