In construing contracts, the intention of the parties Motion overruled, and judgment for the plaintiff. THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI vs. ISAAC McGRAW. INDICTMENT FOR STEALING A SLAVE REFERRED FROM PIKE CIRCUIT COURT. An indictment for stealing a negro man, not called a slave is insufficient. A trial and acquittal on an indictment for stealing a negro man, is no bar to a subsequent prosecution for stealing a negro man slave. A conviction or acquittal or an invalid indictment, is no bar to a second prosecution. OPINION OF THE COURT BY THE HON. EDWARD TURNER. It appears by the record, that at the October Term 1823 of Pike Circiut Court, the defendant was indicted for stealing a negro man, on which charge he was tried on the plea of not guilty, and acquitted. At the same term he was also indicted for stealing one negro man slave, named Emanuel, &c. of the goods and chattels of one William B. Heath, &c. On his arraignment, he pleaded a former acquittal for the same offence, to which the state replied nul tiel record of a former acquittal; and the court doubting the law, referred the cause to this court, on the issue of nul tiel record. It appears by the record that the district attorney appeared to enter a nol pros on the first indictment, and informed the prisoner and his counsel, that le considered that indictment invalid, and had preferred another: and submitted to them, whether they would risk a trial on the first indictment-whereupon the prisoner and his counsel would not move to quash the first indictment, but claimed a trial by jury-a trial was had, and verdict for the defendant. I am of opinion that the first indictment was insufficient to warrant a conviction, and on which no sentence could have been passed against the prisoner. It charges the prisoner with having stolen a negro man, no where called a slaye in the whole indictment; and it is obvious that the attorney of the state aimed at an indictment, under the statute, for stealing a slave. The authorities summed up in the first volume of Chitty's Criminal Law, p. 453 &c. show clearly, that a conviction or acquittal on an invalid indictment, cannot be pleaded in bar of a second, or subsequent prosecution. Wherefore, let judgment be entered for the state, on the issue joined on the plea of auterfois acquit; and it is ordered that the cause be remanded for further proceedings in the circuit court of said county of Pike. GAYDEN AND WIFE vs. BATES AND WIFE. in an action of slander, a verdict was rendered for one dollar damages and costs, after the passage of a law enacted subsequent to the commencement of the suit, but before the verdict, declaring that costs are not to be allowed in actions of slander, where the amount of the verdict for the plaintiff does not exceed ten dollars. The costs are recoverable, as the law must not be construed so as to give it a retrospective effect. OPINION OF THE COURT-BY THE HON. EDWARD TURNER. This is a motion to quash a writ of fi fa, issued in this case, in the Amite Circuit Court, on a judgment obtained therein, for the damages and costs. The action is slander, and the verdict of the jury rendered at April Term, 1823 is in favor of the plaintiff for one dollar damages, besides costs. After verdict, the cause was referred to this court, on a motion to abate the suit; which motion was overruled, and judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiffs at December Term 1824. Whereupon the execution in question was issued on the 22d March 1825, for the damages and costs of suit, including a bill of costs, which accrued in the supreme court on the reference aforesaid, amounting to thirty-five dollars, sixty-two and one half cents, returnable to the April term 1825, on which a levy was made and forthcoming bond taken, and returned with the execution to that term. The defendants by their counsel then moved to quash the fi. fa. as to costs, on the following grounds, to wit: first, because the action was an action of slander, and the verdict was for plaintiff for one dollar only. Second; because the law allowed no costs in the supreme court, where the casa Вв was referred by the judge upon doubts, and the court doubting as to the law and rule of decision, referred this motion to the supreme court. The suit was commenced after the November term 1819, and previous to April term 1820. Afterwards, and whilst the suit was pending, the legislature passed the act of June 1822, establishing the circuit court, the 74th section of which provides for the recovery of costs generally, by the parties prevailing in the cause, and the law was so, previous to that time. But the act concerning the limitation of actions, Rev. code, p. 187, sec. 17 provides, that in all actions of assault and battery and slander, commenced and prosecuted in any conrt of law of this state, it the jury find for the plaintiff, under the sum of ten dollars, he shall not recover any costs. It ⚫ is contended by the defendant's counsel, that according to the provisions of this statute, the plaintiffs are not entitled to any costs, that although by the law existing at the time of the commencement of the suit, a plaintiff, in a case like this, prevailing in his cause was entitled to costs, yet that the costs did not then constitute a vested right, and were subject to legislative control, at any time during the pendency of the suit, and that the language of the statute above recited, extended to causes then pending, as well as to those which might be afterwards commenced, and refers to a case found in the Massachusetts reports