and loss. Nothing could now exceed the distress and calamity of the British army; the soldiers as well as the generals were reduced to brood upon the prospect of an ignominious surrender, or total destruction. To attempt the passage of so wide a river, while its shore was guarded with so much vigilance by a formidable body of troops, and in the presence of a powerful enemy, flushed with victory, was an enterprise savoring rather of madness than temerity. On the other hand, the retreat upon the right bank, with the same enemy at the rear, through ways so difficult and impracticable, was a scheme which presented obstacles absolutely insurmountable. Every thing announced therefore an inevitable catastrophe. Nevertheless, in the midst of so much calamity, a ray of hope suddenly gleamed upon the English; and they were near gaining an opportunity of retrieving their affairs all at once. The two armies were only separated by the Fish Kill Creek; report, which magnifies all things, had represented to general Gates the feeble detachment which Burgoyne had sent to escort his pioneers upon the route to Fort Edward, as the entire vanguard and centre of the British army, already well on their way towards that fort. He concluded, therefore, that only the rear guard remained near the Fish Kill, and instantly conceived the hope of crushing it by an attack with all his forces. He made all his preparations in the morning of the eleventh of October. His scheme was to take advantage of a thick fog, which in those regions, and at this season, usually obscure the atmosphere till a little after sunrise, to pass the Fish Kill very early, to seize a battery which Burgoyne had erected upon the opposite bank, and then to fall immediately upon the enemy. The English general had notice of this plan; he furnished the battery with a strong guard, and posted his troops in ambush behind the thickets which covered the banks of the creek. In this position he waited the enemy's approach, and calculating upon their supposed error, he had little doubt of victory. The brigade of the American general Nixon had already forded the Fish Kill, and that of general Glover was about to follow it. But just as the latter entered the water, he was informed by a British deserter, that not only the rear guard, but the whole royal army, was drawn up in order of battle upon the other bank. Upon this intelligence Glover halted, and sent to apprise Nixon of the danger he was in of being cut in pieces, unless he hastened to recover the left bank. General Gates was immediately informed of the incident; he revoked all the orders he had given, and directed that the troops should be reconducted to their positions. General Nixon received the message of Glover in good time; for a quarter of an hour later he would have been lost irrecoverably. He fell back with all expedition; but the fog being dissipated before he was out of sight of the enemy, his rear guard was annoyed by the English artillery, with the loss of a few soldiers.

Frustrated of this hope, general Burgoyne applied his thoughts to devise, if possible, some other way to save the army. He called a council of war, in which it was resolved to attempt by a rapid retreat in the night up the Hudson, to gain the fords of that river at or above Fort Edward, and there having forced a passage, to press on to Fort George. That nothing might retard the march, it was determined to abandon the artillery, baggage, carriages, and all incumbrances. The soldiers were to carry upon their backs a sufficient quantity of provisions, to support them till they could arrive at Fort George. All the troops prepared to execute the plan of their general.

But Gates had already, with great foresight, taken all his measures to defeat it. He had recommended the utmost vigilance to the parties that were stationed to guard the opposite shore of the river; he had posted a strong detachment to guard the fords near Fort Edward, with orders to oppose any attempt of the enemy to pass them, till he should arrive with the army upon his rear. In addition to this, he had established a camp in force, and provided with artillery, upon the high and strong grounds between Fort Edward and Fort George. General Burgoyne had sent forward scouts, to examine the route, and especially to ascertain whether it was possible to force the passage opposite to Fort Edward. They returned with an account that the roads were inconceivably rough and difficult; that the enemy were so numerous and vigilant upon the left bank, that no movement of the army upon the right could escape immediate discovery; and that the passages at the fort were so diligently defended, that it was absolutely impossible to force them without artillery. They also mentioned the intrenched camp on the hills between the two forts. Burgoyne had no sooner received this afflicting intelligence, than he was also informed that general Gates, with the main body of his army, was so near, and observed him with such steady attention, that it would be impossible for him to move a step without being instantly followed; he then saw that he must relinquish all hope of saving himself by his own efforts.

In this deplorable extremity, his only refuge from despair was the faint hope of cooperation from the parts down the river; and with the most intense desire he looked for the aid of Clinton.

It exceeds the power of words to describe the pitiable condition to which the British army was now reduced. The troops, worn down by a series of hard toil, incessant effort and stubborn action; abandoned by the Indians and Canadians; the whole army reduced by repeated and heavy losses of many of their best men and most distinguished officers from ten thousand combatants to less than five thousand effective fighting men, of whom little more than three thousand were English. In these circumstances, and in this state of weakness, without a possibility of retreat, they were invested by an

army of four times their own number, whose position extended three parts in four of a circle round them; who refused to fight from a knowledge of their own condition; and who from the nature of the ground, could not be attacked in any part. In this helpless situation, obliged to lie constantly on their arms, whilst a continued cannonade pervaded all the camp, and even rifle and grape-shot fell in every part of their lines, the troops of Burgoyne retained their ordinary constancy, and while sinking under a hard necessity, they showed themselves worthy of a better fate. Nor could they be reproached with any action or word which betrayed a want of temper, or of fortitude.

At length, no succour appearing, and no rational ground of hope of any kind remaining, an exact account of the provisions was taken on the morning of the thirteenth, when it was found that the whole stock would afford no more than three days bare subsistence for the army. In such a state, it was alike impossible to advance or to remain as they were; and the longer they delayed to take a definitive resolution, the more desperate became their situation. Burgoyne, therefore, immediately called a council of war, at which not only the generals and field officers but all the captains of companies were invited to assist. While they deliberated, the bullets of the Americans whistled around them, and frequently pierced even the tent where the council was convened. It was determined unanimously to open a treaty and enter into a convention with the American general.

