XIX.

CHAP. so long as it was upon the open sea, he was not empowered to strike, and might be honourably reluctant to move out into the Euxine and run the risk of having to witness a naval engagement between the ships of the Czar and of the Sultan, without being at liberty to take part in it unless it chanced to be In propor- fought within gunshot of the Turkish coast. But would pal- exactly in proportion as this excuse for the Ambasinaction of sadors and Admirals was valid, it tended to bring blame upon the Home Governments of France and

tion as this

liate the

the Admi

rals, it would tend to bring blame upon the

vernment.

England. The honest rage of the English people was about to break out, and there were materials for a Home Go- rough criticism of men engaged in the service of the State. Some might blame the Home Government, some the Ambassador, some the Admiral; but plainly it would fare ill with any man upon whom the public anger might light.

Reception of the

On the 11th of December the tidings of Sinope tidings of reached Paris and London. The French GovernSinope by

the French ment felt the bitterness of a disaster endured as it

were under the guns of the French and English 'fleets.'* In England the indignation of the people ran to a height importing a resolve to have vengeance; and if it had clearly been understood that the disaster had resulted from a want of firm orders from home, the Government would have been overwhelmed. But the very weight and force of the public anger gave the Government a means of eluding it. The torrent had so great a volume that it was worthy to be turned against a foreign State.

* M. Drouyn de Lhuys. 'Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 299.

XIX.

of the

people is

from offi

sonages

to and

the

brought to

bear on

the Czar.

The blaming of Ministers and Ambassadors and CHAP. Admirals, and the endless conflict which would be engendered by the apportionment of censure, all The anger might be superseded by suggesting, instead, a demand English for vengeance against Russia. The terms of Count diverted Nesselrode's Circular of the 31st of October had cial pergiven ground for expecting that, until provoked a contrary course, the Czar, notwithstanding Turkish declaration of war, would remain upon the defensive; and the people in England were now taught, or allowed to suppose, that Russia had made this attack upon a Turkish squadron in breach of an honourable understanding virtually equivalent to a truce, or, at all events, to an arrangement which would confine the theatre of active war to the valley of the Lower Danube. This charge against Russia An unjust was unjust; for after the issue of the Circular, the against Government of St Petersburg had received. intelligence not only that active warfare was going on in the valley of the Lower Danube, but that the Turks had seized the Russian fort of St Nicholas, on the eastern coast of the Euxine, and were attacking Russia upon her Armenian frontier. After acts of this warlike sort had been done, it was impossible to say, with any fairness, that Russia was debarred from a right to destroy her enemy's ships; and it must be acknowledged also, as I have already said, that the destruction of the Turkish squadron at Sinope was not a thing done in stealth. But the people of England, not knowing all this at first, and hearing nothing

* See ante.

charge

the Czar

gains full

belief in

England.

XIX.

CHAP. of the Russian fleet until they heard of the ravage and slaughter of Sinope, imagined that the blow had come sudden as the knife of an assassin. They were too angry to be able to look upon the question in a spirit of cold justice. It was therefore an easy task to turn all attention from the faults of public functionaries and fasten it upon a larger scheme of vengeance. Ministers, Ambassadors, and Admirals, went free, and in a spirit of honest, inaccurate justice, the Emperor Nicholas was marked for sacrifice. This time it was his fate to be condemned on wrong grounds; but his sins against Europe had been grievous, and the rough dispensations of the tribunal which people call' opinion' have often enough determined that a man who has been guilty of one crime shall be made to suffer for another. There were few men in England who doubted that the onslaught of Sinope was a treacherous deed.

First deci

sion of the English Cabinet in regard to Sinope.

When the Cabinet met to consult upon the questions raised by the tidings from Sinope, it came to the conclusion that the fleets of the Western Powers would forthwith enter the Euxine; and the majority were of opinion that the instructions addressed to the English Admiral on the 8th of October, reinforced by a warning that such a disaster as Sinope must not be repeated, would be still a sufLord Pal- ficing guide. But Lord Palmerston saw that, even

merston

resigns office.

if this resolution was suited to the condition of things on the shores of the Bosphorus, it would find no mercy at home. In truth, he was gifted with the instinct which enables a man to read the heart of a

ΧΙΧ.

nation. He saw, he felt, he knew that the English CHAP. people would never endure to hear of the disaster of Sinope, and yet be told that nothing was done. He resigned his office. The residuum of the Cabinet determined to leave the English Admiral under the guidance of his own instructions.

of the

Emperor.

But on the 16th of December the Emperor of the Proposal French once more approached the Government of French the Queen with his subtle and dangerous counsels. The armed conflict of States in these times is an evil of such dread proportions that it seems wise to uphold the solemnity of a transition from peace to war, and to avoid those contrivances which tend to throw down the great landmark; for experience shows that statesmen heartily resolved upon peace may nevertheless be induced to concur in a series of gentle steps which slowly and gradually lead down to war. The negotiations for a settlement between Russia Danger of and Turkey had not only been revived, but were far down the from being at this time in an unpromising state; and it is probable that if Lord Aberdeen and Mr Gladstone had been called upon to say whether they would observe peace faithfully, or frankly declare a war, they would scarcely have made the more violent choice. But the alternative was not presented to the minds of the Queen's Ministers in this plain and wholesome form.

breaking

old bar

riers be

tween

peace and

war.

ous char

The ingenious Emperor of the French devised Ambigua scheme of action so ambiguous in its nature that, acter of at the option of any man who spoke about it, it posal. might be called either peace or war, but so certain

the pro

CHAP. nevertheless, in its tendency, that the adoption of it XIX. by the maritime Powers would blot out all fair

The
French

prospect of maintaining peace in Europe. He proposed to give Russia notice that France and Eng'land were resolved to prevent the repetition of the ' affair of Sinope, and that every Russian ship thenceforward met in the Euxine would be requested, and, if necessary, constrained, to return to Sebastopol ; ' and that any act of aggression afterwards attempted against the Ottoman territory or flag would be repelled by force.'* This proposal involved, without expressing it, a defensive alliance with Turkey against Russia; and, if it were adopted, the Emperor of Russia would have to see his flag driven from the waters which bounded his own dominions. It was so framed that Lord Palmerston would know it meant war, whilst Lord Aberdeen and Mr Gladstone might be led to imagine that it was a measure rather gentle than otherwise, which perhaps would keep peace in the Euxine. Indeed, the proposal seemed made to win the Chancellor of the Exchequer; for it fell short of war by a measure of distance which, though it might seem very small to people with common eyesight, was more than broad enough to afford commodious standing-room to a man delighting as he did in refinements and slender distinctions.

The Emperor of the French pressed this scheme Emperor upon the English Cabinet with his whole force. He presses not only urged it by means of the usual channels.

upon the

English
Cabinet.

*Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 307.