IV.

His policy

from 1829

to 1853.

Upon the whole, it would seem that from the CHAP. peace of Adrianople down to the beginning of 1853 the state of the Czar's mind upon the Eastern Question was this:-He was always ready to come forward as an eager and almost ferocious defender of his Church, and he deemed this motive to be one of such cogency that views resting on mere policy and prudence were always in danger of being overborne by it; but in the absence of events tending to bring this fiery principle into action, he was really unwilling to face the troubles which would arise from the dismemberment of Turkey, unless he could know beforehand that England would act with him. If he could have obtained any anterior assurance to that effect, he would have tried perhaps to accelerate the disruption of the Sultan's Empire; but as England always declined to found any engagements upon the hypothesis of a catastrophe which she wished to prevent, the Emperor had probably accustomed himself to believe that Providence did not design to allot to him the momentous labour of governing the fall of the Ottoman Empire. He therefore chose the other alternative, and not only spoke but really did much for the preservation of an Empire which he was not yet ready to destroy. Still, whenever any subject of irritation occurred, the attractive force of the opposite policy was more or less felt; for it is not every man who, having to choose between two lines of action, can resolve to hold to the one and frankly discard the other. In general, the principle governing such a conflict

CHAP. is found to be analogous to the law which determines

IV.

the composition of mechanic forces, and the mental struggle does not result in a clear adoption of either of the alternatives, but in a mean betwixt the two. It was thus with the Emperor Nicholas whenever it happened that he was irritated by questions connected with the action of the Turkish Government. At such times his conduct, swayed in one direction by the notion of dismembering the Empire, and in the other direction by the policy of maintaining it, resulted in an endeavour to establish what the English Ambassador called a predominant influence over the counsels of the Porte, tending in the interest of absolute power to exclude all other influences, and to secure 'the means, if not of hastening the downfall of the 'Empire, at least of obstructing its improvement, ' and settling its future destinies to the profit of 'Russia, whenever a propitious juncture should ar'rive.'*

6

*Eastern Papers,' part i. p. 237.

CHAPTER V.

V.

in Monte

IT happened that at a time when the Emperor of CHAP. Russia was wrought to anger by the triumph of the Latin over the Greek Church, there were troubles in Troubles one of the provinces bordering upon the Austrian negro. territory, and Omar Pasha, at the head of a Turkish force was operating against the Christians in Montenegro. The continuance of this strife on her frontier was no doubt alarming and vexatious to Austria; but with the Emperor Nicholas the tidings of a conflict going on between a Moslem soldiery and a Christian people of the Greek faith could not fail to kindle his religious zeal, and cause him to thirst for vengeance against the enemies of his Church. Of course the existence of this feeling on the part of the Czar was well understood at Vienna, and it was probably in order to anticipate his wishes, and to remove his motives for interference, that the Austrian Cabinet determined to address a peremptory summons to the Porte, calling upon the Sultan to withdraw his forces immediately from Montenegro. The Czar secretly but studiously represented that upon this and every other matter touching his policy

*The winter of 1852-3.

V.

Count Leiningen's mission.

sending

another

the Porte

CHAP. in Turkey he was in close accord with Austria.* This, however, the Austrian Government denies. Truthful men declare that the Czar was not even informed beforehand of the demand which Austria had resolved to press upon the Porte. It is certain, however, that the Czar determined to act as though he were in close concert with Austria. Count Leiningen was to be the bearer of the Austrian summons; and simultaneously with the Count's departure from Vienna, the Emperor Nicholas resolved to despatch to the Porte an Ambassador Extraordinary, who was to declare The Czar's that a refusal to withdraw Omar Pasha's forces from plan of Montenegro would be regarded by the Czar as a mission to ground of war between him and the Sultan; and the at the same Ambassador was also to be charged with the duty of obtaining redress for the change which had been made in the allotment of the Holy Sites to the contending Churches. It may seem strange that the Czar should propose to found a declaration of war upon a grievance which was put forward by the Cabinet of Vienna, and not by himself; but he was always eager to stand forward as the protector of Christians of his own Church who had taken up arms against their Moslem rulers; and when, as now, his conservative policy was disturbed by anger and religious zeal, his ulterior views upon the Eastern Question became too vague, and also, no doubt, too alarming, to admit of their being made the subject of a treaty engagement with Austria.

time.

Apparently, then, the plan of the Emperor Nicho*Eastern Papers,' part v., in several places.

V.

the Empe

las.

las was this: he would make the rejection of Count CHAP. Leiningen's demand a ground of war against the Porte, and then, acting under the blended motives Plans of furnished by the assigned cause of war and by his ror Nichoown separate grievance, he would avenge the wrong done to his Church by forcing the Sultan to submit to a foreign protectorate over all his provinces lying north of the Balkan. This, however, was only one view of the contemplated war. It might be applicable, if the occupation of the tributary provinces should evoke no element of trouble except the sheer resistance of the enemy; but the Czar, who did not well understand the Turkish Empire, was firmly convinced at this time that the approach of war would be followed by a rising of the Sultan's Christian subjects. On the other hand, he feared, and with better reason, that if the angry Moslems should deem the Sultan remiss or faint-hearted in the defence of his territory, they might rise against their Government and fall upon the Christian rayahs, whom they would regard as the abettors of the invasion. He could not fail to perceive that in the progress of the contemplated operations he might be forced by events to give a vast extension to his views against the Sultan; and that, even against his will, and without being prepared for the crisis, he might find himself called upon to deal with the ruins of the Ottoman Empire in the midst of confusion and

massacre.