for interest, or the court has not jurisdiction. Thomas, use
&c. vs. Miller,
XIX. A note given to the city of Natchez, "for port duties to be
collected," is an illegal contract, being prohibited by act of
Congress admitting the State of Mississippi into the Union.
City of Natchez vs. Trimble & Forsyth,
See ASSIGNEE, III.
"DECLARATION, V, VI.
"WITNESS, VI.
I Notice of protest, given on the day the note falls due, is suffi-
cient. Harrell vs. Bixler,
II. Notice of protest left at the nearest post office to the residence
of the endorser, where he does not reside in town, is suffi-
cient. Stamps vs. Brown,
See PROMISSORY NOTE, II, 1II, VI.
I. Attorney's receipt for the collection of money, cannot be assimi-
lated to a bill of exchange, so as to require of the assignee,
demand and notice. Runnels vs. Spencer & Lea,
I. A recognizance must be taken for the appearance of the accused
in criminal cases, removed into the Supreme Court, or the
writ of error will not operate as a supersedeas. State vs.
Craft,
I. Whether the Chancellor will grant a re-hearing, is discretion-
ary with him, and his refusal to grant a re-hearing, cannot
be reviewed upon an appeal. Hoggatt's Adm'r vs. Hunt's
Exec'rs,
II. It is usual to grant a re-hearing upon petition signed by two
counsel. Ibid,
I. The motion upon a replevy bond, given by a tenant, on replevy
ing goods distrained for rent, should be for execution, and
not for judgment; the bond operating after forfeiture, as a
judgment. Vannerson vs. Staunton, Adm'r,
I. On sustaining a demurrer to a plea, there should be judgment
of respondeat ouster. Douglass for Long, vs. Hendricks
et al.,
Southward & Bowles, use &c. vs. McLaughlin & others,
I. The road laws do not require notice to individuals, and the in-
tervention of a jury, in order to discontinue a pnblic road-
Nicholson vs. Stockett,
II. In the case of a mere discontinuance of a public road, the in-
dividual proprietor is restored to the use of the soil, though
he may have received compensation therefor. Ibid.,
III. In turning, changing, or altering a public road, an actual
view of the new route is necessary, and the intervention of
a jury is required. Ibid.,
IV. Perhaps, in such cases, also, notice must be given to the own-
ers of the soil, and compensation ascertained by the verdict
of a jury. Ibid.,
V. The authority of the county courts to order public roads to be
laid out, is a special obligation of power, and must be strict.
pursued, or all its acts are absolutely void. Stockett vs.
Nicholson,
VI. The court cannot lay out a public road, but only order it to be
done by a jury. Neither court nor jury can exercise pow-
ers delegated to the other, nor can a road be established till
the court order it, and the jury lay it out. Ibid.,
VII. Jury must lay out the road in the mode prescribed by stat-
ute. Ibid.,
VIII. In debt, for the penalty under the statute against cutting
down trees, the defendant having cut the trees for building
a bridge, is within the exception of the statute, in favour of
public roads. Courtney vs. Smylie,
See COMMISSIONERS OF ROADS, I.
I. Payment to clerks of courts is no satisfaction of the claim or
judgment. Lewis vs. Johnson,
I. A Scroll, representing a seal, without words in the body of the
instrument, showing the intention of the maker to make it
a sealed one, will not make it such. Bohannon vs. Hough
I. The penalties inflicted by the statute upon a sheriff, for omitting
to levy an execution, or for failing to pay over money col-
lected on an execution, cannot be recovered without notice
to the sheriff of the motion against him. Vance vs. Connell
II. Action for damages lies against a sheriff, if a slave sell for less
money, on account of any neglect in the sheriff to perform
his duty. Hutchins vs. Lee,
III. If the Sheriff fails to return an execution on the return day, he
is liable, on motion, to judgment for the amount, with 8 per
cent interest, and 5 per cent damages. Helm vs. Gridley,
IV. It is the universal practice to permit sheriffs to amend their
returns, agreeably to the facts. Garner vs. Collins,
See SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS, II.
I. The purchaser, at Sheriff's sale, of a tract of land, for which
the defendant on the execution held only a bond to make a
title, takes it, subject to the vendor's lien for the purchase
money. Meade vs. Thompson,
I. In an action of slander, a verdict was rendered for one dollar damages and costs, after the passage of a law enacted subsequent to the commencement of the suit, but before the verdict, declaring that costs are not to be allowed in action of slander, where the amount of the verdict for the plaintiff does not exceed ten dollars. The costs are recoverable, as the law must not be construed so as to give it a retrospective effect. Gayden & wife vs. Bates & wife,
II. Words merely abusive and insulting are not actionable at common law, unless special damages are laid in the declaration and proved; such words being actionable under the statute of this state. Davis vs. Farrington,
III. The words that "the plaintiff' got drunk on Christmas," not
actionable at common law.
I, Murder may be committed by the killing a slave. State vs.
Jones,
II. In some respects, slaves may be considered as chattels, but in
other respects, they they are regarded as men. Ibid.,
III. The ancient laws of Rome, giving power over the life of the
slave, never extended here. Ibid.,
IV. The provisions of the statute, for the sale of runaway slavǝs,
are merely directory, and a non-compliance with these pro-
visions, does not invalidate the sale. Hutchins vs. Lee,
V. If the slave sell for less money, because of any neglect in the
sheriff to perform his duty, the remedy is by an action
against the sheriff for damages. Hutchins vs Lee,
I. The treaty of cession, by Virginia to the United States, which
guarantees to the inhabitants of the N. W. territory, their ti-
tles, rights and liberties, does not render void that article of
the Ordinance of Congress, of 1787, which prohibits slavery
in that territory. Harry & others vs. Decker & Hopkins,
II. Any state may, by its constitution, prohibit slavery within its
limits: when not restrained by the constitution, slaves with-
in the limits of the Northwestern territory became freemen,
by virtue of the Ordinance of 1787, and can assert their
claims to freedom, in the courts of this state. Ibid.,
III. Slavery exists not by force of the law of nature, or of nations,
but, by virtue only of the positive provisions of the law; to
this the master must look for all his rights, and they do not
confer the power of taking the life of the slave. State vs.
Jones,
I. The law in Spain continued in force here, till after the territo-
rial government was actually organized, under the act of
Congress of the 7th April, 1798, and this government was
not actually organized, until the beginning of the
Chew vs. Calvert & others,
But see note of Reporter,
II. Under the laws of Spain, executors had no power to sell the
immovable property of the testator. Ibid.,
III. Grants of land here by Spain, were donative, and not subject
to the rights of community, between husbend and wife.-
The conditions contained in these grants, were for the bene-
fit of the donee, and were rarely, if ever fulfilled. Ib.,
IV. A Spanish order of survey, signed by a deputy Governor, is
presumed, prima facie, to be issued by the competent au-
thority, and in the absence of proof to the contrary, will be
regarded in the same light as if signed by the Governor in
Chief. Such order of survey vests such a right as could only
be defeated by the alienation of the grantee, or his volun-
tary abandonment, or by an entire failure to perform the
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