escort, and conduct her in safety to the camp. The two savages went accordingly, and brought her through the woods; but at the very moment they were about to place her in the hands of her future husband, they fell to quarrelling about their recompense, each contending that it belonged entirely to himself; when one of them, transported with brutal fury, raised his club and laid the unhappy maiden dead at his feet. General Burgoyne, on being informed of this horrid act, ordered the assassin to be arrested, that he might suffer the punishment due to his crime. But he soon after pardoned him upon the promise made him by the savages of abstaining for the future from similar barbarities, and of strictly observing the conditions to which they had pledged themselves upon the banks of the river Bouquet. The general believed that this act of clemency would be more advantageous than the example of chastisement. It even appears that he did not think himself sufficiently authorised, by the laws of England, to try and punish with death the murderer of the young lady; as if there existed not other laws besides the English, which bound him to inflict a just chastisement upon the perpetrator of a crime so execrable. But if he was warned by prudence to abstain from it, then was he to be pitied for the state of weakness to which he was reduced, and the weight of censure and detestation must fall exclusively upon the counsels of those who had called these barbarians into a civil contest. However the truth was, the condescension of general Burgoyne recoiled upon himself; for the savages finding they were no longer permitted, as at first, to satiate their passion for pillage and massacre, deserted the camp and returned to their several homes, ravaging and plundering whatever they found in their way. Thus terminated, almost entirely, this year, the Indian war; a war impolitic in principle, atrocious in execution, and bootless in result. The Canadians themselves, and the loyalists who followed the royal army, terrified at the sinister aspect of affairs, deserted with one consent; so that Burgoyne, in his greatest need, was left nearly destitute of other force except his English and German regular troops.

Such was his situation, when a party of republicans undertook an enterprise upon the rear of his army, which, if it had succeeded, would have entirely cut off his provisions and retreat towards Canada; and at least demonstrated the danger to which he had exposed himself, in having advanced with so small an army to so great a distance from the strong posts upon the lakes.

General Lincoln, with a strong corps of the militia of New Hampshire and Connecticut, conceived the hope of recovering for the confederation the fortresses of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, and consequently the command of Lake George. He knew that these places were guarded only by feeble garrisons. He advanced from Manchester to Pawlet. He parted his corps into three

divisions; the first, commanded by colonel Brown, was to proceed to the northern extremity of Lake George, and thence to fall by surprise upon Ticonderoga; the second, led by colonel Johnston, was destined to scour the country about Fort Independence, in order to make a diversion, and even an attack, if occasion should favor it; the third, under the orders of colonel Woodbury, had it in view to reduce Skeenesborough, Fort Anne, and even Fort Edward. Colonel Brown, with equal secrecy and celerity, surprised all the posts upon Lake George and the inlet of Ticonderoga, Mount Hope, Mount Defiance, and the old French lines. He took possession of two hundred batteaux, an armed brig, and several gun boats; he also made a very considerable number of prisoners. Colonel Johnston arrived at the same time under the walls of Fort Independence. The two fortresses were summoned to capitulate. But brigadier Powell, who held the chief command, replied, that he was resolved to defend himself. The Americans continued their cannonade for the space of four days; but their artillery being of small caliber, and the English opposing a spirited resistance, they were constrained to abandon the enterprise, and to recover their former positions.

Meanwhile, general Burgoyne continued in his camp, on the left bank of the Hudson, where he used the most unremitting industry and perseverance in bringing stores and provisions forward from Fort George. Having at length, by strenuous efforts, obtained about thirty days' provision, he took a resolution of passing the river with his army, in order to engage the enemy, and force a passage to Albany. As a swell of the water, occasioned by great rains, had carried away his bridge of rafts, he threw another, of boats, over the river at the same place. Towards the middle of September, he crossed with his army to the right bank of the Hudson, and encamped on the heights and in the plain of Saratoga; Gates being then in the neighborhood of Stillwater, about three miles below. The two armies of course faced each other, and a battle was expected soon to follow.

This measure of passing the Hudson was by many censured with great vehemence; it was considered as the principal cause of the unfortunate issue of this campaign. Some were of the opinion that after the affairs of Bennington and Stanwix, Burgoyne would have acted more wisely, considering the daily increase of the American army, if he had renounced the project of occupying Albany, and made the best of his way back to the lakes. It appears, however, to us but just to remark for his excuse, that at this time he had not yet received any intelligence either of the strength of the army left at New York, or of the movements which sir Henry Clinton was to mike, or had made, up the North river towards Albany. He calgulated upon a powerful cooperation on the part of that general. Such was the plan of the ministers, and such the tenor of his own remptory instructions. And to what reproaches would he not

have exposed himself, if, by retiring towards Ticonderoga, he had abandoned Clinton to himself, and thus voluntarily relinquished all the advantages that were expected from the junction of the two armies? We may, however, consider as vain the apology which was advanced by Burgoyne himself, when he alleged, that if he had returned to the lakes, Gates might have gone to join Washington, who, falling upon Howe with the combined armies, must have overpowered him, and decided the fate of the whole war. Gates would never have abandoned the shores of the Hudson, so long as the army of Burgoyne was opposed to him, whether in the position of Saratoga, or in that of Ticonderoga. It is, besides, to be observed, that as a great part of the army of Gates consisted in the New England militia, these, at least, would not have followed him, even if he had marched upon the Delaware. But, though we think that Burgoyne committed no error in resolving to prosecute his expedition, it nevertheless appears that he ought not to have passed the Hudson. By continuing upon the left bank, he could retire at will towards Ticonderoga, or push forward towards Albany. It was evidently more easy to execute this movement, while having between himself and the now formidable army of Gates, so broad a river as the Hudson. The roads above, from Batten Kill to Fort George, were much easier upon the left than those upon the right bank; and in going down towards Albany, if they were not better, at least they were not worse. The city of Albany, it is true, is situated upon the right bank; but when Burgoyne should have arrived opposite to that city, upon the left, the English from below night have come up with their boats, and transported the troops to the right bank. At any rate, Burgoyne might thus have operated his junction with Clinton. But the former, either confiding too much in his army, which was, in truth, equally brave and flourishing, or not esteeming the Americans enough, notwithstanding the more favorable opinion of them which the actions of Bennington and of Stanwix should have given him, resolved to quit the safer ground and try the fortune of a battle; he considered victory as certain and decisive. In like manner as the British ministers, erroneously estimating the constancy of the colonists, had persuaded themselves that they could reduce them to submission by rigorous laws, the generals deceiving themselves as strangely with respect to their courage, had no doubt that with their presence, a few threats, and a little rattling of their arms, they could put them to flight. From this blind confidence in victory, resulted a series of defeats, and the war was irretrievably lost from too sanguine an assurance of triumph.

