own thoughts. The cultural interest deals with the sciences for the purpose of attaining a vigorous mental life as well as a clear view of things and their relation to man; and it makes their content the ground of varied activity. The cultural interest, however, extends beyond knowledge and skill and expresses itself in customs, habits of life, and social intercourse, so that its aim is here also the enriching of the personality and the assimilation of the outer world with the inner.

2. This interest in forming the personality is opposed to the tendency to attain practical skill. To be practically efficient, one must devote his attention to some special department. But the personal tendency in education does not attend to special fields. It is taken up with general elements, strives to bring the mind into contact with many things, deals, therefore, with different sciences, and consequently follows a policy that is contrary to what modern civilization has introduced--the division of labor. All practical education is modified essentially by the content of the respective art or science; its goal and standard is the special department in which the pupil would excel. Cultural education, whose aim is the forming of the personality, is more free in regard to the content of its subjects, for its object is, not to master them in their entirety, but to assimilate as material for the organic growth of the pupil's mind whatever they contain of cultural elements; some certain effects to be obtained in the pupil's mind are therefore the goal and standard of cultural education. If the educator aims at practical efficiency, then the period of schooling will be over as soon as the special aim has been attained. But the aims of cultural education can never be fully attained: no school can give a complete course in general culture, and the student must continue beyond the period of schooling to perfect himself along cultural lines; and he will find real satisfaction only when he is free to select whatever appeals to him as worthy of being assimilated.

To this opposition between practical efficiency and cultural education we can trace the conflict between the schools and the demands of life. The world demands of the young that they study for life; but the school contends that they should live for their studies, that they must spend some years in intellectual growth, and that their minds must be developed during these years irrespective of the immediate needs of practical life. The school justly claims the right to develop the latent powers of the child, without being obliged to prove in each case that these

powers will in after life be put to practical use. The school must afford light and air to the tender plants of the human faculties, even though most of these faculties may never attain to maturity. The elementary school preserves the child from being put prematurely to work, and does its utmost with its modest amount of intellectual content to create some intellectual interest and to spiritualize the child's skill. The higher schools demand of their students a generous amount of abstract study of such subjects as are not immediately useful, to the end that the young people may realize the meaning of mental growth and strength and be stimulated to convert in later life all their specialized knowledge and skill into an organic part of their personality.

The principle of humanism is one of the formulations of the personal tendency in education. Proceeding from the concept. of the Roman humanitas, it correlates all studies and arts with what is distinctively human in man. It is mainly concerned with the ancient world, not only because of its inner relationship with that age, but also because the ancient classics constitute the best material for a kind of education that must be removed as well from the distracting influences of the needs of everyday life as from the danger of premature specialization.

The principle of formal education springs from the same tendency. It opposes the view that the basis of education must be broad and comprehensive with regard to content and that future efficiency is unthinkable without the mastery of diversified knowledge. It demands, on the contrary, that the formative powers of the mind be awakened, and maintains that these will of themselves prove equal to the different material they will have to cope with; just as the knife, if sharpened, will cut different things, and as the muscle, once it is developed and strengthened, will prove equal to different kinds of work. This principle suggests the study of the formal subjects language and grammar, mathematics and logic; and advises that the material of these branches be selected and treated with a view to securing the greatest possible amount of mental training. It implies, therefore, that certain intellectual qualities should be regarded as the goal and standard in selecting the material for the lessons and exercises.

CHAPTER IV.

The Moral Motives.

1. Any serious effort made to enrich and refine human life must take into account the moral nature of man. Man's inner nature can not be truly developed without developing his moral sense. This interaction between the cultural interest and moral striving is expressed in many terms employed to designate the end of education. In the Greek kaλoyalía the good is added to the beautiful. The Latin erudire expresses that man's thoughts as well as his morals should be raised from what is rude and vile. When we speak of inner refinement we mean moral and intellectual refinement; and when we speak of humanism, idealism, harmony of nature, and the like, as being the end of education, we combine the intellectual and the moral into a unit.' Even the practical tendency in education leads eventually to moral aims: the bona artes represented such knowledge as was useful and gave man solid moral worth; and when we advise the young to acquire a good, solid education we are conscious both of the usefulness and the moral value of learning. Intellectual health implies both the instinctive craving and the moral striving for knowledge. This is well expressed in the dedication of the Rhetoric attributed to Aristotle: "As health is the custodian of the body, so education is the custodian of the soul... It teaches one how to acquire all that is good. It is a pleasure to see with the eyes of the body, but to see with the eyes of the soul, that is indeed wonderful."

