there are some of much interest. Of these we instance the case of Quo warranto, against the State Bank of Indiana, and the case of the State v. Lasselle, p. 60. The following is the statement of facts used by the court, in giving their opinion in the latter case.

Appeal from the Knox Circuit Court, Polly, a woman of color, was brought before the circuit court by Lasselle, in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus. He stated in his return that he held her by purchase as his slave; she being the issue of a colored woman purchased from the Indians in the territory north west of the river Ohio previously to the treaty of Greenville and cession of that territory to the United States. The Court below remanded the woman to the custody of Lasselle.

In the act of Virginia, passed 1783, ceding this territory to the United States, is the following condition, under which the defendant in this case claimed to hold Polly as his slave. "That the French and Canadian inhabitants and other settlers of the Kaskaskies, St. Vincent, and the neighboring villages, who have professed themselves citizens of Virginia, shall have their possessions and titles confirmed to them, and be protected in the enjoyment of their rights and liberties.""

The Court remarks, that, 'it was within the legitimate powers of the convention, in forming our constitution, to prohibit slavery in the State of Indiana. We are, then, only to look into our constitution to learn the nature and extent of our civil rights; and to that instrument alone we must resort for a decision of this question.'

In the 11th article of that instrument, section 7th, it is declared, that "There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in this State, otherwise than for the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." It is evident, therefore, that, by these provisions, the framers of our constitution intended a total and entire prohibition of slavery in this State; and we can conceive of no form of words in which that intention could have been more clearly expressed.'

It will be remarked that the arguments of counsel are in no case given. This is undoubtedly a matter of regret; but the omission is not to be imputed to negligence in Judge Blackford; as it is only within a few years, and long since these decisions were made, that the judge, at the earnest solicitation of the pro

fession, undertook the task of publishing them. And only by the provision in the statute of Indiana requiring the judges in all important cases to give their opinions in writing, and those opinions to be recorded, is it, that they have been preserved. It has been, however, by thus omitting the arguments of counsel, and the care that seems to have been taken to make the statement of facts as short as possible, that the Reporter has been enabled to embody in this volume the unusual number of cases that it contains; being no less than 230.

The notes appended to a majority of the cases will be found exceedingly valuable. These are very full and embrace a vast number of cases, on the same points, arranged in a most satisfactory manner. This was highly necessary in the present work. Having been decided so long before publication, numerous decisions on many of the questions have been made elsewhere, which are here brought before the reader.

Much care appears to have been taken in the formation of the index, to refer subjects to their proper heads and place, them in a situation for easy reference, by briefly restating them under all the titles to which they have the remotest relation.

As an instance of this, we find under the title pleading, in addition to 21 articles specially appropriated to that head, references to 25 other titles. The abstracts at the head of the cases also seem to be well worthy of commendation. Wherever the facts of the case are necessary to be known, they are clearly and simply stated, and then the decision made upon them is given as in the case of Lions et. al. v. the State, p. 309.

'Scire facias in recognizance. Plea, that the principal had appeared in Court in discharge of the recognizance, and pleaded not guilty to the indictment; that the Court, after hearing the evidence dismissed the jury, and discharged him; and that afterwards he had been called, and the recognizance declared forfeited. Held that the plea was good. That the averment, that the principal had been discharged, was essential to the validity of the plea.'

It may not be uninteresting to state that the only assistance rendered by the public towards the publication, was the subscription of the State for 60 copies of the work, which have been distributed and placed in the clerk's offices of the different counties of the State. Yet the volume is sold, neatly

bound in sheep, with spring backs, at $4, and the paper, type and mechanical execution of the work will bear a comparison with similar publications of the older States.

ART. VIII.-RULES AS TO CONSTRUCTION OF DEVISES.

1. Ir a man devise to another lands, &c. indefinitely as to estate, he takes only for life, unless a manifest intention appear to give a greater estate. Latch, 40; Pollexfen, 541; Cowper R. 240, 355, 659, 841; Doug. R. 759; 1 Bro. Ch. R. 489; 5 T. R. 320; 6 T. R. 175; 7 T. R. 635; 6 T. R. 610; 8 T. R. 64; 2 Peere Will. 335.

2. General introductory words, such as, ' touching my worldly estate,' &c. indicating an intention to dispose of the whole estate, are not sufficient to enlarge the estate, which would otherwise be construed for life, into a fee. 5 T. R. 13; 6 T. R. 612; 8 T. R. 64; 4 Bos. & Pull. 335; 2 W. Bl. 889; Cowp. 352, 657; Doug. 759; 2 Binn. 13, 455.

3. The heir at law is not to be disinherited, unless by express words or manifest intention on the face of the will. Prec. Chan. 381, 439; 3 T. R. 83; Cro. Car. 368; 8 T. R. 579.

4. If a devise be to A, indefinitely, with a devise over, in case of an indefinite failure of heirs, issue, &c. of A, A will take a fee tail. Therefore a devise to A, and if A should depart this life and leave no issue of his body,' then over, A takes a fee tail. Forth v. Chapman, 1 P. Will. 664.

