able enterprise. He was near sharing the fate of one of the largest ships, which blew up only a few moments after he left her. Near four hundred men were thus saved, by the noble exertions of Curtis from inevitable death. The French and Spaniards, however, lost no less than fifteen hundred men, including the prisoners and wounded, in the attack by sea. The wounded that fell into the power of the conqueror were carried to the hospitals of the fortress, and treated with the greatest humanity. Nine floating batteries were burnt by the redhot shot, or by the Spaniards, themselves. The tenth was burnt by the English, when they found she could not be brought off. Their loss was inconsiderable; it amounted, according to their account, since the ninth of August, to no more than sixty-five killed, and three hundred and eighty-eight wounded. The fortifications received but slight damage; or at least not so considerable as to afford any room for future apprehension.

In this manner was victory obtained with lasting glory to general Elliot, and the whole garrison of Gibraltar. The treasures which the king of Spain had expended for the construction of these enormous machines, the bravery and perseverance of his troops, the valor and spirit of the French, were all in vain.

It cannot indeed be positively affirmed, that if such formidable means of attack had even been employed in all their efficacy, and according to the intention of the generals, they would have sufficed to carry the place; but neither can it be denied that the allies committed several faults of no little importance. The first was undoubtedly that of having hurried on the attack before, M. d' Arcon had been able to bring his floating batteries to that degree of perfection which he could have wished. By working the pumps, he had perceived that the water of the pipes leaked upon the inward parts, and that the powder was exposed to be wet by it, and rendered unfit for

He would have found a remedy for this inconvenience; but he was not allowed time to seek it. The inner pipes were therefore stopped up, and only the outer ones filled with water, which were found an insufficient defence against the effect of the redhot shot. It is, besides, to be considered that don Moreno was ordered so abruptly to repair to the attack from the point of Majorca, that he found it impossible to form the line of his floating batteries in front of the Old Mole, as contemplated in the plan of attack. From that point his fire would assuredly have been more efficacious, and he might also have retired thence without difficulty if he had thought it necessary; but he was constrained to take post between the Old and the New Mole. Nor did the Spanish gunboats answer the general expectation, whether they were in effect opposed by the wind, as was pretended, or that their spirit of adventure sunk under the dreadful fire from the garrison. Only two of them took any considerable share in the attack. The great fleet itself remained in a state of almost

total inaction. It is uncertain whether this failure should be attributed to an unfavorable wind, or to secret jealousies between the land and sea commanders. The batteries on shore, whatever was the cause of it, were equally far from performing the services which were expected from them. Their fire was neither so well supported, nor so well directed, as it should have been. It resulted from these several causes, that the garrison, instead of being disquieted upon all points at the same instant, found themselves at liberty to direct the whole weight and force of their fire against the floating batteries. In this manner was disconcerted the most ingenious design which for a long time had been framed by the wisdom of man. The most sanguine hopes suddenly gave place to the opinion, that Gibraltar was not only the strongest place known, but that it was absolutely inexpugnable.

Convinced, by this attack, that a regular siege could not have the desired issue, the allied commanders resolved to convert it into a blockade, and to await from famine what they despaired of obtaining by dint of arms. It was therefore of the highest importance to prevent admiral Howe from throwing into the place the intended relief. The combined fleet had accordingly taken its anchorage in the bay of Algesiras, to the number of about fifty sail of the line; among which were five of one hundred and ten guns, and the Trinidad, of one hundred and twelve. The design of don Lewis de Cordova, the commander of these forces, was to engage the British fleet as soon as it should appear, while his light squadron should give chase to the transports and capture them, one after another. It is not easy to explain why this admiral, instead of advancing to meet the enemy off Cape St. Mary, where he would have been able to display his whole line, took the determination to await him in a narrow bay, where the number of his ships, so far from being an advantage, could only tend to embarrass him. It appears that this disposition emanated immediately from the king of Spain, whose thoughts were all absorbed in the conquest of Gibraltar.

In the meantime, admiral Howe met with much delay through contrary winds and unfavorable weather, on his way to Gibraltar. His anxiety was therefore extreme, lest the place should find itself necessitated to surrender before the arrival of succours. It was not till the fleet had arrived near the scene of action that his apprehensions were removed, by intelligence received from the coast of Portugal, of the total discomfiture of the combined forces. This news increased his hope of succeeding in his enterprise; he calculated that the enemy, discouraged by so severe a check, would show himself less eager to encounter him. Near the mouth of the straits he met with a furious gale of wind, which damaged several of his ships. The combined fleet suffered much more in the bay of Algesiras. One ship of the line was driven ashore near the city of that name;

another fine Spanish ship, of seventy-two guns, was driven across the bay, under the works of Gibraltar, and was taken by the boats of the garrison. Two more were driven to the eastward into the Mediterranean; others lost masts or bowsprits; and many suffered more or less damage.

On the morning that succeeded the storm, the British flcet entered the straits' mouth, in a close line of battle ahead, and in the evening of the same day it was opposite the port of Gibraltar; but the wind failing, only four victualling ships could enter the harbor. The rest of the transports with the squadron were drifted by the currents into the Mediterranean. The combined fleet took the same direction. A general action seemed inevitable; a calm and fog which came up, prevented it; or perhaps the admirals themselves were not disposed to engage, without all probabilities of success. However it was,

admiral Howe profiting dexterously of an east wind which sprung up in the strait, passed his whole convoy to Gibraltar harbor. To cover this operation, the British fleet had formed in order of battle at the mouth of the straits, fronting the Mediterranean, between the opposite points of Europa and Ceuta.

