XIX. of diplomatic communication, but privately desired CHAP. Lord Cowley to recommend it in the strongest ' terms to the favourable attention of Her Majesty's 'Government as a measure incumbent upon himself and them to take;' and he avowed the disappoint'ment which he should feel if a difference of opinion prevented its adoption.'* This language is cogent-it is also significant; and, to one who can read it by the light of a little collateral knowledge, it may open a glimpse of the relations subsisting between the French Court and public men in England. Aber Cabinet On the 17th the English Government had taken a step in pursuance of the decision to which the majority of the Cabinet had come; but on the following day they were made acquainted with the will of the French Emperor. It would seem that there was a struggle in the Cabinet; but by the 24th all resistance had broken down, and the first decision of the Government was overturned. The proposal of Lord the French Emperor closed in like a net round the deen's variegated group which composed Lord Aberdeen's yields, and Ministry, and gathered them all together in its sup- with a ple folds. Some submitted to it for one reason, and addition, some for another; but the pressure of the French Emperor was the cogent motive which governed the scheme. result. Still, this time, though the pressure was inflicted by the hand of a foreign sovereign, it was after all from the English people themselves that the French Emperor drew his strongest means of coer* Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 307. adopts, slight the French Emperor's CHAP. cion. XIX. Their indignation at the disaster of Sinope made him sure that he could bring ruin on Lord Aberdeen's Administration by merely causing England to know that her Government was shrinking from the hostile scheme of action which he had proposed. The result, however, was that now, for the second time, France dictated to England the use that she should make of her fleet, and by this time perhaps submission had become more easy than it was at first. The Ministry, with much openness, acknowledged that they were acting without the warrant of their own judgment, and in deference to the will of the French Emperor. The Government,' said Lord Clarendon, having announced that the recurrence of a disaster such as that at Sinope must be prevented, and that the command of the Black Sea must be secured, would have been content to have left the 'manner of executing those instructions to the dis'cretion of the Admirals, but they attach so much 'importance not alone to the united action of the 'two Governments, but to the instructions addressed 'to their respective agents being precisely the same, that they are prepared to adopt the specific mode of action now proposed by the Government of the Lord Pal- Emperor.'* This being resolved, Lord Palmerwithdraws ston consented to return to office.t With the adhis resig merston nation. 6 *Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 321. + His secession during these ten or twelve days was afterwards stated by him to have been based upon a question of home politics, but it would not, of course, follow from this statement that no other motives were governing him; and when it is remembered that his resignation 1 XIX. execute and to an dition of a proviso that for the present the Sultan CHAP. should be engaged to abstain from aggressive operations on the Euxine, instructions exactly in accord Orders to with the French Emperor's proposal were forthwith the scheme sent out to the Bosphorus, and at the same time the nounce it French and English representatives at St Petersburg Peterswere ordered to communicate this resolution to Count Nesselrode. was simultaneous with the first resolution of the Cabinet, and that his return to office coincided with the Cabinet's adoption of the French Emperor's scheme, it will hardly be questioned that the four events may be fairly enough placed in an order which suggests the relation of cause and effect. at St burg. XX. Terms of settlement by the four Powers, and forced upon the accept Turks by CHAPTER XX. CHAP. AFTER much labour, the representatives of the four Powers at Constantinople had agreed upon a scheme of settlement which they deemed likely to be acceptagreed to able to the Emperor Nicholas, and they pressed its adoption by the Porte. The warlike spirit of the Ottoman people had been rising day by day, and it ance of the became very hard and dangerous for the Government to venture upon entertaining a negotiation for peace. But Lord Stratford had power over the minds of Turkish Statesmen; and he exerted it with so great a force that, although it was now impossible for them to obey him without having to face a religious insurrection, they obeyed him nevertheless. The fury of the armed divines, insisting upon the massacre of worldlings, was less terrible to them than the anger of the Eltchi. To his will they bent. Not only the Turkish Cabinet, but even the Great Council of State, was brought to accept the terms proposed.* The difficulty, nay the peril of life, which had thus been encountered by the Turkish Ministry for the sake of Grounds for expecting an amicable solution. The terms were finally accepted on the 31st of December 1853. Eastern Papers,' part ii. p. 362. XX. making peace with Russia-the success achieved at CHAP. Sinope--and some victories gained over the Turks on the Armenian frontier,-all these were circumstances tending to assuage the mortification inflicted upon the Czar by the failure of Prince Mentschikoff's mission. Again, it had long been plain that the time was illfitted for the promotion of any scheme of Russian ambition; and it was known that the English Ambassador had brought the Turks to the utmost verge of possible concession. Moreover, terms of arrangement, agreed to by the Turkish Government, were about to be pressed upon the Czar with all the authority of the four great Powers. It might seem, therefore, that all things were conducing towards an amicable settlement. Nor was this hope at all shaken when the Government of St Petersburg was made acquainted with the first and unbiassed decision to which the English Government had come after hearing of the disasters of Sinope. Apprised by his private letters of the tenor of this decision, Sir Hamilton Seymour gathered or inferred that the Admirals of the Western Powers, being enjoined to prevent the recurrence of an attack like the attack of Sinope, would assert the command of the Black Sea; and when he imparted to the Russian Govern- Friendly ment the impression thus produced on his mind, his by the communication was received in a wise and friendly spirit by Count Nesselrode; for after hearing that the Western Powers would be likely to assume the command of the Black Sea, the Count 'expressed his belief that the Russian fleet would, in consequence of the net. VOL. I. 2 c reception Russian Govern ment of the news of the first decision of the Eng lish Cabi |