This view, that knowledge and skill should promote moral development, antedates other conscious aims. In history we meet the ideal of the wise man earlier than that of the educated man. That all study and practice should be conducive to virtue, and that they are truly efficient only when actuated by moral motives, appeals more readily to common folk than the æsthetical development of one's personality. There are many Eastern sayings to the effect that intellectual growth without a corresponding moral growth is of no avail, and that only the

1 The Danish word "danne" expresses both intellectual culture and moral excellence; it means to form, to develop; “dannelse" means a picture, culture, and education; but "dannemand" is an honest man, and "dannequinde," an honest woman.

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pure can enter into the secrets of science. For instance, the Chinese describe justice as the landed estate of the well-educated man, while the enrichment of his mind is his gain and profit.' The Hindus teach that only the pure and humble can profit by the study of the Vedas." The morally beautiful was the object of Greek education: the Spartans prayed the gods to grant them the beautiful on the ground of the good. Hence the philosophers taught nothing new when insisting that study and practice should make man better. They merely recalled the old truth to the minds of their countrymen, and warned them against following a purely æsthetical aim in education. Plato inculcates the truth that poetry and music are not given to us for aimless enjoyment, but as a means for regulating, harmonizing, and beautifying our inner nature. The Stoics were rigorous in correlating all studies with moral aims, and refused to consider any studies as liberal unless they assisted man in attaining freedom of desires. They considered ethics as the only science of real intrinsic value; and in comparison with it, put the cultural studies on the same level as the vocational arts. The ancients also taught that morality must be, not only the end, but also the starting-point, of education. Plato tells us that the sensual man must, if possible, be made morally better before being taught;" and a Stoic maxim reads, "Mores primum, mox sapientiam disce, quæ sine moribus male discitur." The ancients in general knew nothing of searching after truth for its own sake; and though they contrasted the theoretical tendency of the mind with the practical, they regarded both as being ethical.

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2. With these views the educationists of all ages agree in so far as they all maintain that education must develop the moral sense. But they do not agree as to the power that knowledge has to make a man morally good. The intellectualistic view,

1 Vol. I, ch. VIII, 3.

2 Cramer, Geschichte der Erziehung und des Unterrichts, II, p. 62.

3 Tà κalà ẻmì Toîs ȧyaboîs. Plato, II, Alc., p. 148, and Plutarch, Inst. lac., p. 253 ed. Hutten.

Tim., p. 47.

5 Cf. Seneca, Ep. 88, where he reviews the arts and finds fault with them because of their small moral value: we should be less concerned about the wanderings of Ulysses than about our own aberrations from the path of duty; we should attend more to the moderation of our wishes than to the measuring of fields and estates; we should think less about straight lines than about the straight path to be followed in life, etc.

6 Soph., p. 246.

to which modern pedagogy inclines, considers instruction as the chief factor in moral training. However, there is a vast difference between knowledge and conscience, and moral education is impossible without discipline and careful habituation. But, objects the individualist, man should live virtuously for reasons founded on his own individuality, and hence the moral formation is a continuation and a perfecting of the æsthetical. However, if we regard man as essentially related to larger moral bodies, we must allow a greater distance between the beautiful and the good, and consequently also a greater distance between the educative forces and the moral. Morality and the mind are so variously and delicately intertwined with each other that it is difficult to see through the whole. Hence it is not surprising that men, looking at the subject from different viewpoints, arrive at different conclusions regarding the individual factors and their reciprocal influences. However, for our present purpose of analyzing the aims of education it is sufficient to have established the fact that all divergent views meet in this point that mental culture must be co-ordinated with moral ends.'

The view that education is to make men better, presupposes that much thought has been given to the subject of mind and morality. Before arriving at this view men realized that teaching and learning are themselves moral actions. Among the ancients this latter conception gave rise to solemn forms of teaching and to the pupil's reverence for his teacher. The relations between the teacher and his pupils, between the master and his disciples, are frequently compared to the first of all moral relationships, that between father and son: the teacher is described as the second father who gives birth to the intellectual life of the pupil; he is deemed worthy of filial respect, and the ties between him and his pupil outlive the period of schooling and continue during all after life.

This reverence for the teacher springs, however, not only from the feeling of personal gratitude, but also from the conviction that the teacher is the administrator of intellectual treasures, and that he imparts these to the pupil in order to fulfill his duty with regard to conserving and transmitting the intellectual heritage of the race. This view is not peculiar to

In Discourse VIII, Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Religious Duty, of his Idea of a University, Cardinal Newman deals with the influence of knowledge on morality.