EDUCATION IN ITS RELATION TO THE

SUM TOTAL OF LIFE'S DUTIES.

1. Just as the function of an organ can be understood only in the light of its sharing in the life of the organism, so the various fields of man's activities can be understood only in their teleological connection. For this reason our inquiry, to be complete, must trace the relationship between education and the sum total of man's duties, and in this way the educative process, which was the subject of our inquiry, and which was unavoidably isolated, will be brought back to the large whole of which it is but a part. The science that treats of man's duties is ethics, and our science of education has frequently laid this science under contribution, especially when dealing with the ends and the system of education; and to it, as to the definitive science, we would now submit the results of our investigation.

The ancients defined ethics as the inquiry περὶ βίου καὶ τῶν Tрòs nuas. This may be rendered as the science dealing with the duties of human life, for the Greek wording contains a hendiadys, and the phrase "of life and our duties" is equivalent to: "what is our duty in life." The Greek definition has several points in its favor. It expresses the normative character of ethics as of the science that deals with duties. It also brings out the fact that the field of ethics is life, which can and should be conceived as partly individual and partly social. And, lastly, it gives a view of life in general, that is, the organic world.

Thus there are also primitive duties of life, which, while rooted in the organic nature, are outside the pale of the moral world, but are, nevertheless, the best subject to examine before treating the moral duties, since we shall find a natural transition from the primitive duties to the moral duties.

The first and plainest duty imposed by natural law upon every living being is that of preserving its life. The instinct of life-preservation is the basic instinct of all animal organisms. Its two forms are the instinct of self-preservation and the instinct of species-preservation; and these two instincts manifest themselves respectively in the love of life and in the instinct for propagation. Self-preservation implies, on the one hand, the supplying of the means of subsistence, the object of the instinctive craving for food, and, on the other hand, the pro

tecting of life from dangers, the object of the instinctive seeking for protection. The instinct for the preservation of the species results in mating and induces the parents to protect and bring up their young. Feeding and mating, protection of its own life and of the life of its young-these are the sum total of the lifeactivities of the brute. The objective points of these activities are the individual self and the species, and the senses are the instruments. The brute is wholly taken up with sensuous-selfish instincts. These activities and instincts are powerful motor forces in man's life also: "Magister artis ingenique largitor venter," as an ancient poet puts it; and a modern poet tells us that hunger and love are the dynamic forces responsible for the bustle of human life. Because the human race consists of individuals. and represents a species, the preservation of the life of the individual and of the species must be recognized as a human duty, and the sensuous-selfish element must for the same reason be included in the circle of human interests.

Attempts have been made to let this sensuous-selfish element represent more than a factor, to have it recognized as the principle that governs all human duties; and consequently man would be regarded as a sublimated brute. But aberrations of this kind would be prevented by merely considering how strongly opposed this sensuous-selfish element is to the moral element, after which the whole inquiry has been named, and which, if ignored or only curtailed, must lead to grave errors. Morality connotes primarily the control of the sensuous instincts. Á moral man is primarily one who is not a slave to lust and lewdness. All morality connotes purity of life and the senses, such as can not coexist with man's animal instincts uncontrolled. When a man allows his lower nature to control him, we call his life beastly and describe it as unworthy of his high calling. And the control of the selfish instincts is likewise essential to morality. Morality must check the selfish instincts when they prompt an attack upon what belongs to our fellowman. Such attacks upon a neighbor's rights are called brutal, thus voicing the common opinion of men that the brute is the representative of unchecked egoism as well as of uncontrolled sensuousness.

2. The sensuous-selfish element is but a component of human life, and it alone offers no explanation of human life. The latter must be conceived as a resultant in which a second force is simultaneously active. This second force must be opposed to the first, and the superficial observer might regard the rational

social tendency as such. This tendency controls the instincts. and unites the individuals; it reasons theoretically that the special must be subordinated to the general, and results practically in subordinating the interests of the individual to those of the community. To retain the figure of co-operating forces, we should say that this second component is too near the first, and, because of the small angle it forms, it does not change its direction enough. The merely rational will not effectively control the sensuous, and the social tendency primarily multiplies the selfish elements. Social life may, indeed, check somewhat the high-handed proceeding, but does not attack egoism at the root. It operates from the outside upon the inner nature, but not from within upon the outer nature. The mechanical pressure which it exerts is, though indispensable, yet insufficient, and it must needs be supplemented by an organizing tendency that is active from within.

