PLEA.

I. The statute allowing donble pleas, means legal pleas. Moore
use, vs. Mitchell,

II. A special plea which amounts to the general issue, may be re-
jected by the court as frivolous. Ibid.,

III. A plea in abatement and in bar, cannot be put in at the same
time; the latter is a waiver of the former, Pearce vs.
Young,

IV. A plea by a surety, of extension of time given by creditor to
his principal debtor is defective, if it does not state
that it was given without the consent of the surety. Green
vs. Brandon,

V. A plea, alleging that the premises of the plaintiff were
not enclosed by a sufficient fence, is not good. Miles vs.
Myers,

VI. Under the statute of this State, requiring a list of offsets to be
filed with the plea of payment, that plea is nevertheless
good, without such list, when the payment was made in
money. Prim vs. Kittridge,

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231

23

259

372

379

390

VII. In a suit on a bill single, against the endorser, the defendant
pleaded nil debit, payment &c.; and it was error to strike
out all the pleas but the first. Ibid.,

390

VIII. The plea of payment admits the execution of the bond sued
on. Hines vs. Rogers, Slocumb, & Co.,

486

IX. To a declaration in debt for the penalty of a bond, with a
condition not set forth, nil debet is not a legal plea. Bar-

field vs. Kearny,

504

See DEMURRER, IV.

" LIMITATIONS-STATUTE OF.

PLEADING.

1. An averment in a replication requires no stronger proof than
an averment in a declaration. Moore, use, vs. Mitchell,

See DEMURRER, IV.

VERDICT, VII.

PRACTICE.

I. After a plea of payment, it is wholly irregular to enter up

221

Judgment against the defendant, by default. Selzer vs.
Wilkinson,

II. Upon proper showing to the court, that one of the defendants,
who was a non-resident, is dead, the cause may be revived
by publication, under direction of the court. Dismukes vs.
Terry,

589

PAGE

.

108

180

219

III. A verdict, without judgment, will not sustain the plea of
former recovery. Butler vs. Stephens,

IV. A plaintiff has a right, during the progress of the trial, to
withdraw an account filed by him; and if the debits are
withdrawn, the credits must necessarily follow. King, Ap-
pellant, vs. Cooper, Exec'r &c., Appellee,

V. It is not error for the court to refuse to charge the jury upon a
certain point, unless it appears by the bill of exceptions, that
such point did arise in the cause. Miles vs. Myers,
VI. The court is not bound to charge the jury, unless called upon.
Montgomery & Norris, Adm'rs, &c. vs. Griffin,

VII. In an action founded on a bond, with conditions, and assign-
ment of breaches, to assess damages is error. Riley's Ad-
ministrators vs. Ruffin's Exec'rs,

VIII. On a motion for judgment under the statute, by a surety
against his principal, the judgment against the surety, and
the fact, that the plaintiff in the motion is a mere surety,
should appear on the record. Brown vs. Oldham,
IX. It is the universal practice to permit sheriffs to amend their
returns, agreeably to the facts. Garner vs. Collins,

359

379

453

425

492

518

X. An erroneous charge upon an abstract point, which did not
arise in the case, and could not prejudice the cause, is not a
ground for reversal. Ibid.,

518

See ASSUMPSIT, II.

"AUDITORS.

I. A special agent, who exceeds his authority, does not bind his
principal, unless the latter ratifies his acts. Landsdale, vs.
Shackleford,

II. Any act of a general agent, within the limits of his ostensible
powers, as a factor or consignee, binds the principal, though
he may have given secret instructions to pursue a different
course. Ibid.,

PRISON BOUND BOND.

I. A prison bound bond, given by a defendant in custody, on a ca.
sa., payable to the marshal of the U. S., is void; the exist-
ing statutes of this State, requiring such bonds to be made
payable to the plaintiffs in the executions. Winchester,
Adm'r, &c., vs. Collins,

II. Where a defendant was delivered by the Marshal of the U. S.
court in Kentucky, to the county jailor, the jailor was autho-
rized to take a prison bound bond, according to the laws of
Kentucky. But the discharge of such prisouer, under the
insolvent laws of Kentucky, is not a good defence to an ac-
tion on the prison bound bond. Offutt vs. Bowen,

PROBATE COURT.

