from the needs of practical life. But even at that time it was found necessary to warn the students against being too much taken up with the hope of financial gains or high honors; and the complaint was actually made that "in our time the minds of our young people are too intent on material gain." The popular saying, "Knowledge is power," can be traced back to the Middle Ages, for it is Roger Bacon (d. 1294) who said, “Ipsa scientia potestas est." But the saying became widely known only through the teaching of Francis Bacon: "Scientia et potentia humana in ipsum coincidunt.""" Looking at the particular words employed by the two writers, we might find it significant that the Scholastic speaks of potestas, the power of authority, while the father of modern naturalism speaks of potentia, the power which is such by its own virtue. The saying, "Doctrina in dictis, scientia in factis est vera virtus," as well as the distich, "Disce libens: quid dulcius est, quam discere multa? Discentem comitantur opes, comitantur honores," seem to be of later date. The Renaissance revived the ancient tendency of making ambition the chief incentive to study, and the educators of that period approved and employed this principle extensively. The indirect motives were allowed a still wider scope when the schools came to be regarded as training school for public service. The utilitarianism of the 18th century introduced the bread-and-butter evaluation of studies. Rousseau insisted that the pupil should feel free at all times to ask, "Of what benefit is this to me? What shall I gain thereby?" And the Philanthropinists of the Enlightenment as well as of our own day recognize no higher standard for the evaluating of studies than that of direct utility. 2. However, educationists of deeper views have ever opposed the dominion of these indirect interests and have contended that the direct interest as well as the moral and æsthetical motives. should prevail in education. But while opposing utilitarianism and emulation, they have at times forgotten that the indirect interest extends beyond these abuses, that it may justly claim. a place among the educational aims, and that it will always, because of the exigencies of human nature, retain this place. To illustrate: the pupil who is encouraged in his studies by the 1 Vincent. Bell., De erud. fil. reg., 73. 2 Büchmann, Geflügelte Worte, Berlin, 1880, p. 247. "Knowledge is power," is the popular version of Hobbes' "Scientia propter potentiam." hope of a successful career is not the beloved of the Muses, but is not on that account a narrow egoist. We may well respect that father who gives his children a good education in the belief that to equip them for the struggles of life is more important than to hoard up for them silver and gold. And the statesman who endeavors by spreading knowledge and encouraging useful arts to promote the welfare of the nation, is actuated by very praiseworthy motives. In short, to fit oneself and others for future work and achievement is, if done in the right spirit, not only not blamable, but very laudable. It is true, utilitarian motives are not of the highest order; they are inferior to the motives that prompt us to pursue our studies for their own sake. Still, so long as these lower motives do not crowd out the loftier aims, the educational content will not suffer if influenced by motives of practical utility. If, however, all higher aims were excluded from the schools, then the educative process would become purely mechanical. Yet one may go to the opposite extreme also: witness the Greek conception of the end of education which was too idealistic,' and which had to be corrected by Christian philosophy.' Education is concerned with what is universally recognized as valuable, and what is so recognized will prove, at least in great part, of use to all. The subject-matter of teaching must be modified considerably by those factors that are an influence in daily life, and in this sense the school must serve the practical needs of life. Utilitarianism errs, like every other cult of the indirect aims, only in that it takes too narrow and too low a view of life: it regards life merely as the struggle for existence; whereas the adequate view of life, while not excluding this phase of life, includes other phases of less egoistic activity. If the questions: "Of what benefit will this prove to me? How may I utilize it in later life?" represented the sole standard for the evaluation of knowledge, then the supreme function of a school would be to lead its pupils by the shortest possible road to wealth and influence. But if, on the contrary, there would be no relation whatsoever between the studies and their future utility, then there would be danger lest the pupils, if lacking the higher aims, grow indolent and listless. An institution whose students are exclusively intent on cramming for examinations or on fitting themselves for a lucrative career, is 1 Vol. I, ch. X, 1. undoubtedly far removed from the ideal school with its broad humanistic spirit. Yet if we exclude all these indirect aims and all tangible profits, the average student will lack the inducement for persistent efforts. For instance, the young noblemen who go to the university for the purpose merely of broadening their intellectual horizon and of obtaining a smattering of higher learning, do not gain much from their attendance in the lecture halls. Again, the education of girls that does not look forward to the practical duties of women, is generally shallow and spends itself on an endless variety of fads and frills. Hence we should not underestimate the fact that the course of study leads to professional honors and distinctions. This fact may be regarded as a leaven in education, and the organization of the school system must take it into account. However, a due appreciation of higher educational motives and aims must prevent these utilitarian tendencies from becoming the main factor in education. 