began to manifest more positive resolutions. England herself, if her king and his ministers had yielded less to their individual prepossessions, would have prudently paused; and abandoning an enterprise above her strength, would have resorted to the only way of safety that she had left. But pride, obstinacy and intrigue are too often the ruin of states; and lord Bute was incessantly smoothing that route for king George. After the victory of Saratoga, the Americans pursued with rare sagacity the policy prescribed by their new circumstances. Their conduct demonstrated as much ability as experience in affairs of state. They reflected, that as their successes had increased their strength, rendered their alliance more desirable, and banished all doubts from enlightened minds respecting their independence, nothing could be better calculated on their part, than to give jealousy to France, by pretending a disposition to make alliance with England; and disquietude to England, by the appearance of courting the strictest union with France. They hoped by this conduct to arrive at length to something conclusive. Accordingly, the same express that carried to England the news of the capitulation of Saratoga, was the bearer of despatches, the drift of which was to insinuate, that the Americans, disgusted by the excessive delays of the French, and indignant at not having received in the midst of their reverses, avowed and more efficacious succours, were eagerly desirous of an accommodation with England, and to conclude with her a treaty of commerce, provided she acknowledged their independence. In order to give more weight to this suggestion, it was added, that the colonists would feel particular gratification in a reconciliation with their ancient country; whereas, in the contrary case, they should be compelled to throw themselves into the arms of the inveterate and implacable enemy of the English name.

General Gates, on whom his recent victory reflected so much lustre, wrote to the same effect, to one of the most distinguished members of parliament. These steps of the chiefs of the American revolution were likewise necessary to satisfy the people, who would not, without extreme repugnance, have seen themselves thrust precipitately into the party of France, before having attempted every probable mode of effecting an adjustment with England. The prejudices they entertained against France were still in all their force; and the persuasion that this power had speculated upon their misfortunes, had greatly exasperated their aversion. These negotiations were no secret to the court of Versailles, as they had been communicated to Franklin, who knew how to make the best use of them the umbrage they gave the French ministers will be readily conceived. Franklin, about the same time, received instructions to reiterate his expostulations with the government, that it might at length discover itself, since otherwise, it was to be feared that England, convinced by the catastrophe of Burgoyne, and even by the

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useless victories of Howe, that the reduction of America, by dint of arms, was absolutely impossible, would acknowledge independence. The Americans, he added, finding themselves deserted by the French, will be constrained to listen to the overtures of the English, and to accept of favor wherever they find it; and such an arrangement could not have effect but to the irreparable prejudice of the interests of France. The ministers perceived clearly that the time was come, in which, if they would not lose the fruit of all their policy, it was necessary finally to lay aside the personage of the fox, and to assume the nature of the lion. Judging the British ministers by themselves, they supposed them entirely exempt from all passion, as statesmen ought to be; consequently, fearing the measures which their wisdom might prescribe, they determined to resume, and bring to a conclusion, the negotiations they had opened already so long since with the Americans, and which they had so shrewdly prolonged.

This decision appeared to them the more urgent, as they were not ignorant that the great body of the inhabitants of America, their independence once established, would much more willingly have coalesced with the English, a people of the same blood, of the same language, of the same manners, and still not entirely forgetful of former friendship, than with the French, a nation not only foreign and rival, but reputed faithless; whose long hesitations had countenanced the imputation, and against whom, from their tenderest childhood, they had fostered the most unfavorable prepossessions. On the other hand, the Americans had supported three entire years of the most trying distress, without having ever discovered the least disposition to relinquish their enterprise, or the least mark of weariness in their conflict with adverse fortune. Their moderation had not deserted them in success; and the perseverance of their efforts had given to the first victories of the English all the consequences of defeats. These considerations had persuaded the ministers of France that America had knowledge, power and will, to keep the faith of treaties.

The resolution of finally taking an active part in this war, by extending an auxiliary hand to the Americans, could not fail, besides, of being highly agreeable to the greater part of the French nation. The motive of it was not merely to be found in the inveterate hatred borne the English, in the remembrance of recent wounds, in the desire of revenge, and in the political opinions which, at that period, had spread throughout the kingdom, but also in numerous and powerful considerations of commercial advantage. The trade which had been carried on between France and America, since the commencement of disturbances, and especially since the breaking out of hostilities, had yielded the French merchants immense gains. All of these, therefore, eagerly desired that the new order of things

might be perpetuated by independence, in order never to see the times revived, in which the prohibitory laws of parliament, and especially the act of navigation, would have deprived them of these benefits. It is true, however, that they had not found this commerce so lucrative as they had anticipated; for several of them, hurried away by the excessive love of gain, and principally those of the maritime cities, had despatched to America ships loaded with valuable merchandise, a great number of which had been taken on the passage by the British cruisers. But even these losses stimulated their desire to be able to continue the same cominerce, and to witness the reduction of that British audacity which pretended to reign alone upon an element common to the whole universe. They hoped that the royal navy in open war would afford protection to the ships of commerce; and that force would thus shield the enterprises of cupidity. The French had, besides, in this conjuncture, the hope, or rather the certainty, that Spain would take part in the quarrel. This was a consideration of weight, in addition to the motives which always influenced them. That kingdom had a formidable marine, and was animated with so strong a desire to make trial of it against England, that the French court, rigidly adhering to its plan of circumspection, had hitherto thought it prudent to check rather than stimulate the cabinet of Madrid. It was not in the least doubted, that all the united forces of the House of Bourbon, already so long prepared, and directed towards the same object, were more than sufficient to take down the intolerable arrogance of the English, to protect rich cargoes from their insults, and even to cause the commerce of the two Indies to pass almost entirely into the hands of the French and Spaniards.

