cept has, therefore, attained its highest point of distinctness, when there is such a consciousness of its characters that, in rendering its comprehension distinct, we touch on notions which, as simple, admit of no definition, and, in rendering its extension distinct, we touch on notions which, as individual, admit of no ulterior division. It is true, indeed, that a distinctness of this degree is one which is only ideal; that is, one to which we are always approximating, but which we never are able actually to reach. In order to approach as near as possible to this ideal, we must always inquire, what is contained in, and what under, a notion, and endeavour to obtain a distinct consciousness of it in both relations. What, in this research, first presents itself we must again analyse anew, with reference always both to comprehension and to extension; and descending from the higher to the lower, from the greater to the less, we ought to stop only when our process is arrested in the individual or in the simple."

" a

a Esser, Logik, § 48, p. 96.-ED.

LECTURE X.

STOICHEIOLOGY.

SECT. II.-OF THE PRODUCTS OF THOUGHT.

I. ENNOEMATIC.

IMPERFECTION OF CONCEPTS.

LECT.
X.

Ir is now necessary to notice an Imperfection to which concepts are peculiarly liable, and in the exposition of which I find it necessary to employ an expression, Imperfec which, though it has the highest philosophical author- cepts. ity for its use, I would still, in consequence of its ambiguity in English, have avoided, if this could have been done without compromising the knowledge of what it is intended to express. The expression I mean, is

intuitive, in the particular signification in which it is used by Leibnitz," and the continental philosophers in general, to denote what is common to our direct and ostensive cognition of individual objects, in Sense or Imagination, (Presentation or Representation), and in opposition to our indirect and symbolical cognition of general objects, through the use of signs or language, in the Understanding. But, on this head, I would, first of all, dictate to you the following paragraph.

¶ XXX. As a notion or concept is the fac- Par. XXX. titious whole or unity made up of a plurality of tion of Con

a Meditationes de Cognitione, Veri- 80.-ED.

tate, et Ideis, Opera, ed. Erdmann, p.

Imperfec

cepts.

LECT.

X.

attributes, a whole too often of a very complex multiplicity; and as this multiplicity is only mentally held together, inasmuch as the concept is fixed and ratified in a sign or word; it frequently happens, that, in its employment, the word does not suggest the whole amount of thought for which it is the adequate expression, but, on the contrary, we frequently give and take the sign, either with an obscure or indistinct consciousness of its meaning, or even without an actual consciousness of its signification at all.

Illustration. This liability to the vices of Obscurity and Indistinctness arises, 1°, From the very nature of a concept, which is the binding up of a multiplicity in unity; and, 2°, From its dependence upon language, as the necessary condition of its existence and stability. In consequence of this, when a notion is of a very complex and heterogeneous composition, we are frequently wont to use the term by which it is denoted, without a clear or distinct consciousness of the various characters of which the notion is the sum; and thus it is, that we both give and take words without any, or, at least, without the adequate complement of thought. I may exemplify this :-You are aware, that in countries where bank-notes have not superseded the use of the precious metals, large payments are made in bags of money, purporting to contain a certain number of a certain denomination of coin, or, at least, a certain amount in value. Now, these bags are often sealed up and passed from one person to another, without the tedious process, at each transference, of counting out their contents, and this upon the faith, that, if examined, they will be found actually to contain the

X.

number of pieces for which they are marked, and for LECT. which they pass current. In this state of matters, it is, however, evident, that many errors or frauds may be committed, and that a bag may be given and taken in payment for one sum, which contains another, or which, in fact, may not even contain any money at all. Now the case is similar in regard to notions. As the sealed bag or rouleau testifies to the enumerated sum, and gives unity to what would otherwise be an unconnected multitude of pieces, each only representing its separate value; so the sign or word proves and ratifies the existence of a concept, that is, it vouches the tying up of a certain number of attributes or characters in a single concept, attributes which would otherwise exist to us only as a multitude of separate and unconnected representations of value. So far the analogy is manifest; but it is only general. The bag, the guaranteed sum, and the constituent coins, represent in a still more proximate manner the term, the concept, and the constituent characters. For in regard to each, we may do one of two things. On the one hand, we may test the bag, that is, open it, and ascertain the accuracy of its stated value, by counting out the pieces which it purports to contain; or we may accept and pass the bag, without such a critical enumeration. In the other case, we may test the general term, prove that it is valid for the amount and quality of thought of which it is the sign, by spreading out in consciousness the various characters of which the concept professes to be the complement; or we may take and give the term without such an evolution."

a A hint of this illustration is to chap. viii. vol. i. p. 200.-ED. be found in Degerando, Des Signes,

LECT.
X.

The liability

and vague

It is evident from this, that notions or concepts are peculiarly liable to great vagueness and ambiguity, and that their symbols are liable to be passed about without the proper kind, or the adequate amount, of thought.

This interesting subject has not escaped the obserto ambiguity vation of the philosophers of this country, and by ness of con- them it has, in fact, with great ingenuity been illusBritish phi- trated; but as they are apparently ignorant, that the losophers. matter had, before them, engaged the attention of

cepts no

ticed by

Stewart

quoted on

sundry foreign philosophers, by whom it has been even more ably canvassed and expounded, I shall, in the exposition of this point, also do justice to the illustrious thinkers to whom is due the honour of having originally and most satisfactorily discussed it.

The following passage from Mr Stewart will afford this subject. the best foundation for my subsequent remarks. "In the last section I mentioned Dr Campbell as an ingenious defender of the system of the Nominalists, and I alluded to a particular application which he has made of their doctrine. The reasonings which I had then in view, are to be found in the seventh chapter of the second book of his Philosophy of Rhetoric, in which chapter he proposes to explain how it happens, 'that nonsense so often escapes being detected, both by the writer and the reader.' The title is somewhat ludicrous in a grave philosophical work, but the disquisition to which it is prefixed, contains many acute and profound remarks on the nature and power of signs, both as a medium of communication, and as an instrument of thought.

Refers to
Hume.

"Dr Campbell's speculations with respect to language as an instrument of thought, seem to have been suggested by the following passage in Mr Hume's