conditions, or some act against the government, which would
justify a confiscation. Winn vs. Cole's heirs,

V. The report of the surveyor of the Spanish Government, stating
the land to be vacant, and the allegation of that fact in a
Spanish grant, does not amount to a confiscation, or a revo-
cation of a prior grant of the same land. Ibid.,

VI. A revocation of a grant, if the effect of capricious tyranny, ought not be regarded. Ibid.,

VII. But little importance was attached by the Spanish government, to the conditions set forth in their grants.

Ibid.,

PAGE

119

119

119

119

See MINOR, I, II, III.

SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS.

I. Summary remedies given by statute, cannot be extended beyond the letter of the law. Lombard vs. Whiting & Lewis,

229

II. The statutes giving summary remedies against sheriffs, must
be strictly construed. Connell vs. Lewis,
III. Under the summary proceedings for the possession of slaves,
before the judge of probate, and his associates, both his as-
sociates must be present. Arnett vs. Bitsel,

251

496

SUPERSEDEAS.

-See RECOGNIZANCE, I.

SUPREME COURT.

I. The Supreme Court has power to grant a mandamus. John
Robson, ex parte,

Madison County Court vs. Alexander et al.,

II. This court will not notice errors in opinions given by the judge below, if not excepted to. Carraway vs. McNeice,

See JURISDICTION, II, III, V.

SURETY.

See PRACTICE, VIII.'

"PROMISSORY NOTE, VIII.

412

523

538

STATUTES.

I. Statutes must not be construed so as to give them a retrospective effect. Gayden vs. Bates,

Easton vs. Vandorn,

II. When strictly construed. Lombard vs. Whiting & Lewis,

PAGE

Connell vs. Lewis,

See CONSTITUTION, VII.

"CONTRACT, VII.

TENDER.

401

I. An offer of money, in bags, is a legal tender, and it is the duty of the receiver to count it, and see that there is enough. Behaly vs. Hatch,

II. The general rnle is, that if no place be fixed for payment or performance, a tender to the person is good. Bates vs. Bates,

III. In order to make a tender in property legal, the articles ought to be specifically pointed out, and their identity clearly ascertained, so that the plaintiff might be able to prove them should he be driven to an action for them.

See CONTRACT, VIII.

TENANTS IN COMMON.

Ibid,

I. One tenant in common cannot sustain an action of trover against another. Hines vs. Terry,

II. If one tenant in common cannot take all the personal chattel to his own separate possession, the other has no remedy by action, but may take to himself the personal chattel, when opportunity occurs. Ibid.,

III. Although a tenancy in common may be created by a deed or will, yet effect shall be given to words of survivorship, if there is a time to which such words may be applied.Shanks vs. Chambless, senior, et al.,

401

80

80

249

TITLE.

PAGE

I. The Spanish order of survey, confirmed by the United States,
constituted a legal title, independent of the patent. Winn
vs. Cole's heirs,

See LAND LAWS, I, II, III.

" LIMITATIONS-STATUTE OF, I.

“PATENT, I, II, III.

TRANSFER OF CAUSES.

I. The parties to a suit can legally transfer it, by consent, from
the circuit court of one county to that of another. Choat
vs. Billingsly,

See JURISDICTION, II, III.

TREATY.

I. The Northwestern Territory, ceded by Virginia to the United
States, prior to the peace of 1763, was subject to, and
claimed by France, but, by the treaty of 1763, was trans-
ferred to Great Britain. Harry & others vs. Decker and
Hopkins..

II. In 1775, this territory was under a government distinct and
separate from that of the colony of Virginia. Ibid..

36

III. There is no evidence that the laws of Virginia were ever ex-
tended to this territory, or that Great Britain ever changed
the laws existing prior to 1763, and therefore the laws then
existing were the municipal laws of the country. Ibid.,
See SLAVERY, I, II.

36

TRESPASS.

I. Where a court has no jurisdiction, or where it has jurisdiction
but is bound to adopt certain forms, from which it deviates,
the proceedings, in either case, are coram non judice, and
constitute no justification in an action of trespass. Stockett
vs. Nicholson,

II. The true distinction between trespass and case, is when the
act itself occasions the injury to the plaintiff's person or
property, the action should be trespass; but when the act it-

75

self is not an injury, but a consequence from that act is pre-
judicial, the proper remedy is by an action on the case.
McFarland vs. Smith,

III. The action of trespass for an injury to property is founded on
possession, and cannot be maintained, unless the plaintiff
has actual or constructive possession. Ibid.,

IV. A having hired a slave to B, cannot support trespass for an
injury done to the slave, during the unexpired term for
which the slave was hired. B. is the proper person to
bring that action, and A. may bring an action on the case,
for an injury done to his reversionary interest. Such an
error in the form of the action. is not cured by the statute of
Jeoffails, or by verdict. Ibid,

See PLEA, V.

PAGE

172

. 172

172

TRIAL.

1. Persons separately indicted for the same offence, may be tried
jointly. State vs. Blennerhassetts,

TROVER.

I. Trover cannot be sustained by one tenant in common against
another. Hinds vs. Terry,

II. In trover, the value of the personal chattel, and interest from
the date of the conversion, is the true measure of damages.
Ibid,

III. In trover, for the value of a slave, the jury would be instructed
to give a verdict for the value of the slave at the date of the
conversion, with his yearly value from that date. Texada
vs. Camp,

TRUSTEES OF THE POOR.

I. The trustees of the poor are a public corporation subject to legis-
lative control. Governor &c. vs. Gridley,

VENDOR & VENDEE.

I. Where A. sells land to which he has not a valid title, the pur-
chaser who has not been evicted, or threatened with eviction,
cannot withhold the payment of the purchase money; there
being no fraud in the transaction, and the purchaser having
taken bond to secure the perfection of the title. Miller vs.
Owens et al.,

80

80

150

328

244

II. Where a bargain was made for the sale of a gin stand, and
purchase money paid, the vendor being ready to deliver,
but inconvenient for the vendee to receive the stand, which
remained in possession of vendor by their mutual consent;
where it was consumed by fire, without any negligence on
his part, it is vendee's loss. Smith vs. Nevitt,

See SHERIFF'S SALE, I.

VENUE.

I. It is error to refuse to change the venue, when the defendant
makes oath that he is a resident freeholder of a different
county from that in which the action is instituted. Spain
vs. Winter,

PACK

371

152

VERDICT.

I. Error in proceedings cured by verdict. Delahuff vs. Reid,
II. Omission in the declaration, amounting to error, cured by ver-
dict. Ibid.,

74

74

Poindexter vs. Turner,

349

III. A verdict will aid a title or demand defectively set out, but
not a defective title. Ibid,

74

IV. It is error in the court below to permit a verdict to be rendered
without an issue, or judgment by default, or writ of enquiry.
Hendricks Adm'r, vs. Snodgrass,

86

Horn vs. Gillock,

107

V. A verdict without judgment will not sustain the plea of former
recovery. Butler vs. Stephens,

219

VI. A defective averment in a declaration is cured by verdict, but
not where the total want of title appears. Poindexter vs.
Turner,

349

VII. After verdict and judgment, no defect in the declaration and
pleadings will be noticed, which might have been taken ad-
vantage of by demurrer. Whitaker vs. Comfort,

431