But let us resume the course of events. The nineteenth of September was reserved by destiny for an obstinate and sanguinary action, in which it was at length to be decided whether the Americans, as some pretended, could only resist the English when protected

by the strength of works, or of woods, rivers and mountains, or if they were capable of meeting them upon equal ground, in fair and regular battle. General Burgoyne having surmounted the obstacles of thick woods and broken bridges, by which his progress was continually interrupted, at length arrived in the front of the enemy, some woods only of no great extent separating the two armies. Without a moment's delay, the English formed themselves in order of battle; their right wing rested upon some high grounds, which rise gradually from the river; it was flanked by the grenadiers and light infantry, who occupied the hills. At some distance in front, and upon the side of these, were posted those Indians, Canadians and loyalists, who had still remained in the camp. The left wing and artillery, under general Phillips and Reidesel, kept along the great road and meadows by the river side. The American army drew up in the same order from the Hudson to the hills; Gates had taken the right, and given the left to Arnold. Smart skirmishes immediately ensued between the foremost marksmen of either army. Morgan, with his light horse, and colonel Durbin with the light infantry, had attacked and routed the Canadians and savages; but the latter having been supported, they were both in their turn compelled to resume their place in the line. Meanwhile, Burgoyne, either intending to turn the left flank of the enemy, or wishing to avoid, by passing higher up, the hollows of the torrents which fall into the Hudson, extended his right wing upon the heights, in order to fall upon Arnold in flank and rear.

But Arnold was, at the same time, endeavoring to execute a similar manœuvre upon him, while neither of them was able, on account of the woods, to perceive the movements of his enemy.

The two parties met; general Frazer repulsed the Americans. Finding the right flank of the enemy's right wing so well defended, they left a sufficient guard to defend this passage, made a rapid movement to their right, and vigorously assailed the left flank of the same wing. Arnold exhibited upon this occasion all the impetuosity of his courage; he encouraged his men with voice and example. The action became extremely warm; the enemy fearing that Arnold, by cutting their line, would penetrate between their wings, as was manifestly his intention, hastened to reenforce the points attacked. General Frazer came up with the twenty-fourth regiment, some light infantry and Breyman's riflemen; he would have drawn more troops from the right flank, but the heights on which it was posted, were of too great importance to be totally evacuated. Meanwhile, such was the valor and impetuosity of the Americans, that the English began to fall into confusion; but general Phillips soon appeared with fresh men and a part of the artillery; upon hearing the firing he had rapidly made his way through a very difficult wood to the scene of danger. He restored the action at the very moment it was about being decided in favor of the enemy.

The Americans, however, renewed their attacks with such persevering energy that night only parted the combatants. The royalists passed it under arms upon the field of battle; the republicans retired. They had lost from three to four hundred men in killed and wounded; among the former were colonels Adams and Coburn. The English had to regret more than five hundred, and among others, captain Jones, of the artillery, an officer of great merit.

Both parties claimed the honor of victory. The English, it is true, kept possession of the field of battle; yet, as the intention of the Americans was not to advance, but to maintain their position, and that of the English not to maintain theirs, but to gain ground, and as besides it was a victory for the republicans not to be vanquished, it is easy to see which had the advantage of the day. On the other hand, the English were now convinced, to the great prejudice of their hopes, and even of their courage, that they would have to grapple with a foe as eager for action, as careless of danger, and as indifferent with respect to ground or cover as themselves.

The day following, general Burgoyne finding that he must abandon all idea of dislodging the enemy by force, from its intrenched positions, endeavored to console himself with the hope, that time might offer him some occasion, to operate with more effect.

He was, besides, in daily expectation of news from general Clinton, with respect to whose movements he was still entirely in the dark. Resolving, therefore, to pause, he pitched his camp within cannon shot of the American lines. He threw up numerous intrenchments, both upon his right, the part which had been attacked, and upon his left, in order to defend the meadows near the river, where he had established his magazines and hospitals. An English regiment, the Hessians of Hanau, and a detachment of loyalists were encamped in the same meadows for greater security. General Gates continued to occupy his first position, taking care, however, to fortify himself strongly on the left. With the return of success, his army was continually reenforced by the accession of fresh bodies of the militia. General Lincoln joined him with two thousand men, well trained and disciplined, from the New England provinces. The English exerted the greatest vigilance to avoid surprise; and the Americans to prevent them from going out of their camp to forage. The skirmishes were animated and frequent.

The British general had for a long time been expecting news from New York; and his impatience was at its height, when, the twentieth of September, he received a letter of the tenth, written in cyphers, by general Clinton, informing him that about the twentieth of the month, he should with two thousand men attack Fort Montgomery, situated on the right bank of the Hudson, and upon the declivity of the highlands. He excused himself upon account of weakness for not doing more; and even declared, that if the enemy made any