We must, therefore, seek a different and purer element to oppose the sensuous-selfish. And this opposing force is no other than the supersensuous-unselfish. Here the transcendental tendency is opposed to instinct; sacrifice to egoism; and the inner bond, the religio, to all high-handed and arbitrary proceeding. Only the transcendental tendency of human nature can effectively oppose the instincts, for it is something elemental and powerful as are the instincts themselves. It alone is able to attack them at the root and to change their inner nature. By opposing the life of the beyond to the present it secures the Archimedean fulcrum for controllong the instincts. It teaches us to hold this present life in small account because of the life to come, and yet to hold it in great account as leading to the life eternal. In its unselfishness it possesses the root of charity which unites man with man, not in the manner of an instinct, neither in the manner of a rational association, i. e., outwardly, but unites them inwardly and in the common devotion to a third and higher sphere.

Religion is the source of morality. It is the basis of purity and moderation, and these are characteristic traits of morality. The inner harmony, the fruit of self-discipline, is only external and merely reflects that harmony which is the fruit of the peace in God; and likewise the justice which can only bend the selfwill is but a reflection of the charity which melts all self-will. Thus we see that to the duty of life-preservation which is based on sensuous and selfish motives, is opposed the higher duty of consecrating human life and of so incorporating one's lowly self

with the order that is above the earth and its interests. These two duties, life-preservation and life-consecration, mark the extreme points between which life, i.e., the moral world, extends, and in this broad extent we behold the material and the ideal, the animal element and the transcendental, interlaced in various organizations.

In order to preserve his life, man turns to economic interests and follows a trade. The same interests, joined with the spontaneous delight found in representing things, result in art, while the craving for knowledge produces science and research. Social intercourse and community of life create the organ of language, which is the vehicle of both polite and scientific literature. The term culture embraces all these intellectual treasures, which are a fitting content of human life. There is a mutual relationship between culture and civilization, the latter embracing all the institutions and forms of life which make man a member of a community. The foundations of civilization are customs and rights, the family, society, and the State; and its highest form is that stage of refinement when the external forms of civilization have entered into the inner nature, so that the outer and inner man are in perfect harmony.

3. Culture and refinement are conditioned to a great extent on natural and material elements. Instincts (which are partly analogous to the instincts of the brute), needs of all kinds, struggles, and sensuous-selfish tendencies have co-operated in regulating human life and in giving it objects to strive for. But simultaneously with these lower motives a higher tendency and one foreign to the natural man began to exert itself, and it taught that bodily needs are of secondary importance; and it also put an end to the strife caused by the struggle for existence.

Man is like a tree which obtains its nourishment, not only from the soil wherein its roots are buried, but also from the height to which its crown extends. Without the transcendental tendency the arts would never have gotten beyond mere handicraft, on the one hand, and beyond mere playing, on the other. Religion inspired the artists both with a higher aim and a more serious purpose: it led man to advance from building his house to the constructing of temples and cathedrals, from the playful imitating of nature to sculpturing and painting his objects of worship, from songs to hymns, and from dances to processions. Literature and science owe much of their development to the service they rendered to religion by preserving its teaching. Science and art are more esteemed than the trades because they

may be cultivated in an unselfish spirit, without a thought of one's personal needs or gains, the sole object being the attainment of what the mind has proposed to itself as an aim. But unselfish devotion to an ideal is born of the transcendental tendency of human nature. The struggle for existence can not teach it, for from this viewpoint such a devotion appears unreasonable and foolish. All culture is, furthermore, in need of tradition; but the latter is not fixed and sacred unless it be entrusted with the transmission of a sacred content. Just as tradition gives a content to human life, so authority regulates and controls it. But for all authority there must be a source whence the obligation can ultimately be derived. But this ultimate source must be sought outside the human relations, as these are themselves derived and not primitive. Only a higher order, which affects the innermost nature of man, can obligate his mind and the operations of his soul; and human authority must be content with externals and can not claim the right to bind the soul, unless it be commissioned to do so by one who is possessed of this right.

Good sense has ever considered the higher order, which is the object of religion, the basis of the rule of life. "All human laws," says says Heraclitus, "are supported by the one divine law."1 Cicero voiced the common opinion of the ancients when he wrote: "We are beholden first to the immortal gods, next to our country, then to our parents, and finally to the rest of men. in a descending scale. "? Nor is it surprising that the ancients recognized that the treasures of culture are the gifts of the deity. "That god of all gods do I praise," says Euripides, "who has raised our life above that of the brutes, who gave us reason and language, which is the messenger of thought, who gave us fruit for food, protection against the weather, navigation over the Plato teaches that we have received virtue by divine dispensation. Pindar says that man acquires wisdom by the help of God." Philosophy and science are, according to Cicero, the inventions of the gods." The same truth is embodied in the Spartans' prayer in which they begged the gods to give

seas, etc.

3

1 Fr. 123: τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπινοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τοῦ θείου.

2 De off, I, 45: "Prima officia Diis immortalibus, secunda patriæ, tertia parentibus, deinceps gradatim reliquis debentur."

3 Eur., Suppl., 198 ff.

4 Meno., p. 100.

5 Ol., X, 10.

6 Cic., Tusc., I, 26: "Philosophia inventum Deorum."