Gates used his victory with moderation. Only he proposed that the royal troops should lay down their arms in camp; a condition which appeared too hard to the English, and which they peremptorily refused. They all preferred to be led against the enemy, notwithstanding the disadvantage of number, rather than submit to such a disgrace. After several conferences, the articles of capitulation were settled the fifteenth. They were to be signed by the two contracting parties on the morning of the seventeenth. In the night, captain Campbell arrived at the British camp, sent express by general Clinton, with the intelligence that he had moved up the Hudson, reduced Fort Montgomery, and penetrated as far as Esopus. The hope of safety revived in the breasts of some.

The officers were invited to declare, whether in a case of extremity, the soldiers were in a situation to fight, and whether they considered the public faith as pledged by the verbal convention. A great number answered, that the soldiers debilitated by fatigue and hunger, were unable to make resistance; all were decidedly of the opinion, that the public faith was engaged. Burgoyne alone manifested a contrary opinion. But he was constrained to acquiesce in the general suffrage. Meanwhile, Gates, apprised of these hesitations of his enemy, and the new hopes which occasioned them, formed his troops

in order of battle on the morning of the seventeenth, and sent to inform Burgoyne that the stipulated time being arrived, he must either sign the articles, or prepare himself for battle.

The Englishman had taken his resolution; he signed the paper, which had this superscription; Convention between lieutenant-general Burgoyne and major-general Gates. The principal articles, exclusive of those which related to the provision and accommodation of the army in its way to Boston, and during its stay at that place,

were;

That the army should march out of the camp with all the honors of war and its camp artillery, to a fixed place, where they were to deposit their arms and leave the artillery; to be allowed a free embarkation and passage to Europe, from Boston, upon condition of their not serving again in America, during the present war; the army not be separated, particularly the men from the officers; roll calling, and other duties of regularity, to be permitted; the officers to be admitted on parole, and to wear their side arms; all private property to be retained, and the public delivered upon honor; no baggage to be searched or molested; all persons, of whatever country, appertaining to, or following the camp, to be fully comprehended in the terms of capitulation, and the Canadians to be returned to their own country, liable to its conditions.

Assuredly, these conditions were very honorable for the British army, considering its ruined state and irretrievable circumstances; but it obtained still more from the magnanimity of general Gates. From tenderness towards the feelings of the vanquished, he ordered his army to retire within their lines, that they might not witness the shame of the English, when they piled their arms.

This conduct demonstrated not only the humanity but the clemency and elevation of character which distinguished the American general; for he was already informed of the horrible ravages recently committed by general Vaughan, upon the right bank of the Hudson, where, imitating the usage of barbarians, he had laid in ashes, and utterly destroyed, the fine village of Esopus. It is our duty not to pass without mention, that while Gates, in the whole course of this campaign upon the Hudson, displayed all the talents which constitute an able and valiant general, he proved himself not to want any of those qualities which characterise a benevolent and generous heart. Humane towards all whom the fortune of war had thrown into his hands, he was eminently attentive to those who were sick, and suffered them to want for no succour within his power to administer.

The day of the capitulation, the American army amounted to near fifteen thousand men, of whom about ten thousand were regular troops; the English army to five thousand seven hundred and ninetyone, of whom two thousand four hundred and twelve were Germans, and three thousand three hundred and seventy-nine English.

The Americans acquired a fine train of brass artillery, amounting to forty-two pieces of different sorts and sizes, four thousand six hundred muskets, an immense quantity of cartridges, bombs, balls, and other implements of war.

Such was the fate of the British expedition upon the banks of the Hudson. It had been undertaken with singular confidence of success, but the obstacles proved so formidable that those who had expected from it such brilliant results, were themselves its victims; and those it had alarmed at first, derived from it the most important advantages. There can be no doubt, that, if it was planned with ability, as to us it appears to have been, it was conducted with imprudence by those who were intrusted with its execution. For, it is to be remarked, that its success depended entirely on the combined efforts of the generals who commanded upon the lakes, and of those who had the management of the war in the state of New York. But far from moving in concert, when one advanced, the other retired. When Carleton had obtained the command of the lakes, Howe, instead of ascending the Hudson, towards Albany, carried his arms into New Jersey, and advanced upon the Delaware. When, afterwards, Burgoyne entered Ticonderoga in triumph, Howe embarked upon the expedition against Philadelphia; and thus the army of Canada was deprived of the assistance it expected from New York.

Perhaps Howe imagined that the reduction of such a city as Philadelphia, would so confound the Americans, and so derange their plans, that they would either immediately submit, or make but a feeble resistance. Perhaps also he believed that by attacking the centre, and as it were, the very heart of the confederation, he effected the most useful diversion in favor of the army of the north, thereby depriving the Americans of the ability to oppose it with a sufficient force upon the Hudson. Finally, it is not impossible, that, listening to his ambition, he had flattered himself that with his own. means alone he could acquire the exclusive glory of having put an end to the war. But whatever might have been the importance of the acquisition of Philadelphia, every one must readily perceive how much greater was that of the junction at Albany, of the two armies of Canada and of New York. It was very doubtful whether the conquest of a single city could decide the issue of the war; whereas the juncture of the armies, offered almost an assurance of it. It should also be considered that the Americans, in order to prevent this junction, would have risked a pitched battle, the success of which could scarcely be doubtful, and which could have formed no obstacle to the eventual union. Besides, when two armies have the same object in view, is it not evident that they can operate with more concert and effect, when they are near to each other, than while remotely separated? We may therefore consider this expedition as having been wisely calculated in its design, and even in the means

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