INDEX.

ABANDONMENT OF VOYAGE-See ADMIRALTY, 11, 18.

ACTION.

1. BY INSURER AGAINST NEGLIGENT THIRD PERSON, MUST BE BOUGHT
IN NAME OF ASSURED.-At common law, where insured property
had been destroyed through the negligence of a third person, and
the insurer had paid to the assured the amount of the insurance,
he could not sue the wrong-doer in his own name, but must bring
the action in the name of the assured and owner. Presbyterian
Society vs. Goodrich Trans. Co., 312.

2. WHERE INSURANCE WAS LESS THAN VALUE OF PROPERTY.-And
though the insurance was less than the value of the property de-
stroyed, there could not be two actions, but the liability of the
wrong-doer, must be enforced in the name of the owner and
assured. Id.

8. WISCONSIN CODE ALLOWS ONE JOINT BUT NOT SEPARATE ACTIONS.-
The Wisconsin code does not give the insurer the right of a sepa-
rate suit, but by the payment of the insurance, he acquires the
right to join with the owner as party plaintiff in a suit to recover
the whole loss against the wrong-doer. Id.

ADJOINING STATES-See ADMIRALTY, 9, 10.

ADMIRALTY-See CREDITOR'S BILL.

1. MARITIME SERVICE OR CONTRACT-TEST OF.-The true test of what
constitutes a maritime contract or service is whether it is to be
substantially performed or rendered on navigable waters. Phoenix
Ins. Co. vs. E. & W. Trans. Co., 18.

2. JURISDICTION-THROUGH BILLS OF LADING.-A contract was made
for the shipment of grain from Chicago, by which it was agreed
that the "Anchor Line" of propellers should carry the grain to
Erie and there deliver it to the elevator company, as the agent of
the consignee, for transhipment by rail to certain inland points in
Pennsylvania. The bills of lading denoted a rate of freight charged
for a continuous transportation service from the point of shipment
to the inland points named, and provided that only that carrier
should be liable for loss in whose actual custody the grain might

ADMIRALTY—Continued.

be at the time of loss: Held, that in the case of loss while the grain
was in the course of water transit, the court of admiralty had juris-
diction of an action against the propeller company. Id.

8. PETITION TO LIMIT OWNER'S LIABILITY.-Each separate voyage or
trip of a vessel is a separate venture, and the owners of the vessel
cannot limit their personal liability, under the Act of Congress,
as to any loss or damage except that occurring on the last voyage.
The losses of different voyages cannot be grouped together and
all the losers cited in to share what has been saved, and the owners
exonerated from further liability. The Alpena, 436.

4. JURISDICTION-WHEN PETITION MAY BE FILED.-The District Court
has jurisdiction to entertain a petition by the owners of a vessel
for an apportionment of their interest in the vessel among the dif-
ferent sufferers, and the limitation of their liability under the Act
of Congress, although at the time the petition was filed, no suit
had been brought against them. Id.

5. LIABILITY FOR LOSS OF LIFE.-This limitation of liability applies
to claims by the personal representatives of persons lost on the
trip. Id.

6. UNLOADING VESSELS-WHEN TO BEGIN-USAGE.-By the usage at
the port of Chicago, a consignee is entitled to twenty-four hours,
or a full day, from the time the vessel arrives in which to furnish
her with a dock, and commence unloading. Mitchell vs. Langdon,
527.

7. A CONSIGNEE is not obliged to commence unloading a vessel on Sun-
day; and when a vessel arrives in port on Saturday morning, the
consignee need not begin unloading until Monday morning. Id.
8. DEMURRAGE-DELAY IN UNLOADING.-Where consignee unloaded a
vessel from only one hatch at a time, it was held that this unreason-
ably delayed the unloading of the vessel, and entitled libellants
to demurrage. Id.

9. EVIDENCE-BOUNDARIES OF STATES-§§ 4520 AND 4521, REVISED
STATUTES.-Under these sections which provide that if a master
employs seamen without shipping articles, for a voyage from a
port in one state to a port in any other than an adjoining state,
the seamen shall be entitled to the highest wages given during the
preceding three months, at the port of shipment, the court will
take judicial notice of the legally established boundaries of the
different states. Thorson vs. Peterson, 530.

10. ILLINOIS AND MICHIGAN ARE ADJOINING STATES within the meaning
of such statutes, the boundary line being the middle of Lake
Michigan. Id.

11. BREAKING UP OF VOYAGE OF SAILING VESSEL-RIGHTS OF SEAMEN.
-When a sailing vessel is dismasted and rendered incapable of
proceeding on her voyage, the voyage is broken up, and the sea-

ADMIRALTY-Continued.

men who contracted for the voyage are at liberty to leave as soon
as the vessel has come into a port of safety, and if at the request
of the master they remain with the vessel they are entitled to full
wages, and cannot be held to a voyage contract. Id.

