ments.

CHAPTER VI.

CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTIES.

IN the preceding chapter we have endeavoured to show that if the machinery of a Federal Government for the Empire were created, it would be competent to fulfil all the duties which are usually assigned to such GovernUntil the arguments by which we arrived at this conclusion have been refuted, any further opposition to Federation, as being an impracticable project, must be based on constitutional and administrative difficulties, similar in kind to those which are to be encountered in the formation and administration of any representative Government, though we are willing to admit that in this case they would be likely to prove greater in degree.

Assuming it to have been proved that the conditions of existence are to be found, the possibility of creating and maintaining the proposed Federation have yet to be demonstrated. We therefore proceed to consider the nature of the governmental machinery which would be required to call the Federation into being, and the manner in which the difficulties in the way of its formation may be overcome.

The first point, of course, would be the establishment of a Federal Legislature—a Parliament in which the British Islands and the Colonies should be alike represented on terms of equality.

Here it is necessary, before going any further, to define

COUNTRIES CONSTITUTING COLONIES.

95

the sense in which we use the term Colonies,' as the Empire includes many outlying provinces which do not properly come under that appellation. Foremost among these is India, and next are fortresses-such as Gibraltar and Malta—and commercial stations-such as Hong Kong. By the term Colonies we mean countries in which all, or a very considerable portion, of the population, consists of a British or European stock; or, to descend to particulars, British America, Australasia, South Africa, and the West Indies, with perhaps Mauritius, and hereafter such other lands within the Empire as may be colonised by emigration from Great Britain. To these and to the British Islands representation in the Federal Legislature would have to be confined: all other parts of the Empire would require to remain in their present position of dependencies, from their incompetency to fulfil the conditions on which the Federation would be based.

The constitution of the Federal Legislature would be a matter of the very highest importance. On it the success or failure of the new Empire would, to a very great extent, depend. For its establishment there are two courses open: the Colonies might be allowed representation in the Imperial Parliament as at present constituted; or an absolutely new Federal Legislature might be created, whilst the Imperial Parliament should become the local legislature of the British Islands, either remaining in its present shape or being divided into three legislatures, accordingly as it might be determined to have one or three Local Governments for England, Ireland, and Scotland.

On the former of these schemes Mr. Smith has exerted himself to pour a large volume of contempt. • Such a piece of political machinery,' says he, as a set of Parliaments, one of which would be at once national and federal, while all the rest would be national only, would scarcely

find an advocate, even among the defenders of Imperial unity at all costs.' We shall, however, examine the merits of this scheme, notwithstanding Mr. Smith's contemptuous dismissal of it. The Imperial Parliament already fulfils almost all the duties which in every Federation devolve on the Federal Legislature; and is legally competent to legislate for any, and every, part of the Empire. The less violent the nature of political changes by which a desired result is obtained, the better it is for all parties. It may therefore be well to inquire if a Federal Legislature could be created by allowing colonial representatives seats in the Imperial Parliament. We must premise, however, that this is not to be taken as indicative of a personal preference for that

course.

The difficulty in the way of this plan lies in the fact that whilst the Imperial Parliament discharges the duties of a federal legislature, it unites with them, as every national legislature must do, those which, in a Federation, are discharged by the local legislatures. It would evidently be unfair to the United Kingdom to allow representatives elected in Canada or Australia to vote on matters affecting the people of the British Islands exclusively, whilst their representatives would be destitute of any corresponding influence over the internal government of the Colonies. We believe, however, that this difficulty might be overcome, and a Federation established with a set of Parliaments, one of which would be national and federal, whilst all the rest would be national only.' The manner in which we believe this to be capable of accomplishment is by a classification of the prerogatives of the Imperial Parliament as a federal and national legislature, and having its duties in each capacity discharged in different sessions.

This classification having been effected, the body now

MODIFICATION OF THE IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT. 97

known as the Imperial Parliament might meet to legislate on the subjects defined as belonging to the internal government of the British Islands. This legislation having been finished, the colonial representatives might be admitted to their seats, and a second session opened for legislation on matters defined as belonging to the Federal Government of the Empire. At present the representatives of the United Kingdom discharge the duties of both a federal and local legislature every session. If these duties were distinguished and discharged at different times in the manner proposed, there would be nothing to hinder the Colonies enjoying representation in a Federal Legislature, and the United Kingdom retaining the exclusive control of its own local affairs, without the formation of any legislative power at present unknown to the constitution; though in the Executive Government a slight change would be needed.

One sovereign and one ministry now discharge the duties of both a Federal and Local Executive Government. But with the Imperial Parliament acting in two separate characters, they could not continue to do so. Ministers, indeed, would not find any increased difficulty in the discharge of the same duties which they have to fulfil today. But ministerial responsibility is now-a-days the corner-stone of the British constitution, and as the Federal Legislature might declare its want of confidence in a ministry sustained by the Local, and vice versâ, it would be requisite to have two ministries-one for the Federal, and the other for the Local Government. Each, of course, would be responsible only to that legislature of which it acted as the Executive, and to the Crown acting as head of both Local and Federal Executives. We should not think it requisite to impose any check on the members of either ministry sitting in both legislatures. In Canada there are Dominion ministers who sit in the

H

Local Parliament, and Local Ministers who sit in the House of Commons, and the results have been to increase the legislative capacity of both, and to augment identity of feeling between them.

By these means we think that the Imperial Parliament might be made to fulfil the functions of both a Federal and a Local Legislature without conferring on the United Kingdom any unjust control over the local rights of the Colonies, or on the Colonies any influence whatever over the internal affairs of the British Islands. There is a good deal to be said in favour of this course. England has happily been always disposed to look with disfavour on any violent changes, and felt a desire to adapt old institutions to the fulfilment of new duties. The above policy would be in consonance with this feeling. The old Parliament of England would remain intact, no new assembly would displace it from the lofty height which it has so long occupied, nor would it be thrust down into any inferior position, as would necessarily follow were it confined to the single duty of legislating for the affairs of the British Islands. It would thus leave England somewhat more in possession of her original supremacy in the Empire than would be the case were a legislature entirely new to be created; and, colonist though we be, we can truly say that we would not grudge it to her ourselves, nor do we think that our fellow-colonists would disagree with our feeling in the matter. But, besides thus soothing English pride, colonial representation in the Imperial Parliament would secure the great advantage of rendering any collision between the Federal authorities and the Local Government of the most important member of the confederation almost impossible. Such collisions are the peculiar danger of federal institutions. But when the same men would act in both capacities in the United Kingdom, it is pretty certain that the two Governments