Thus favored by circumstances, and by the voice of the people, the French government had more need of prudence to restrain it from precipitating its resolutions, than of ardor, to incite it to encounter the hazards of fortune. Never, assuredly, had any government to adopt a counsel more recommended by the unanimous and ardent wishes of its subjects, or which promised a more fortunate issue, or more brilliant advantages. Unable, therefore, to resist longer the pressing solicitations of the agents of Congress, the ministers resolved at length to seize the occasion, and to conclude with America the treaty which had been the object of such long negotiations. But as, heretofore, the intention of France had been to elude any positive engagement, the articles of the convention, though often and deliberately discussed, were not yet settled. Under the apprehension, however, that the British government, in case of further delays, might tempt the Americans with conciliatory overtures, the French ministers concluded to signify to the commissioners of Congress the preliminaries of the treaty of friendship and commerce, to be stipulated between the two states. This communication was made the six

teenth of December, 1777, by M. Gerard, royal syndic of the city of Strasbourg, and secretary of the king's council of state. Its purport was as follows; That France would not only acknowledge, but support with all her forces the independence of the United States, and would conclude with them a treaty of amity and commerce; that in the stipulations of this treaty she would take no advantage of the present situation of the United States, but that the articles of it should be of the same nature as if the said states had been long established, and were constituted in all the plenitude of their strength; that his most christian majesty plainly foresaw that in taking this step, he should probably enter upon a war with Great Britain; but that he desired no indemnification upon that score on the part of the United States; not pretending to act solely with a view to their particular interest, since, besides the benevolence he bore them, it was manifest, that the power of England would be diminished by the dismemberment of her colonies. The king expected only, with full confidence, from the United States, that whatever was the peace which might be concluded eventually, they would never renounce their independence, and resume the yoke of British domination.' This declaration on the part of France, reassured the minds of the Americans; it was followed by very active negotiations during all the month of January. They were immediately communicated to Spain, that she might also, if so inclined, become a party to the convention; nor was it long before a favorable answer was received from that court.

All difficulties being surmounted, and the conditions acceded to on the one part and on the other, upon the sixth of February was concluded the treaty of amity between his most christian majesty and the United States of America. It was signed on behalf of the king by M. Gerard, and for the United States by Benjamin Franklin, Silas Deane, and Arthur Lee. By this treaty, in which the king of France considered the United States of America as an independent nation, were regulated between the contracting parties, various maritime and commercial interests concerning the duties which merchant vessels were to pay in the ports of the friendly state; it guaranteed the reciprocal protection of vessels in time of war; the right of fishery, and especially that which the French carried on upon the banks of Newfoundland, by virtue of the treaties of Utrecht and of Paris; it exempted from the right of Aubaine, as well the French in America, as the Americans in France; it provided for the exercise of commerce, and the admission of privateers with one of the contracting parties, in case the other should be at war with a third power. To this effect, in order to preclude all occasion of dissention, it was determined by an express clause, what articles, in time of war, should be deemed contraband, and what should be considered free, and consequently might be freely transported, and introduced by the subjects of the two powers into enemy

ports; those excepted, however, which should be found at the time, besieged, blockaded or invested. It was also agreed, that the ships and vessels of the contracting parties should not be subject to any visit; it being intended that all visit or search should take place prior to the clearance of the shipping, and that contraband articles should be seized in port, and not upon the voyage, except, however, the cases, where there should exist indications or proofs of fraud. It was stipulated, besides, that in order to facilitate the commerce of the United States with France, his most christian majesty should grant them, as well in Europe as in the islands of America subject to his dominion, several free ports. Finally, the king pledged himself to employ his good offices and mediation with the emperor of Morocco, and with the regencies of Algiers, Tripoli, Tunis, and other powers of the coast of Barbary, in order that provision should be made in the best possible mode for the accommodation and security of the citizens, ships, and merchandise, of the United States of America.' It is to be observed, that this treaty, besides the recognition made in it of American independence, was completely subversive of the principles which the British government had uniformly attempted to establish as well with respect to the commerce of neutrals, in time of war, as with regard to the blockade of the ports of an enemy state by the British squadrons. Consequently, it was easy to foresee that, although France had not contracted to furnish succours of any sort to the United States, Great Britain, nevertheless, on being so wounded to the quick in her pride, and in her most essential interests, would manifest a keen resentment, and would probably declare war against France. Hence it was, that the contracting parties concluded the same day another, eventual, treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, which was to take its effect so soon as war should break out between France and England. The two parties engaged to assist each other with good offices, with counsel, and with arms. It was stipulated, a thing until then unheard of, on the part of a king, that the essential and express object of the alliance, was to maintain effectually the liberty, sovereignty, and independence of the United States. It was also covenanted, that if the remaining provinces of Great Britain upon the American continent, or the Bermuda islands, came to be conquered, they should become confederates or dependants of the United States; but if any of the islands were taken situated within, or at the entrance of the gulf of Mexico, these should belong to the crown of France. It was agreed, that neither of the two parties could conclude truce or peace with Great Britain without the consent of the other. They reciprocally obligated themselves not to lay down arms, until the independence of the United States should be either formally or tacitly acknowledged in the treaties which should terminate the war. They guaranteed to each other, that is the United States to the king of France, his pre