From the above tables it can be seen that in the years 1869 and 1870 each colonist consumed English goods to the amount of 27. 19s. 11d., against 7s. 3d. taken by each inhabitant of Western Europe, and 13s. 8d. by each American. We have previously shown that Americans when colonists, and when they, in common with all the world, consumed much less manufactured goods than they do at present, imported from England at the rate of 17. per head. Do not these facts decisively prove that the colonial trade is much more valuable than that with foreigners, and that maintenance of the connection is requisite to keep it so?

As we remember to have seen a statement to the effect that tables similar to the above had lately been published in England, it may be as well to state that we have never seen them; that the above argument was set forth by the writer six years since in a Toronto newspaper, and that the original idea of the relative superiority of colonial trade was derived from a passage in the second volume of Alison's Europe, 1815-52, vol. ii. p. 6.

CHAPTER II.

DIPLOMATIC, MILITARY, AND FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF EMANCIPATION.

IN urging the disruption of the Empire on pleas based on diplomatic, military, and financial considerations, emancipationists take higher ground than that which they occupy when surveying the commercial aspects of the question. There they only say that the Colonies are useless to England, and that no loss would accrue from separation. But, in urging the latter pleas, they contend that the Colonies are positively pernicious to the mother-country, inasmuch as they tend to involve her in war for their defence, draw away her troops for their garrisons, and her revenue for paying them; and that, as emancipation would deliver her from the dangers of war to which they now expose her, and would, practically, strengthen her army by enabling her to concentrate it in England, besides relieving her from the charge of paying the colonial garrisons, she would be a positive gainer in a diplomatic, military, and financial point of view by its adoption. All these pleas are urged in the strongest manner against British America, as it is--or has been-the most vulnerable of the Colonies on each of these points. Mr. Smith thus states the case:

'If there had been a war with the United States, the "Trent" would have been the occasion, but Canada would have been the cause. It is because we have a

dependency on that continent easily assailable, and which because it is a dependency it is not thought immoral to assail, that the idea of a quarrel with England rises in the minds of the Americans whenever their temper or the desire of relief from internal difficulties leads them to think of foreign war.' 1

And, again, even more distinctly, he affirms that Canada is the sole cause which can induce a war with the States:

For Canada, and for Canada alone, we stand always on the brink of a war with the great Anglo-Saxon Republic, our best mart, and, if we were not compelled to stand in the path of her advancing greatness, our closest and surest ally.'2

On the other hand, Canada's only danger of aggression is said to arise from her connection with England:

There is but one way to make Canada impregnable, and that is to fence her round with the majesty of an independent nation. To invade and conquer an independent nation without provocation is an act from which, in the present state of opinion, even the Americans would shrink.' And in a note he adds-' even the Americans as they were while their Government was filled with the aggressive insolence of the Southern slave-owner. I know not what reason we have for believing that a Government representing the industrious and thrifty citizens of the North is likely to be military and aggressive.' 3

Perhaps after having seen the history of the 'Alabama' controversy, Mr. Smith may be less confident of the pacific temperament of his Northern friends than he was when writing the above. It is pretty certain that a good many other people have altered opinions much the same as those expressed by him. But however this may be, the sentiments conveyed in the above extracts must be 1 The Empire, p. 1. 2 Ibid. p. 131. 3 Ibid. p. 2.

The

met; for they represent living issues, held even more strongly to-day than when they were written. whole course of reasoning is a mass of inconsistencies which go far to destroy its entire force.

Mr. Smith tells us that the States neither are, nor are likely to become, aggressive, and fills several pages with arguments intended to establish these propositions. If this view be correct, England need not fear that Canada will ever form a casus belli between herself and the States, and the first plea which emancipationists urge in favour of its abandonment is inoperative. There is no danger, or rather no possibility, of aggression from a non-aggressive people and government.

Mr. Smith, however, in defiance of his own argument to prove that the States are not aggressive, maintains that the possession of Canada, and that alone, keeps England constantly on the brink of war with the great Anglo-Saxon Republic,' and not only this, but also that Canada's sole danger of attack arises from the connection with England. One of these propositions may be correct, but both of them cannot be so. If the States be aggressive, and entertain hostile feelings towards both England and Canada, it is plain that a severance of the connection would not alter this feeling. If they had hostile feelings or designs against one of them only, then it is true that the other would escape being drawn into war when the victim was attacked by having previously dissolved the partnership; but that two countries can ever escape an assault directed against one only, by severing their political connection, is clearly impossible. Therefore, before we can be sure that this new, honourable, and truly British mode of averting aggression-by running away from aggressors would be effectual in the case of either England or Canada, we must be sure that one only of these countries is in danger of aggression from the States,

and must know which of them it is. This we cannot tell ; and, therefore, must remain ignorant as to which of them might gain safety by the above device; but we may be sure that, in case of the States becoming aggressive, emancipation could not bring safety to both England and Canada. If the assault were directed against one only, that one would still remain open to attack; if against both, it would be their interest to form an alliance to resist it.

These inconsistencies pervade the reasonings of the whole of the emancipationist school on this subject. They hold up Canada as a standing casus belli between England and the States; but as it would be too cruel a blow to their feelings to admit that their model Republic could be aggressive, and as they know that the British people would never abandon their offspring to the tender mercies of an aggressor, they stoutly deny that the States are aggressive, and assert that Canada's only danger of attack is to be found in her connection with England; forgetting that, if this be true, it invalidates their former theory that it is Canada which brings danger to England; whilst there can be no doubt that, if Canada really does bring danger to England, the danger to herself must continue to exist after the severance of the connection. Thus, in establishing either one of these theories, they overturn the other.

But is the doctrine with which we are now more immediately concerned, that 'for Canada, and Canada alone, England stands always on the brink of a war with the great Anglo-Saxon Republic,' correct? We say that it is grossly incorrect. The Trent' affair is a case in point. Mr. Smith says that had hostilities arisen out of that event Canada would have been the cause,' though the Trent' affair would have been the occasion.' We are unable to extract any other meaning from this nice distinction than that the 'Trent' affair would have been seized

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