XV. CHAP. other Powers with whom they were in cordial agreement. The English Government, however, not only consented to engage in naval movements which affected-nay, actually governed-the question of peace or war, but fell into the error of concerting these movements with France alone, and doing this not because of any difference which had arisen between the four Powers, but simply because France and England were provided with ships; so that in truth the Western Powers, merely because they were possessed of the implement which enabled them to put a pressure upon the Czar, resolved to act as though they were the only judges of the question whether the pressure should be applied or not; and this at a time when, as Lord Clarendon declared in Parliament, the four Powers were all acting cordially together.' Of course, this wanton segregation tended to supersede or dissolve the concord which bound the four Powers, and, as a sure consequence, to endanger yet more than ever the cause of peace. Some strange blindness prevented Lord Aberdeen from seeing the path he trod, or rather prevented him from seeing it with a clearness conducive to action. But what the French Emperor wanted was even more than this, and what he wanted was done. It is true that neither admiration nor moral disapproval of the conduct of princes ought to have any exceeding sway over our relations with foreign States; and if we had had the misfortune to find that the Emperor of the French was the only potentate in Europe whose policy was in accord with our XV. own, it might have been right that closer relations of CHA P. alliance with France (however humiliating they might seem in the eyes of the moralist) should have followed our separation from the other States of Europe. But no such separation had occurred. What the French Emperor ventured to attempt, and what he actually succeeded in achieving, was to draw England into a distinct and separate alliance with himself, not at a time when she was isolated, but at a moment when she was in close accord with the rest of the four Powers. Towards the close of the Parliamentary session of 1853, the determination on the part of Austria to rid the Principalities of their Russian invaders was growing in intensity. Prussia also was firm; and in principle the concord of the four Powers was so exact, that it extended, as was afterwards seen, not only to the terms on which the difference between Russia and Turkey should be settled, but to the ulterior arrangements which might be pressed upon Russia at the conclusion of the war which she was provoking. The four great Powers,' said Lord Aberdeen on the 12th of August, are now 'acting in concert.'* 'In all these transactions,' said Lord Clarendon,t Austria, England, Prussia, and France are all acting cordially together, in 'order to check designs which they consider incon'sistent with the balance of power, and with those territorial limits which have been established by ' various treaties.' * 129 Hansard, p. 1650. + Ibid. p. 1423. Yet it cannot be doubted that in the midst of this perfect concord of the four Powers, the English Government was induced to enter into a separate understanding with the Emperor of the French.* This was the fatal transaction which substituted a cruel war for the peaceful but irresistible pressure which was exerted by the four Powers. The purport of this arrangement still lurks in private notes, and in recollections of private interviews; but it can be seen that (for reasons never yet explained) France and England were engaging to move in advance of the other Powers. The four Powers, being all of one mind, were still to remain in concert so far as concerned the discussion and adjudication of the questions pending between Russia and Turkey; but France and England were to volunteer to enforce their judgment. The four Powers were to be judges, and two of them—namely, France and England-were to be the executioners. What made this arrangement the more preposterous was, that the outrage of which Europe complained was the occupation of two provinces which abutted upon the Austrian dominions. Of all the great Powers, Austria was the chief sufferer. Austria was upon the spot. Austria was the one Power which instantly and in a summary way could force the Czar to quit his hold; and yet the charge of undertaking a duty which pressed upon her more than upon any other State in Europe, was voluntarily taken upon themselves by two States whose dominions were vastly distant * 129 Hansard, pp. 1424, 1768, 1826. XV. from the scene of the evil deed. It was much as CHAP. though the forces of the United States and of Brazil were to come across the Atlantic to defend Antwerp from the French, whilst the English looked on and thanked their enterprising friends for relieving them of their duty. There was not, perhaps, more than one of the members of the English Cabinet who desired the formation of this singular alliance on grounds like those which moved the French Emperor; and it is believed that Lord Aberdeen and several other members of the Government were much governed by a shallow theory which had prevailed for some years amongst public men. The theory was, that close union between France and England was a security for the peace of Europe. Sure I am,' said one confident man, who echoed the crude thought of many-sure I am, that if the advisers of the Crown in this country act in cordial concert with the Government of the Emperor of the French, and if the forces of the two countries in the Mediterranean are to act in 'concert, then it will be almost impossible that any war can disturb the peace of Europe.' But of course, to men of more statesmanlike views, the main temptation was the prospect of seeing France dragged into the policy which England had always entertained upon the Eastern Question. 6 Perhaps it will be thought that the practice of hiding away momentous engagements between States in the folds of private notes may now and then justify an endeavour to infer the nature of an agree XV. 6 CHAP. ment secretly made between two Governments from the tenor of their subsequent actions, and from a knowledge of surrounding facts. If this licence were to be granted, and if also it were to be assumed that the English as well as the French Government was negotiating with open eyes, it might perhaps be laid down that the compact of Midsummer 1853 was virtually of this sort :-The Emperor of the French 'shall set aside the old views of the French Foreign Office, and shall oblige France with all her forces to uphold the Eastern policy of England. In consideration of this sacrifice of French interests by the French Emperor, England promises to give her 'moral sanction (in the way hereinafter prescribed) to 'the arrangements of December 1851, and to take 'the following means for strengthening the throne ' and endeavouring to establish the dynasty of the Emperor of the French: 1st, England shall give the system of peaceful coercion which is involved ' in the concerted action of the four Powers, and shall adopt, in lieu of it, a separate understanding with France, of such a kind as to place the two Powers conspicuously in advance of the others, and in a state ' of more immediate antagonism to Russia with a prospect of eventual war. 2d, Even before any 'treaty of alliance is agreed upon, the Queen of up England shall declare before all Europe that the Emperor of the French is united with Her Majesty ' in her endeavours to allay the troubles now threaten 6 ing Europe with war; and it shall not be competent 'to the English Government to weaken the effect of |