Coffey vs. Universal Life Ins. Co. trust company, it would be subject to the order of the court in the matter, and that an order to that effect was made by the court on the eighteenth day of July, of which all the policy-holders had due notice. This statement was incorrect in several particulars. No such notice had been sent to the complainant, nor did the notice which the company misdirected, according to its own proof, state that the premium could be paid to the company direct, nor did the order itself so provide. The complainant was then informed that he had chosen to act upon reports and public assertions in reference to the affairs of the company, instead of making inquiry direct at the office. And this was said in the face of the secretary's letter of February 18th, in which the assured was informed that his policy was forfeited, and his requests for information were summarily refused, and treated as the inquiries of an impertinent intruder. In the letter of March 9th the secretary further says: "As the matter now stands the company is still, under the order of the court, prevented from entering into any agreement or reviving any policies which have lapsed, or doing anything except to the extent permitted by the special order of the court issued in reference thereto. However much disposed we might be, to re-instate your policy, we can. not do so until we are clear of the court proceedings. Then we can give the matter further consideration. We, of course, can make no promise to hereafter restore the policy on the payment of the premium, and can only say that we will consider such facts as you may have to present when we are able to act as a company." Here the matter was left to rest until August, 1878, when correspondence began between the company and the complainant's solicitors. Now, if it be said that in March, 1878, the complainant was thus advised that the court in New York had in July, 1877, authorized the payment of premiums to the United States Trust Company, and that the complainant should then either have made payment, or within sixty days thereafter have transmitted his policy, duly receipted, and asked for a paid-up policy, it may well be replied that in the Coffey vs. Universal Life Ins. Co. preceding February the secretary of the company had asserted to the complainant that his policy was already forfeited; and the statements in the letter of March 9th, just recited, were such as to naturally lead the assured to understand that his policy had wholly lapsed, and that, if anything was thereafter done in the way of reviving it, it could only be done after the company was clear of the court proceedings, and after it could act as a company, and then only as an act of grace or favor. And thus the action of the company made it natural to suppose that nothing could be done by either it or the complainant until after its original power and authority to act were restored to it; and it was upon this theory, evidently, that the complainant's counsel acted from August, 1878, to March, 1879, as is shown by their letters of inquiry, in evidence, written to the company. It is noticeable, also, that although the order of the court in New York, made October 29, 1878, by which the company was authorized to resume business, required notice of the order to be sent to policy-holders, and gave to the latter ninety days after sending such notice in which to pay past-due premiums, no notice in obedience to that order was sent to the complainant, and it was not until about February 25, 1879,-nearly a month after the ninety days had expired,that the complainant, by his counsel, was informed of that order, although his counsel had been in correspondence with the company since August, 1878. Finally, in March, 1879, the company was requested either to recognize the policy by accepting the past-due premiums or to issue a paid-up policy on transmission of the original, duly receipted. The reasons assigned by the company for refusing so to do were that the notices before mentioned were duly sent to the complainant; that he did not write to the company; and that he made no attempt to ascertain the facts, either from the company or its local agent in Milwaukee,-- most of which reasons were, as Coffey vs. Universal Life Ins. Co. we have seen, unfounded in fact. And further, as late as March 14, 1879, it was represented by the company that it was still in the hands of the court, with the order of October 29th yet in force and the application for a receiver still pending. Now, undoubtedly, if the circumstances were such as to excuse the complainant from literal compliance with the condition of the policy as to its transmission, duly receipted, it was his duty, if he would avail himself of the right to a paid-up policy, to act with requisite promptness after those circumstances ceased to exist. And I think such action was taken when a surrender was offered, in March, 1879. In the light of all the facts and circumstances of the case, I have no hesitation in holding that the complainant had at that time a right to take the necessary steps to secure a paid-up policy. After all that had transpired between the complainant and the company, from August 23, 1877, to March, 1879, I think the company should be held estopped to assert that the complainant forfeited his rights by failing either to pay the premium on the twenty third day of August, 1877, or to transmit the policy receipted and to demand a paid-up policy within sixty days after such default. I have carefully examined the authorities cited on the argument, and especially the case of Universal Life Ins. Company vs. Whitehead, very recently decided.' In that case the court held that the clause in the policies of this company requiring the policy to be transmitted, duly receipted, within sixty days after default in the payment of any premium, if a paid-up policy was desired, was a condition precedent; that time was of the essence of the contract, and that, to entitle the assured to a paid-up policy, he must have strictly complied on his part with the literal terms of that condition, notwithstanding the company was disabled by the proceedings against it in the courts of New York to issue a 158 Mississippi, 226. Coffey vs. Universal Life Ins. Co. paid-up policy. The question arose in that case on a demurrer to a bill to enforce the issuance of a paid-up policy, filed by the representative of the assured after the latter's death; and it was undoubtedly well decided that the election to take a paidup term policy should have been made during the life of the assured, and on that ground alone the demurrer was sustainable. But, on the general question decided, it is to be observed that the case does not show that the bill set out the proceedings in New York against the company, further than to state the institution and general character of the proceedings, the injunctional order of the court of August 23, 1877, and that such order continued in force until October 29, 1878. In view of the manner in which the question there arose, the fact that the bill was filed after the death of the assured by his representative, and of the absence of many of the material facts brought out in the case at bar, I do not regard the decision in the Mississippi case as an authority that should be deemed controlling here. Referring again to the proceedings in New York, it is, perhaps, worthy of observation that it appears from the order of the court made October 29, 1878, by which the company was declared solvent, that pending those proceedings the company procured releases of policies from the holders to the extent of over $7,000,000, and that policies which had become claims by the death of the insured and matured endowments, to the extent of over $600,000, had been released one-half by the holders thereof. These facts were recited in the order, in connection with the judgment of the court, that the company had become solvent, and show that there was cause for the institution of the proceedings, and that the disability of the company to act arose from its financial condition and the consequent intervention of the court; and that it was only removed when solvency was brought about by the cancellation of a large amount of its liabilities. Gottfried vs. Seipp Brewing Co. A decree will be entered requiring the defendant to issue and deliver to the complainant a paid-up policy for $600, on surrender of the original policy, properly receipted. NOTE.-Where the Insurance company neglects to inform the assured of a change in the agent authorized to receive the premium, after adopting a rule to give such notice in all cases, and the assured tenders the premium in due season to the former agent, and is unable to find the new agent after reasonable inquiry, a failure to pay the premium within the 60 days will not forfeit the policy, but he will be entitled to what, under the circumstances, is a reasonable time. Seamans vs. North. western Mutual Life Ins. Co. 1 McCrary, 508. So where the policy provided that in case it should become void after three annual premiums have been paid, the company will, upon demand within 30 days after forfeiture, issue a paid-up policy, the holder will be entitled to a paid-up policy if he demands it within a reasonable time after forfeiture, and he is not limited to the 30 days. Johnson vs. Southern Mutual Life Ins. Co. 9 Insurance Law Journal, 189.-[REPORTER. MATTHEW GOTTFRIED et al. vs. THE CONRAD SEIPP BREWING COMPANY. CIRCUIT COURT-NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS-JUNE, 1881. IN EQUITY. 1. PATENTS-RIGHT TO REPLACE WORN PARTS OF MACHINE.-Where some of the parts of a patented machine wear out faster than others, the purchaser of such machine has the right to replace those parts as often as necessary so long as the identity of the machine is retained. 2. PATENT FOR PITCHING BARRELS-INFRINGEMENT.-The Gottfried patent for heating barrels, for the purpose of pitching, by means of a |