LECTURE XIII. STOICHEIOLOGY. SECT. II.-OF THE PRODUCTS OF THOUGHT. II. APOPHANTIC, OR THE DOCTRINE OF JUDGMENTS. JUDGMENTS. THEIR NATURE AND DIVISIONS. LECT. XIII. Judgments. HAVING terminated the Doctrine of Concepts, we now proceed to the Doctrine of Judgments. Concepts and Judgments, as I originally stated, are not to be viewed Doctrine of as the results of different operations, for every concept, as the product of some preceding act of Comparison, is in fact a judgment fixed and ratified in a sign. But in consequence of this acquired permanence, concepts afford the great means for all subsequent comparisons and judgments, and as this now forms their principal relation, it behoved, for convenience, throwing out of view their original genealogy, to consider Notions as the first product of the Understanding, and as the conditions or elements of the second. A concept may be viewed as an implicit or undeveloped judgment; a judgment as an explicit or developed concept. But we must now descend to articulate statements. ¶ XLVI. To Judge (xpívew," judicare) is to Par. XLVI. recognise the relation of congruence or of con-what. a The verb κpive, to judge, and still more the substantive, píois, judgment, are rarely used by the VOL. I. Greeks-(never by Aristotle) -as Р Judgment, LECT. -what is ment. fliction, in which two concepts, two individual things, or a concept and an individual, compared together, stand to each other. This recognition, considered as an internal consciousness, is called a Judgment, (Móyos áπоpavτiкós, judicium); considered as expressed in language, it is called a Proposition or Predication, (ἀπόφανσις, πρότασις, διάστημα, propositio, prædicatio, pronunciatum, enunciatio, effatum, profatum, axioma3). a Explication, As a judgment supposes a relation, it necessarily implied in implies a plurality of thoughts, but conversely a pluJudgment. rality of thoughts does not necessarily imply a judgThe thoughts whose succession is determined by the mere laws of Association, are, though manifested in plurality, in relation, and, consequently, in connection, not, however, so related and so connected as to constitute a judgment. The thoughts water, iron, and rusting, may follow each other in the mental train; they may even be viewed together in a simultaneous act of consciousness, and this without our considering them in an act of Comparison, and without, therefore, conjoining or disjoining them in an act of judgment. But when two or more thoughts are given in consciousness, there is in general an endeavour on our part to discover in them, and to develop a relation of congruence or of confliction; that is, we endeavour to find out whether these thoughts will or will not coincide,-may or may not be blended into a [Aristotle uses the term póraσis merely for the premise of a syllogism, especially the major (he has no other word for premise); whereas àrópavσis he employs always for an enunciation considered not as merely syllogistic. See Ammonius, In De In terpret., f. 4 a. Gr. p. 4. Lat. ; Fac- XIII. one. If they coincide, we judge, we enounce, their LECT. congruence or compatibility; if they do not coincide, we judge, we enounce, their confliction or incompatibility. Thus, if we compare the thoughts,-water, iron, and rusting,-find them congruent, and connect them into a single thought, thus-water rusts iron— in that case we form a Judgment." under which But if two notions be judged congruent, in other Condition words, be conceived as one, this their unity can only notions are judged conbe realised in consciousness, inasmuch as one of these gruent. notions is viewed as an attribute or determination of the other. For, on the one hand, it is impossible for us to think as one two attributes, that is, two things viewed as determining, and yet neither determining or qualifying the other; nor, on the other hand, two subjects, that is, two things thought as determined, and yet neither of them determined or qualified by the other. For example, we cannot think the two attributes electrical and polar as a single notion, unless we convert the one of these attributes into a subject to be determined or qualified by the other; but if we do,—if we say, what is electrical is polar, we at once reduce the duality to unity, we judge that polar is one of the constituent characters of the notion electrical, or that what is electrical is contained under the class of things marked out by the common character of polarity. In like manner, we cannot think the two subjects iron and mineral as a single notion, unless we convert the one of these subjects into an attribute by which the other is determined or qualified; but if we do,—if we say, iron is a mineral, we again reduce the duality to unity, we judge that one of the attributes of the subject iron is, that it is a a Cf. Krug, Logik, § 61, Anm. i. p. 149-150. LECT. mineral, or that iron is contained under the class of XIII. things marked out by the common character of must con notions. mineral. A judgment From what has now been said, it is evident that a tain three judgment must contain and express three notions, which, however, as mutually relative, constitute an indivisible act of thought. It must contain, 1°, The notion of something to be determined; 2°, The notion of something by which another is determined; and, 3o, A notion of the relation of determination between the two. This will prepare you to understand the following paragraph. Par. XLVII. ¶ XLVII. That which, in the act of Judging, we think as the determined or qualified notion, is technically called the Subject, (vπokeíμevov, subjectum); that which we think as the determining or qualifying notion, the Predicate, (кατηуоρоúμEvov, prædicatum); and the relation of determination, recognised as subsisting between the subject and the predicate, is called the Copula. Aristotle, the predicate includes the copula;" and, from a hint by him, the latter has, by subsequent Greek logicians, been styled the Appredicate, (προσκατηγορούμενον, apprædicatum). β The Subject and Predicate of a proposition are, after Aristotle, together called its Terms or Extremes," a See De Interp., c. 3, where the ¿îμa, or verb, includes the predicate and copula united.-ED. B See De Interpretatione, c. 10, § 4: Οταν δὲ τὸ ἔστι τρίτον προσκατηγορῆται, -an expression to which may be traced the scholastic distinction between secundi and tertii adjacentis. For the term pоσKATη By Yopouμevov to denote the predicate of a proposition, see Ammonius on De Interp., p 110 b, ed. Ald., Venetiis, 1546. See below, p. 230.-ED. [For the origin of this distinction see Blemmidas (after Aristotle), Logica, p. 186.] y Anal. Prior., I. 1, 4.-ED. XIII. (ὅροι, ἄκρα, πέρατα, termini); as a proposition LECT. Thus in the proposition, iron is magnetic, we have Illustration. iron for the Subject, magnetic for the Predicate, and the substantive verb is for the Copula. In regard to this last, it is necessary to say a few words. "It is not always the case, that in propositions the copula is expressed by the substantive verb is or est, and that the copula and predicate stand as distinct words. In adjective verbs the copula and predicate coalesce, as in the proposition, the sun shines, sol lucet, which is equivalent to the sun is shining, sol est lucens. In existential propositions, that is, those in which mere existence is predicated, the same holds good. when I say I am, Ego sum, the am or sum has here a far higher and more emphatic import than that of the mere copula or link of connection. For it expresses, I am existing, Ego sum existens. It might seem that, in negative propositions, when the copula is affected by the negative particle, it is converted into a non-copula. But if we take the word copula in a wider meaning, for that through which the subject and predicate are connected in a mutual relation, it a Anal. Prior., I. 15, 16, 25.-ED. For |