The combined fleets then made their appearance, bearing directly down upon the enemy; but the British admiral considering that the revictualling of Gibraltar, the principal object of his mission, was accomplished, he saw that it would be the highest imprudence and rashness to hazard an action in the strait. He knew the superiority of force that he would have to encounter; and he could not but perceive that the vicinity of the enemy's coasts would exceedingly aggravate, for him, the consequences of a defeat. He chose, if he was obliged to come to action, to have searoom enough, in order, by his evolutions, to prevent its being decisive, as it must necessarily be in a confined space. Under these considerations, he took the advantage of a favorable wind, and repassed the straits into the Atlantic.

The allies followed him with only a part of their fleet. Twelve of their largest ships of the line, being heavy sailers, were left behind. Meanwhile, their van came within reach of the British rear, and there immediately ensued between them a brisk, though distant cannonade, the only effect of which was to damage some vessels on both sides. Profiting of their superiority of sailing, the English drew off to such a distance, that the allies lost all hope of coming up with them. They then took the resolution of repairing to Cadiz. Admiral Howe detached eight of his ships for the West Indies, six others to the coasts of Ireland, and returned with the rest to Portsmouth. The destruction of the floating batteries, and the revictualling of Gibraltar, relieved England from all disquietude respecting the fate of that place. This double success was no less glorious for her arms, than afflicting for the enemies she combated. The allies are reproached with having shown upon land too much precipitancy and too little

concord; upon sea, too much indecision and too little spirit. In this occurrence, as in those which had preceded it, the display of their great naval forces had resulted in little more than a vain parade. It is, however, to be considered, that if during the course of all this war, the fleets of the allied courts gained no brilliant advantages, or rather sustained reverses, in general actions, their seamen more often than once acquired signal renown in particular engagements of ship with ship. The French, especially, manifested in these rencounters a valor and ability alike worthy of admiration, and often crowned with victory. We leave those to account for this difference who are more versed than ourselves in naval tactics.

The events which we have related, as well in this as in the foregoing book, had occasioned among the belligerent powers an ardent desire, or rather an avowed will to put an end to the war. On all sides, a hope was cherished that an honorable adjustment would soon be brought about. Several successive campaigns, without any important advantage, and the loss of the army taken at Yorktown, with lord Cornwallis, had at length convinced the British ministry of the impossibility of subjugating the Americans by force of arms. The manoeuvres employed to divide them among themselves, or to detach them from their allies, had not been attended with any better success than military operations. On the other hand, the victories of Rodney and Elliot had not only dissipated all fears for the West Indies and Gibraltar, but also put in safety the honor of Great Britain. With the exception of the independence of the United States, which she could no longer refuse to acknowledge, she found herself in a situation to treat upon a footing of equality with her enemies relative to all other articles. Victorious at Gibraltar, holding the scale of fortune even in the seas of Europe, she had caused it to incline in her favor in the West Indies. If she had sustained sensible losses in that quarter, she had, however, acquired the island of St. Lucia, so important from its strength, the excellence of its ports, and the advantages of its position. Although it could not be considered as a sufficient indemnification on the part of Great Britain for the loss of Dominica, Grenada, Tobago and St. Christophers, yet England bad made so considerable conquests in the East Indies that she brought into a negotiation more objects of exchange than France could offer. But all these considerations yielded to another of far greater moment; the public debt of Great Britain, already enormous, experienced every day an alarming augmentation. The people did not conceal their desire for the return of peace, and the protraction of the war excited public murmurs. The ministers themselves, who had so severely censured the obstinacy of their predecessors in continuing the war, openly inclined for peace; whether because they thought it really necessary, or that they were afraid of incurring similar reproaches. An untimely death had carried off the marquis

of Rockingham, who, in the general direction of affairs, had conciliated universal esteem, and Fox had resigned. The first had been replaced by the earl of Shelburne, and the second by William Pitt, son of the earl of Chatham; both known for consenting rather from necessity than choice to the independence of America. The majority of the ministry, however, was composed of those who had obtained the repeal of the rigorous laws against the Americans, and who had afterwards distinguished themselves in parliament by advocating with singular warmth and eloquence an early acknowledgment of their independence. It was therefore determined to send Thomas Grenville to Paris, in order to sound the intentions of the French government, and to prepare the ways for the plenipotentiaries that were to follow him. A short time after, in effect, M. Fitz Herbert and M. Oswald repaired to the French capital in that character; they had little difficulty in penetrating the dispositions of the court of Versailles. The United States had taken care that their plenipotentiaries should assemble at Paris in this conjuncture; they were John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, and Henry Laurens, who had recently been released from his detention in the tower of London.

If great was the desire of peace in England, it was not less ardently wished for in France, as well by the government as by the people. The court of Versailles' had attained the object it had most at heart, that is the separation of the British colonies from the mother country. The first of the proposals of the court of London was, in effect, to acknowledge the independence of the United States; and this was the principal, and indeed the only avowed motive of France for taking up arms. As to the situation of affairs in the West Indies, the operations that were in contemplation against those islands, interested Spain much more than France. And, besides, the discomfiture of the twelfth of April had deranged all plans, and extinguished all hopes. Nor was there any room to expect better fortune in the seas of Europe, since their empire had already been disputed for several years, without the occurrence of any decisive event.

The losses which France had sustained in the East Indies, might counterbalance the conquests she had made in the West. Upon the whole, therefore, she found herself in a condition to treat for herself on equal terms with respect to the chances of war, and upon a footing of decided superiority in regard to its principal cause; the independence of the United States. Independent of the foregoing considerations, there existed others which powerfully urged a speedy reestablishment of peace. The finances were exhausted; and notwithstanding the judicious regulations and economy which the government had endeavored to introduce into all the departments, the resources were no longer in proportion to the exorbitant charges of the war. The expenditure exceeded the receipt, and every day