It was alleged that, instead of entangling himself in those dangerous defiles, he should, after the occupation of Skeenesborough and the total discomfiture of the enemy's army, have returned immediately down the South river to Ticonderoga, where he might again have embarked the army on Lake George, and proceeded to the fort which takes its name; this being reduced, a broad firm road lay before him to Fort Edward. In this manner, it was added, would have been avoided delays as detrimental to the British army, as propitious to the Americans. Thus, it was maintained, the army might have made itself master of Albany, before the enemy would have had time to recollect himself. But, in justification of Burgoyne, it was advanced, that a retrograde motion in the height of victory, would have diminished the spirit of his troops, and revived the hopes of the enemy; that the Americans would undoubtedly have made a stand at Fort George, and in the meantime would have broken up the road leading to Fort Edward; that by passing, as he had done, through the desert of Fort Anne, besides inuring his troops to the war of the woods, a war so embarrassing and difficult, he compelled the enemy to evacuate Fort George without striking a blow; that having already opened himself a road, it was to be hoped the Americans would not interrupt the other; that the route by land left the vessels, which would have been required for the transport of the troops, upon Lake George, at liberty to be employed in that of arms, ammunition, provisions, and baggage. Finally, it was represented, that by preferring the way upon the left to that upon the right by Lake George, he had enabled himself to detach a strong corps under the command of general Reidesel, to agitate alarms in Connecticut and throughout the country of Vermont.

However, the truth was, Schuyler profited with great dexterity of these delays. Several regiments of regular troops from Peek's Kill were already arrived at the camp, and although it was then the season of harvest, the militia of New England assembled from all quarters, and hastened to join the principal army. These reenforcements placed it in a situation, if not to resume the offensive, at least to occupy all the tenable positions, and defend them with energy and effect.

In the meantime, general Burgoyne received intelligence that colonel St. Leger, whose detachment had been reenforced by a considerable party of savages, after descending by the Lake Oneida from Oswego, in the country of the Mohawks, had arrived before, and was closely besieging, Fort Stanwix. He immediately conceived the hope of deriving an important advantage from this operation. For if the American army in his front proceeded up the Mohawk to the relief of Fort Stanwix, the English found the way open to Albany, and thus attained the first object of their desires. Moreover, if St. Leger succeeded, the Americans would find themselves between

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two royal armies, that of St. Leger in front, and that of Burgoyne in rear. If, on the other hand, the republicans abandoned Fort Stanwix to its fate, and withdrew towards Albany, the country on the Mohawk would fall into the power of the English, and they might form a junction with colonel St. Leger. Their army thus reenforced, and victualled by the Mohawks, would be in a situation to move forward. From these operations it must result, either that the enemy would resolve to stand an action, and, in this case, Burgoyne felt assured of victory; or, that he would gradually retire down the Hudson, and thus abandon to the English the city of Albany. the propriety of a rapid movement forward was therefore evident, the difficulty of finding means to execute it was not less manifest, as the want of subsistence still continued; and this want would of necessity increase with the distance of the army from the lakes, through which it received its provisions. To maintain such a communication with Fort George, during the whole time of so extensive a movement, as would secure the convoys from being intercepted by the enemy, was obviously impracticable. The army was too weak to afford a chain of posts for such an extent; and continual escorts for every separate supply, would be a still greater drain. Burgoyne therefore perceived distinctly that he must have recourse to some other source of supply, or totally relinquish the enterprise. He knew that the Americans had accumulated considerable stores of live cattle, corn, and other necessaries, besides a large number of wheel carriages, at a village called Bennington, situated between two streams, which, afterwards uniting, form the river Hosack. This place lies only twenty miles distant from the Hudson; it was the repository of all the supplies intended for the republican camp, which were expedited from New England by the upper part of Connecticut river, and thence through the country of Vermont. From Bennington they were conveyed, as occasion required, to the different parts of the army. The magazines were only guarded, however, by detachments of militia, whose numbers varied continually, as they went and came at discretion. Though the distance was considerable from the camp of Burgoyne to Bennington, yet as the whole country through which the corps of Reidesel had lately passed appeared peaceable, and even well inclined to submission, the English general, impelled by necessity, and allured by an ardent thirst of glory, did not despair of being able to surprise Bennington, and bring off the provisions of the enemy by means of his own carriages. Having taken this resolution, he entrusted the execution of it to lieutenantcolonel Baum, a German officer of great bravery, and well versed in this sort of partisan war.

The force allotted to this service, amounted to about five hundred men, consisting of two hundred of Reidesel's dismounted dragoons, captain Frazer's marksmen, the Canada volunteers, a party of pro

vincials who were perfectly acquainted with the country, and about a hundred Indians; the corps took with them two light pieces of artillery. At the same time lieutenant-colonel Breyman, with his regiment of Brunswick grenadiers and light infantry, marched down towards Bennington, and took post at Batten Kill, in order, if necessary, to support Baum. The latter had received from general Burgoyne very suitable instructions; he was to exercise extreme caution in the choice of his posts; to have the country diligently explored by the Indians, on the part of Otter Creek, and towards Connecticut river; he was not to allow his regular troops to scatter, but to keep them always in a compact body; he was to march light troops in front and rear of his column, to guard against ambuscades; he was ordered not to hazard dubious rencounters, but if the enemy came upon him in superior force, to take a strong position and intrench himself; he was to give out that the whole army was upon the march for Connecticut; finally, he was to rejoin the army at Albany. Burgoyne, in order to facilitate this operation, and to hold the republican army in check, moved with all his troops down the left bank of the Hudson, and established his camp nearly opposite to Saratoga, having, at the same time, thrown a bridge of rafts over, by which the advanced corps were passed to that place.