vol. II. page 340. Having given to this case all the consideration which its novelty and importance require, we have been unable to find any principle, or any adjudged case, which will sustain the present motion on the first ground. It seems wrong in principle, that the law should authorise a recovery of costs at the time suit was commenced, and that whilst the suit is pending, that the law should be altered, so as to lessen the plaintiff's claim. Ex post facto laws are clearly void, and those having a retrospective effect are not to be favored. It cannot be denied, moreover, that the probable amount of costs had great influence with the jury in assessing the damages, for, by their verdict, as appears by the record, the jury find the defendant guilty, and assess the damages to one dollar and costs. Although the jury had nothing to do with the costs, yet having included them in their verdict, their intention is perceived, although the latter part of the verdict is surplus age. The act of 1822 relied on by the defendant's counsel, is a general law enacted, not so much to alter the then existing law, as to provide a saluta ry general rule on this subject, and as the legislature was engaged in embodying and establishing a general system of statute law for our state. But if any reasonable doubt existed in relation to this point, by the phraseology of the act of 1822 above cited, we consider that the proviso found, in the 7th section of the act, declaring what laws of a public nature shall be incorporated in the revised code, and providing for the publication thereof, passed June the 30th 1822 at the same session of the above recited act, removes all doubt and furnishes the rule on which this matter must be de cided. The proviso is in these words: " Provided that all rights which shall have accrued, and all remedies which shall have been commenced under former laws, shall be, and remain as though the said code had never been adopted. Rev. code, p. 8: see also the 8th section of the same act, and 2 Mass. Rep. 461. We consider these provisions conclusive on this question, and that the plaintiff is entitled to his costs. As to the 2d reason for quashing the ex ecution, it is not relied on. The statute gives no costs in the supreme court in a case referred by a circuit judge, on doubts as to the law. Motion to quash the execution, overruled.. Let an order be made that the supreme court costs, amounting to thirty five dollars sixty-two and one half cents, be credited on the bond and execution. Judges Hampton and Black concurred. DAN'L WINTER vs. GAB. WINTER, ADMIN. OF ELISHA WINTER DEC'D.. A. having taken out letters of administration on the estate of B, in one State, cannot be sued as administrator in another state on a judgment obtained against him as such, in the State where he administered. OPINION OF THE COURT-BY THE HON. EDWARD TURNER.. Judgment was rendered on the declaration, without other pleading, in the court below for the plaintiff, subject to the following agreement of the parties, to wit: "In this case, it is agreed by counsel on both sides, that the judgment taken in this cause be subject to the question, whether the defendant, having never taken out letters of administration in this state, can be here sued upon a judgment obtained against him in another state, for a debt of defendant's intestate, as administrator. This question has been referred to this court on doubts of the judge before whom the suit was pending, and we have given the subject a full and thorough examination, both at the last term and the present. The powers, rights and duties of executors and administrators have been much litigated, and have received a full share of judicial attention: and although many points and principles are settled in the courts of Great Britain, and in those of the United States, of the several States, and even in this State, yet, we cannot promise ourselves that new points will not arise hereafter from this fruitful source of controversy. At a very early period of our territorial government, a suit was brought in the superior court of Jefferson County, by Johnson's executors vs. Green's executors. Johnson sued under letters testamentary obtained in Virginia, for a debt claimed to be due by Green, in his life time, to Johnson. The executors of Green pleaded that Johnson's executors had not obtained letters testamentary in the Mississippi Territory, and on demurrer to the plea, judgment was given for the defendants, under the authority of English precedents, supported by the case of Fennewick vs. Sears' administrators, reported in 1st. Cranch 259. This judgment, it is stated, was affirmed in our supreme court, and has been considered authority ever since. In England, different jurisdictions claimed separate and exclusive rights in settling and distributing deceased persons' estates, and the law protected them in the exercise of their privileges. We are more liberal, and more consistent, for we allow but one probate of a will, or one administration, in our state. Letters testamentary, or of administration granted in any county, have full power and effect throughout the state. Every sovereign power or state, claims the right of having the estates of deceased persons lying or being within their respective jurisdictions, collected and distributed under their own authority; and under this princi ple they allow no foreign power to interfere, or to exercise jurisdiction over such estate. This principle is a convenient and salutary one, and requires only to be well understood, to be approved and respected. If admin |