displays the super-personal treasures, which are sought after for their own sake,' and discloses their transcendental origin." The rational sciences are the chief means for developing the theoretical reason. But indirectly the empirical and the applied sciences serve the same purpose, for they also raise questions of cause and effect, of end and means. Strict reasoning is characteristic of mathematics, and its sensuous substratum renders it available early in life; it prepares for the study of philosophy, especially logic, the latter representing an advanced stage of abstract thought. Physics and also theology contain many rational elements. Mathematics evolves the speculative elements of physics; and philosophy evolves the speculative elements of theology. The practical reason is developed on its formative side by means of language, poetry, literature in general, and the fine arts. Any other materials, however, that are the object of the æsthetical interest, or that foster a refined taste - such as are found in the natural sciences, in the history of civilization, and in philosophy-may likewise further the development of this side of the practical reason. The moral side of the practical reason is developed by means of all such educative contents as develop the consciousness of what is good and bad, just and sinful. Therefore every instruction period that deals with human relations should contribute its quota to the development of the moral sense. This holds principally for religious instruction and the subjects of literature and history; all such instruction should evoke moral judgments, enkindle sympathy, and inspire devotion. All branches of the curriculum can assist in developing the religious consciousness, and will do so the more effectively the more ingenuously a religious aspect is given to the subject. But religious instruction must, nevertheless, remain the centre and basis of all moral training, and must be supplemented by religious exercises, both public and private. 6. The cognitive faculties represent the starting-point as well as the goal of the educative process. But the latter can not begin to operate without the work of those practical functions that belong to the appetitive faculties. The educative process aims, indeed, at the formation of the inner life, but can not dispense with the co-operation of the inner life itself. We have 1 Ch. IV, 3 2 Ch. V. seen above that the educational motives are drawn from the whole field of human strivings: the instinctive impulses to learn, to know, to imitate are the first stimuli to educate oneself. Nor can we forego in this educative process the assistance derived from the practical interests in possessing something and in holding a proper position in society. We must also acquire habits of regular activity so as to insure proper control of the educational appetency. The forming of a circle of presentations must, finally, go hand in hand with the forming of a circle of interests.2 The intellect and will develop, like the circles of presentations and interests, amid mutual influences upon each other: intellectual cognition raises the desire to an act of the will; and also raises the habitual and unconscious doing to conscious activity; and conversely, the will is the power inspiring the increased mental activity required for thinking. The development of man's feelings (Gemüt) is intimately connected with the development of his reason: if we conceive reason as an inner speaking, we must concede that the feelings give resonance to this voice. "Thy reason," says Schiller, "is the voice of the good, but thou thyself art thy heart: 'tis well with thee if thy reason will ever dwell in thy heart." The theoretical reason seeks, not mere intellectual growth, but something that will satisfy the hunger and longing of the heart. It is significant that the ancients say "toto pectore cogitare," and that Scripture speaks of the "cor intelligens" and the “sapientes corde." What we have thought, is our full possession and a factor in our inner life only after it has become the object of our feelings: 3 "If you but think without a feeling strong, One wave of thought will merely wash the other along; Not what you think, but what you feel is true, Your thought but makes your feeling clear to you." (Rückert.) The form-giving reason depends even more on the co-operation of the feelings. It is the heart that makes men eloquent: "pectus est quod facit disertos." Man must feel "in his innermost heart what he would form and create with his hands." Like 1 Supra, ch. I, ff. 2 We employ the term "interest" in a different sense than Herbart. Herbart uses it in the sense of intellectual appetency (Streben); whereas, as used above, it implies the stimulus to regulated appetency in general. 3 Deut. XXIX, 4; Ex. XXVIII, 3. the beautiful, the good and what is pleasing in the sight of God. can not be fully grasped without love. The knowledge of the good is imperfect until it has become a matter of conscience. The sense of right and wrong is a real power for good only after it has become an integral part of the settled character. Consequently, the educative process must take into account the heart and the feelings.' But it is inadvisable to make a further division of the feelings for the purpose of obtaining points that might guide us in evaluating the educational content. Knowledge can be acquired and imparted; the arts can be learned and taught; but the feelings come and go, and can no more be taught than commanded. The life of the feelings is no workshop of education, rather a hall where education may display its choicest products. Only general rules can be laid down for the control of the feelings. The educator must check the sudden changes in feeling and the outbursts of strong emotion, without, however, fostering a cold indifference. He must, as it were, tame the wild emotions, without robbing them of their native strength. He should, indeed, bring light into the dark world. of the feelings, but should not dissect the latter too minutely, nor attempt to convert them into conscious actions. These and other imperatives must suffice on this subject in default of the more definite directions that may be given with regard to what pertains to cognition and interest. 1 Cf. Maher, Psychology, pp. 221 ff. |