So, if A should leave no issue of his body,' even though no previous estate devised to A. Walter v. Drew, Comyn Rep. 372.

So, to my three daughters equally to be divided, viz. to A, B, and C, and if any of them die before the other, then the others to be her heirs, equally to be divided, and if they all die without issue,' then over. King v. Rumball, Cro. Jac. 448; S. C. 1 Rolle Abr. 883.

So, to A his son, and if his (the testator's) daughters outlive the mother and the brother, and his heirs, then they shall have it.' Webb v. Heering, Cro. Jac. 448; S. C. Cro. Jac. 415; recognised, Doug. R. 264; Willes, 166, 369; S. C. 1 Rolle Rep. 398, 436.

So, to A, and if he dies without issue, then to another. Com. Dig. Devise N. 5, cites 3 Mod. 123; 1 Rolle Abr. 837; 1 Vent, 230; Vide 1 P. Will. 605; 4 Burr. 2246.

So, to A and if she has no child by me, and for want of such issue, then over. Wyld v. Lewis, 1 Atk. 432.

So, to A, and if he dies not having a son,' then over. Per Popham. Moore, 682; 1 Vent. 231.

So, to A, and if he marries, and has issue male, his son shall have it, and if he has no issue male, then over. R. 9 Co. 127.

So, to A, and if he dies without male heirs, then over. Denn v. Slater. 5 T. R. 335.

So, if A happens to die without heirs,' then over, though no estate at all be previously given to A. Goodright v. Goodridge, Willes R. 369.

So, to A, B, and C, and if either die without issue, then over. Hope v. Taylor, 1 Burr. R. 268. And see 2 P. Will. 194; Hob. 65; Cro. Jac. 599; Willes R. 1.

So, to A, and if the said A should chance to die without heir or issue, the abovesaid lands to fall into the possession of his brother B.' A has a fee tail only. Burkart v. Bucher, 2 Binn. 455.

5. If there be a devise to A for life, and if he die without issue, then over, A has an estate tail, to effectuate the intent of the testator. For where the testator has a general and also a secondary interest, and they clash, the latter must give way to the former. Forth v. Chapman, 1 P. Will. 667; Target v. Grant, 1 P. Will. 432; Brice v. Smith, Willes, 1. And see Robinson v. Robinson, 1 Burr. 38; Denn v. Purky, 5 T. R. 299; Doe v. Halley, 8 T. R. 5; 2 Wils. 323; 7 T. R. 531; 1 East, 229; 5 East R. 548.

So, a devise to A for life, and after his decease to and among his issue, and in default of issue,' then over, A takes an estate tail. Doe v. Appling, 4 T. R. 82.

6. If a devise be to A generally, and then there be a devise over upon a contingency limited to take effect in his life, (as if he die before 21 years of age,) A takes a fee simple.

6

Therefore a devise to A after his mother's life, and if he die before he come to the age of 21 years, then to my heirs forever.' Per Saunders in Purefoy v. Rogers, 2 Saund. 281,

388, recognised in Moore v. Heaseman, Willes, 138, and Doe v. Cundall, 9 East, 400.

So, to my sister for life, and after her decease to her daughter A, paying to each of her sisters B and C £500 apiece, and if either of them die, the survivor of them to have the legacy; and if the said A die, I will that the farm be divided between the survivors; and in case all the three daughters die before their mother, I will it to descend to the right heirs' of my sister. A takes a fee simple, B and C also a fee on the contingency, even without the clause and in case,' &c. Moore v. Heaseman, Willes R. 138.

So, to A, and if the said A shall happen to die in his minority, or before he comes of age,' then to my three daughters, A takes a fee simple. Frogmorton v. Holyday, 3 Burr. 1618.

So, to my brother in trust for his eldest son A, till he shall attain 21, and if he should die before 21, then over; A's son takes a fee. Tomkins v. Tomkins, cited in Goodtitle v. Whitby, 1 Burr. 234.

So, to 'A and B, daughters of my brother W, when they have attained the age of 21 years; but the executor or executrix shall be accountable for the profits of the said houses unto the said children until the age of 21, or the day of marriage; but if either of them should die before the said age of 21, then the survivor shall be heir. Doe v. Cundall, 9 East, 400.

So, to my grandchildren A, B, and C, equally to be divided between them all, share and share alike, as tenants in common; but in case of the death of either of my said grandchildren under age and without leaving any lawful issue, then it is my will that his share or part of the said several premises shall go and be divided among all and every of my surviving grandchildren. Toovey v. Bassett, 10 East R. 460.

So, to my three sons, A, B, and C; also my will is that if either or any of my three sons should die without children, the survivor or survivors of them to hold the interest or share of each or any of them dying without children. Richardson v. Noyes, 2 Mass. R. 56.

So, to the children of my three daughters who shall be living at the death of the survivor of my said daughters, share and share alike, to take as tenants in common, and not as joint tenants; but if all my said daughters shall happen to die without