These demonstrations tended to inspire the belief that all the British army was about to cross the river, in order to attack the enemy, who still continued to occupy his encampment at Stillwater.

According to the plan which had been traced for him, lieutenantcolonel Baum set forward upon his march with equal celerity and caution. He very shortly fell in with a party of the enemy, who were escorting some cattle and provisions, both of which he took with little difficulty and sent back to the camp; but that evil fortune soon began to appear, which had already so fatally retarded the royal army. The want of horses and carriages, and the roads now become heavy and slippery, in consequence of the bad weather, rendered the advance of Baum excessively tedious. Hence the enemy, who stood upon their guard at Bennington, were seasonably informed of his approach. Colonel Stark, who had lately arrived with a corps of militia he had assembled in New Hampshire, commanded in that town. He sent with all speed to request colonel Warner, who, since the defeat of Hubbardston, had taken post at Manchester, to march to his assistance. All these troops, reenforced with some of the neighboring militia, amounted to about two thousand men. Upon the intelligence that the enemy approached, Stark detached colonel Gregg upon the lookout; supposing at first it might be only a party of savages who were scouring the country. When he had discovered that they were regular troops, he fell back to his principal position at Bennington. Lieutenant-colonel Baum, on his part, having learnt that the enemy were too strong to be attacked by his

present force without temerity, sent immediately to Breyman, apprising him of his situation, and pressing him to hasten to his succour. In the meantime, he took an excellent post near Santcoick Mills, on the banks of Walloon Creek, about four miles from Bennington, and there intrenched himself.

But Stark, not choosing to wait for the junction of the two parties, determined to attack him. Accordingly, on the morning of the sixteenth of August, he issued from Bennington, and advanced with his troops divided in several corps, in order to surround the posts of Baum, and assault them on all sides at once. The latter, on seeing the Americans approach, persuaded himself that they were bodies of loyalists coming up to join him. A number of refugees, who made part of his detachment, had prevailed upon an officer, more familiar with arms than with civil contentions, to adopt the absurd hopes and chimerical conceits with which they habitually deceived themselves. Having at length discovered his error, he defended himself with great valor. But such was the impetuosity, and even the superiority of the Americans, that he could not resist them long; having carried all before them, and taken his two pieces of cannon, they poured on every side into his intrenchments. The savages, Canadians and British marksmen, profiting of their activity, escaped in the woods. The German dragoons still kept together, and when their ammunition was expended, were bravely led by their commander to charge with their swords. But they were soon overwhelmed, and the survivors, among whom was their wounded colonel, were made prisoners.

In the meantime, Breyman had set forward from Batten Kill to the succour of Baum; and although he was on the march by eight in the morning of the fifteenth, had continued it without intermission, and the distance was not over twenty-four miles; yet, so many and so formidable were the impediments he encountered, from the badness of the roads, rendered still more difficult by the continual rain, and from the weakness and tiring of horses in getting forward the artillery, that he was unable to reach the camp of Baum, till after fortune had already pronounced in favor of the Americans. It is asserted that he had received no timely information of the engagement, and that his first knowledge of it was brought him by the fugitives. It was four in the afternoon when he appeared before the intrenchments of Baum, where, instead of meeting his friends, he found his detachment attacked on all sides by enemies. Though his men were excessively fatigued, they defended themselves with great spirit and resolution. As many of the provincial militia had disbanded to pillage, the action was maintained at first with an equality of advantage, and there was even danger that Breyman would recover what Baum had lost.

He had already dislodged the Americans from two or three different hills on which they had posts, and he pressed them so vigorously that they began to exhibit symptoms of disorder. But the affair soon assumed a quite different aspect; colonel Warner arrived at the head of his regiment of the line, and falling upon the rear of the English and Germans, restored the battle with increase of vehemence. The militia that were dispersed in quest of plunder, on hearing the report of the cannon, immediately rallied. Victory, however, remained doubtful till the dusk of evening; on one side combated valor and discipline, on the other, number and fury.

At length the soldiers of Breyman, overpowered by numbers, having expended all their ammunition, and lost the two pieces of artillery they had been at such pains to bring with them, began to give ground, and afterwards to break. They abandoned the field of battle, and in the precipitation of their retreat, left in the power of the conqueror all their baggage, a thousand muskets and nearly as many sabres. The obscurity of night covered their retreat. The royalists lost, in these two engagements, seven hundred men, the greater part prisoners; the number of killed was probably about two hundred. The loss of the republicans was inconsiderable. The Congress addressed their public thanks to colonel Stark and the militia who took part in the actions of this day. Stark was moreover promoted to the rank

of brigadier-general.

In the country of the Mohawks the affairs of the English took, at first, the most favorable turn. Colonel St. Leger had encamped, the third of August, under Fort Stanwix. The force under his command, consisting of English, Germans, Canadians and American loyalists, amounted to about eight hundred men. He was followed by a train of savages, with their wives and children, thirsting indeed for carnage and plunder, but feeble auxiliaries in besieging fortresses. Colonel Gansevort, on being summoned by the English, answered that he should defend himself to the last. Apprised of this state of things, and knowing the importance of this fort to the United States, general Harkimer, a leading man in the county of Tryon, assembled the militia and marched with all expedition to the relief of Gansevort. He sent an express from his camp of Erick, six miles from the fort, to inform him, that he was about to advance and make every exertion to effect his junction with the garrison. Gansevort directed lieutenant-colonel Willet to make a sally upon the British lines, in order to favor the attempt of Harkimer; but the English commander perceiving how dangerous it was to receive the enemy in his intrenchments, and knowing full well how much better the Indians were adapted for the attack than for acting upon the defensive, detached colonel Johnson, with a part of the regular troops and the Indians, to intercept the Americans upon their approach. General Harkimer advanced with extreme negligence, without examination of his