12. IMPLIED CONTRACT FOR WAGES.-When a mate has made several
voyages with a vessel, at a certain rate per day, and goes upon
another voyage without leaving the vessel, it will be presumed, in
the absence of controlling proof of a new contract, that he goes
upon the same terms as before. Id.

13. SEAMEN'S WAGES WHEN Voyage ABANDONED.—Where seamen
have shipped late in the season for a trip on the lakes, and inclem-
ent weather prevents the completion of the voyage, the master
has a right to discharge the crew, in absence of special contract,
upon equitable terms, which in most cases would be the payment
of their wages until the vessel is laid up, and their transportation
to the port of shipment or destination. The Zach Chandler, 372.
14. SAILING RULES-DUTIES OF SAILING VESSEL AND STEAMER WHEN

APPROACHING.-By the sailing rules, a sailing vessel, when ap-
proaching a steamer is bound to keep her course, and it is the
duty of the approaching steamer to keep out of the way. The
Favorite, 536.

15. STEAMER WITH TOWS IS BOUND BY THE RULES.-The fact that the
steamer has barges in tow does not alter the rule. The steamer
in such case should take extra and timely precautions to avoid the
sailing vessel. Id.

16. COLLISION—Negligence.—But little significance is to be attached
to the manœuvres which are executed, or attempted on the part of
a schooner, or a steamer, when in immediate proximity to each
other, and in imminent danger of a collision. The material ques-
tion is, whether there was any negligence, and by whom, in allow-
ing the two vessels to come so close together as to bring on an im-
pending collision. Id.

ADVERSE POSSESSION-See REAL ESTATE.

ANCILLARY SUIT-See CREDITOR'S BILL, 2.

ASSESSMENT OF NATIONAL BANK SHARES-See TAXATION OF
NATIONAL BANKS.

ASSIGNEE IN BANKRUPTCY-See EMBEZZLEMENT.
ASSIGNMENT OF PATENT.

AMBIGUITY.-An assignment of all right, title and interest in letters
patent "excepting thirty-two or thirty-three counties heretofore
sold and assigned" is not necessarily void for ambiguity. Wash-
burn & Moen Man'f'g Co. vs. Haish, 65.

ATTACHMENT-See FEDERAL JURISDICTION 3, 4.

LIABILITY OF SHERIFF FOR PROPERTY.-Where the sheriff re-delivered
attached property to the defendant by direction of the plaintiff;

ATTACHMENT-Continued.

and prior to the dismissal of the suit, a second creditor-under
the Indiana statute-became a party to the action: Held, that
such second creditor could maintain an action against the sheriff
for allowing the attached property to go from his control without
an order of the court. State ex rel. vs. Baldwin, 165.
BANKRUPTCY-See EMBEZZLEMENT.

1. RIGHT OF ACTION.-Until an assignee of the bankrupt's estate is
appointed, the bankrupt has the right to pursue all proper legal
measures for the protection of his interests.
han, 139.

Myers vs. Callag-

2. RIGHT OF ASSIGNEE TO ENJOIN ACTION IN STATE COURT.—An assignee
in bankruptcy cannot maintain a suit to set aside a void sale of his
property by the bankrupt, and to enjoin the purchaser from pros-
ecuting an action of trespass in the State Court against attaching
creditors of the bankrupt, for seizing the goods sold, where the
property has already come into the possession of the assignee
and he is not a party to the proceedings in the State Court.
Main vs. Bromley, 199.

8. EQUITY JURISDICTION-SUIT BY ASSIGNEE.-Where it was arranged
between the bankrupts and another party that the assets of the
bankrupts should be exclusively applied in the payment of one
debt for which such other party was contingently liable, instead
of applying them pro rata upon all the liabilities of the firm;
and the assignee sought by proceedings in equity to charge such
other person with the money and assets so used: Held, that the
court of equity had jurisdiction. Sill vs. Solberg, 252.

4. FRAUDULENT PREFERENCE.-Such application of the bankrupts'
assets constitutes a fraudulent preference within the meaning of
the Bankrupt Act. Id.

5. PREFERENCE-TRANSFER OF ASSETS TO INDORSER.-If, in advance
of his liability being fixed, an indorser takes the bankrupt's prop-
erty to meet the note which he has indorsed when it shall mature,
or to secure himself against loss, he will be liable as accepting a
preference. Id.

6. PARTNERSHIP AND INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY.-Where two partners
signed an agreement, as individuals, to transfer certain property
as security for a partnership liability, but failed to make the
transfer, and subsequently became bankrupt; held, that such
liability was not provable against the separate estate of one of the
partners. Gauss vs. Schrader, 289.

7. GENERAL ORDER PROVIDING FOR DISCHARGE OF BANKRUPTS.-The
District Court has the right to make an order providing that unless
any bankrupt shall take the necessary steps to have the question
of his right to a discharge ready to be determined on or before a
certain date, any creditor might, without notice, move for a