cordingly does, for cash; if it is afterwards made manifest that the land is not embraced by A.'s claim, a court of Chan- cery will rescind the contract, and decree a restoration of the purchase money, though it is not proved that A. was cognizant of the fact, that the land was not embraced by his claim. Harrison & Gibson vs. Stowers,
V. A contract may be rescinded on proof of mutual error, as well as in cases of proof of fraud. Ibid.,
VI. If A. sells, with warranty, an unsound slave, to B.; in an ac- tion by B. against A., on the warranty, it is no defence to the action, that, before its institution, B. sold the same slave to a third person, and that no recovery has been had against B. Texada vs. Camp,
VII. Contracts must be governed by the laws of the State where made, and the construction adopted, given by the courts of a sister State to their statutes. Sampson vs. Breed, VIII. Upon a contract for the delivery of ten slaves, at a given day, and notes taken by the vendor, payable after the day fixed for the delivery of the slaves; a recovery cannot be had on such note, unless all the slaves were tendered at the time fixed by the contract. Farrar vs. Gaillard's Adm'r, IX. A court of law cannot inquire into, and enforce a parol con- tract for the sale of land, although performed in part by de- livery of possession. Payson vs. West,
X. Where A. agreed in writing, in consideration of his own note to B., and also his transfer of C.'s note to B., to pay him $200 in case both notes were not paid by a certain day; this is not a contract to do an act, the non-performance of which would justify a stipulation for specific damages; and the rate of interest is the only legal measure of damages.— Hughes vs. Fisher,
See CHANCERY, XII, XVIII.
"CONDITIONS, I, II.
"DECLARATION, II, VII, VIII.
I. The trustees of the poor are a public corporation, subject to legis- lative control. Governor, &c., use &c. vs. Gridley,
I. The County Court is an inferior tribunal, and if it exceeds its power or jurisdiction, its acts are absolutely void, and may be so regarded in an action of trespass, though not arrested by appeal or certiorari. Stockett vs. Nicholson, II. The defect of the proceedings of the County Court cannot be supplied by parol testimony. Their proceedings must be recorded, and can be proved only by the record. Ibid, 111. The County Court is empowered to settle and allow all claims against the county, and to levy a tax for their liquidation; and if it refuses to do so, the Supreme Court will grant a mandamus. Madison County Court vs. Alexander et al., See APPEAL, II.
"PROBATE COURT, I.
"ROADS, V, et sequitur,
1. A party may proceed by attachment in this State, to recover damages for a breach of covenant. Woolfolk vs. Cage,
I. Creditor of deceased person, dying here without heirs, must proceed against the escheator general. Bolls vs. Duncan,
I. C. gave two promissory notes to B., which B. endorsed to S., and S. sued both C. and B. on one of the notes, and obtained judgment against C.'s administrators, but was nonsuited in the case against B.: C. having died insolvent, S. had the amount of his judgment and of the remaining note both al- lowed, by the commissioners of insolvency, and received a dividend of 72 cents to the dollar, on his whole demand, em- bracing both the judgment and the note. In the case of S. against C. on the second note, the amount of the 72 per cent. dividend should be credited on each claim, pro rata, and not to appropriate to the judgment first, and then the balance to the second note. Stamps vs. Brown,
I. In declaring on a writing, which is neither a deed, bill of ex- change, nor promissory note, a consideration must be stated, and the omission to do so, is not cured by verdict. Minor vs. Michie. Adm'x, &c.
II. Where the contract is by deed, it is not necessary to set forth the consideration upon which it is founded, as the law in in that case, implies a consideration where none is stated. Ibid.,
Consideration is also implied upon bills of exchange, and promissory notes, but, in all other cases, the consideration not being implied, must be stated in the declaration. Ibid. 24, 29 III. In declaring on a written contract, it is not necessary to use the words of the party, but the plaintiff may declare accord- ing to their legal effect. Mullen vs. Jelks,
IV. When the defendant permits judgment to go against him by default, he cannot object to an imperfection in the declara- tion. Irwin in error vs. Williams endorsee,
V. Plaintiff must declare for interest on a note for fifty dollars, or the court has not jurisdiction. Thomas, use &c. vs. Miller. VI. A count in debt, upon a promissory note, may be joined with a count upon a sealed instrument. Mardis vs. Terrell,
VII. Although the plaintiff may waive a special contract in his de- claration, and give it in evidence under the common counts; yet he cannot prove materials furnished under a count for work and labor done, Richardson vs. Oneal,
VIII. Although a special contract existed, and is proved, yet the plaintiff' may recover solely on the common counts. Arnett vs. Evans' Administrators,
I. The court incline to the opinion that, in a sale of a tract of land, where the quantity of acres warranted in the deed is not to be had, if the failure be entire, it is a good defence to an action at law for the purchase money; but not when there is only a partial failure, unless it be combined with fraud. Ker Adm'r vs. Calvit,
II. The deed of a married woman is a nullity. Herrington's Ex'r
I. The omission to state in the declaration, the sum claimed; and the date of the promise, may be taken advantage of by spe- cial demurrer, but such error is cured by verdict. Dela- huff vs. Reid,
II. On sustaining a demurrer to a plea, there should be judgment of respondeat ouster. Douglas for Long, vs. Hendricks et al.,
III. Variance between declaration and bond, may be taken advan- tage of by demurrer. Turnbull vs. Witherspoon, Adm'r,
IV. A demurrer to a replication, opens to the consideration of the court the defects in the pleas of the defendant. Miles vs. Myers,
When an ndividual dies intestate, leaving no wife, or descend- ants, or brothers of the whole blood, the brother of the half blood inherits his estate. Fatheree vs. Fatheree,
I. The descriptio rei, in an action of detinue for a slave, has always been deemed sufficient to enable the jury to assess some va- lue, and the amount assessed is immaterial, if the defendant has it in his power to deliver the slaves. Jennings vs. Gib-
II. If the specific property recovered in detinue cannot be had, then the plaintiff must take the alternate value assessed, and if released by a mistake of law, by the plaintiff, it does not enable him to bring a new action of detinue. Ibid.,
III. Whether the judgment for the alternate value be satisfied or not, a new action of detinue cannot be sustained. Ibid IV. Where the mother of a slave is recovered in an action of de- tinue, a new action cannot be sustained for her child, born before the commencement of the suit. Ibid.,
V. In an action of detinue, the service of the writ is a sufficient de- mand. Caraway vs. McNeice,
VI. The jury should assess the separate value of each and every article found; but if not done, under our statute the court may award a writ of inquiry to ascertain the same.
I. A divorce, a mensa et thoro, will be decreed for continued ill
treatment. Adultery may be set up as a bar to alimony. Holmes vs. Holmes,
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