3. All these motives, based as they are upon the utility of education, imply only an indirect interest in education, but are nevertheless conscious, while certain other motives, indirect like them, are by nature more or less subconscious and instinctive. If any subject of education is widely popular, we may be certain that its popularity is owing not alone to its innate value or its practical utility, but also to a third factor, namely, the tendency of man to follow the example of others, to imitate the leaders of society or the majority of his fellowmen. It is here, too, that the truth of Aristotle's view that man is of all beings the most imitative, comes home to us. This universal need of conforming to others might also be traced back to an instinctive impulse of human nature. Men do, study, and practice what others are doing, studying, and practicing. Men approve of whatever happens to be fashionable, and content to do what others are doing they ask few, if any questions, about its value or utility. All studies, especially if unorganized and pursued informally, are ever subject, to a certain extent, to the caprices of fashion; and every genuine form of mental culture is paralleled by some fashionable imitation that is but a counterfeit of the original. Fashion has been well described as the stepsister of custom. It is characteristic of fashion to make a sport of what is serious in customs, and thus fashionable education is real education perverted into a toy and plaything. Measured by higher standards, even a utilitarian interest in education is superior to that dictated solely by considerations of fashion. The mechanic who is a draughtsman because of his trade, the musician who practices on different instruments, the hotel-waiter eager to learn modern languages-are all pursuing more wholesome studies than the fashionable miss who paints in oils, strums the piano, and chatters a jargon of French. However, her abuse of education, all too common in fashionable society, must not blind us to the important rôle that imitation plays in education. In the schoolroom the instinct of imitation is one of the strongest motive powers; and they are not the worst pupils who learn and study because others before them have done so, and because others after them will follow their example. Though their motive savors of gregariousness, still it may be raised to an esprit de corps and may be connected with a sense of duty much more readily than any selfish desire of honor and gain. CHAPTER III. The Cultural Interest.1 1. While striving to become like others in intellectual attainments, man must realize that education is an honor and ornament, and thus he has a standard for evaluating education. that is based on personality. This truth that knowledge and skill produce not only external results, but confer useful qualities and perfect man's whole nature, is recognized even by primitive peoples. The savage must learn the use of arms for the purpose of the battle and the hunt. But even he appreciates what may be called the ornaments of his simple life: the song, the dance, the procession, the passage of arms, the tournament; and the brave must be as familiar with rhythmic movements as with the shooting of the arrow and the hurling of the spear. In the early stages of civilization there is less need for giving prominence to what may be called the physical perfection of the race: civilization demands service and achievements, and is more concerned about special arts (partielle Fertigkeiten) that have particular aims than about such as are mere ornaments or as increase one's self-consciousness. But by enriching life in all 1 Bildungsinteresse; cf. Monroe, Cyclopedia of Education, s. v. Culture and Culture Values. directions and by giving it a higher content, civilization offers indirectly new and more effective inducements for the conscious and deliberate formation of one's personality. Civilization calls forth noble and self-conscious activity in the domain of the intellect as well as of æsthetics, and this activity may under favorable circumstances become the standard and goal of all education. Among the Greeks this motive was the principal one; they taught and learned, practiced and performed, for the purpose of acquiring the ability and the taste for expressing their inner nature and for spiritualizing the outer world; and this aim was regarded as the only one worthy of a free man. Succeeding periods did not attach the same importance to the personal element in education. The personal element was even ignored for short periods, yet, owing to the influence of the Greek ideal, it always reasserted itself. Our conception of education shows unmistakable traces of the Hellenic Taideía, and these very elements are a safeguard against the encroachments of utilitarian views. Among the different motives of present-day education there is, in fact, a distinctly cultural interest. This interest is concerned with cultural values of all sorts, not because of their inherent charm, as are the instinctive motives, nor because of their practical utility, as are the practical interests, but solely for the purpose of enriching and forming the inner nature; it is an artistic sense engaged on intellectual materials. From this point of view knowledge and skill are our real possession only after they have entered into our nature, i. e., have gone over, as it were, into our bones, to ennoble and refine our whole being. Only in this way can knowledge and works of art become truly educative and materials for building up one's inner nature. This cultural interest is æsthetical and artistic in character. It is primarily concerned with the arts and is intimately connected with the æsthetical interest, but lacks the disinterestedness of the latter. In the arts the cultural interest seeks only artistic appreciation and taste, and does not enter into their technique any further than is necessary for its object. It also deals with languages-for they are the connecting links between the outer and the inner world, give form and expression to our thoughts, and are the medium for communicating our ideasbut it devotes to them no more time than is needed to acquire the power to express one's thoughts in an original and individual way, and to assimilate the words of another with our |