PAGE

149

146

545

I. Judge of Probate Court cannot surcharge and falsify an account
settled by a decree of the county court. Gibson, ex parte,

See APPEAL, II.

"ATTACHMENT, III.

377

PROCESS.

I. Process must be signed by the clerk of the court, or by his de-
puty, in the name of his principal. Felder vs. Meredith,

PROMISSORY NOTES.

I. The statute of this State, rendering notes and sealed instruments
negotiable, is similar to that of Anne, except that it does
not protect in the same manner, the interests of the bona
fide holders of negotiable instruments, but leaves them on
the same footing as the assignees of open accounts; except
that the latter must sue in the name of the assignor, and the
former may sue in their own name. Defrance, use of, &c.
vs. Davis,

II. Notice of protest may be proved without producing the writ-
ten notice. Offutt vs. Vick, Exec'r of Vick,
III. An acknowledgment by an endorser of a bill of exchange, that
he had received notice of the protest, and supposed he should
have to provide for the payment of the bill, is tantamount to
legal notice, and to a promise to pay. lbid.,

IV. If the drawer or endorser of a dishonored bill of exhange, pay
the amount to the holder, without having received notice,
and not knowing the fact, he may recover the money back.
Ibid.,

V. A promise to pay under an ignorance of the facts, is not bind-
ing. Ibid.,

VI. It is immaterial from whom the notice of protest is received.
The holder of a bill of exchange, payable at a fixed time af-
date, should call at the usual business hours, and present it
for acceptance; if accepted, he should, under like formali-
ties, call upon the drawer for payment, before the expiration
of the days of grace, and if payment is refused, protest the
bill before the expiration of the days of grace, and on the
same day, if the mail has not left, deposit the notice of pro-
test in the post office. Ibid.,

VII. QUERE:-Is a bill of exchange, drawn in this state, by one of
its citizens, upon a citizen of another State, and there pay-
able, a foreign, or an inland bill of exchange? Ibid.,

See note of Reporter,

VIII. In an action upon a joint and several promissory note, one

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447

69

99

100

100

100

100

100

104

of the co-promissors cannot discharge himself at law, by
evidence that he was a surety only, and had been injured by
the failure or neglect of the plaintiff, to prosecute his demand
against the principal debtor, after being requested so to do
by the surety. Kerr, Adm'r, vs. Baker, Adm'r,

IX. Such a defence, if available any where, must be made in a
court of equity, where the form of the security is as above
statǝd. Ibid.,

X. A promissory note, endorsed specially, cannot be given in evi-
dence to support an action in the name of the original pay-
ees. Smith, use &c., vs. Runnels,

XI. Possession of a note payble to bearer, or of a note payable to
order and endorsed in blank, is prima facie evidence of own-
ership of the note; but if the endorsement be special, the
suit must be in the name of the last endorsee. After a spe-
cial endorsement, if the note comes again into the possession
of the payee, he must, in an action at law, show a transfer
from the last endorsee, or the jury will be instructed as in
case of a non-suit. Ibid.,

XII. The rules which govern the circulation of negotiable paper
must prevail, and the court cannot moderate any hardship
resulting from these rules, in relation to illiterate persons,
or graduate the system, so as to adapt it to the various de-
grees of intelligence. Chance vs. Right,

XIII. A notice of protest given on the day that a note falls due, is
sufficient. Harrell vs. Bixler,

XIV. A note dated 21st March, 1822, promising to pay a specified
sum, being for "money loaned at forty per cent until paid,"
is sufficiently explicit as to the agreement of the borrower to
pay interest at the rate of forty per cent per annum, and
may be enforced under the then existing provision of the con-
stitution of the State of Mississippi. Lowry vs. Lowry,

XV. A promissory note is prima facie proof of a valuable consid-
eration, either in the hands of the first, or any other holder.
Moore vs. Mitchell,

PAGE

140

140

144

144

176

207

XVI. A judgment obtained by an endorsee, against the maker of
a note, is not conclusive in a suit between the payee and
maker of a note. Wright vs. Bixler,

XVII. A note given for a gambling consideration, may be declared
void, either at law, or in a court of Chancery. McAuley,
Adm'r, vs. Mardis, et al.

XVIII. In suing upon a note for $50, the plaintiff must declare

231

258

307