Bidwell vs. Whitaker. and which shall be established to have been subsisting liens upon such ship, boat or vessel, "at the time of exhibiting the same respectively." This language is unambiguous, and clearly imports that a lien actually subsisted at the time of exhibiting the claims specified in the first section. Section 36 shows, very conclusively, that the object of the proceedings is not to create, but to enforce liens. · . If any doubt existed as to what the legislature intended, judging of that intention by what appears on the face of the act itself, that doubt must vanish when we come to consider, that in an action upon the bond given under section 13, the attaching creditor must aver that his claim was a subsisting lien on the ship, boat or vessel, at the time the same was exhibited, as provided by section ten. If the averment is made necessary by the statute, it must be proved on the trial; this the claimant could not do, if, as contended by the plaintiffs, the boat was not subject to a lien when the claim was exhibited. We cannot attribute to the legislature the folly of requiring the plaintiff to aver, and prove a fact, when by the terms of the statute no such fact existed. [479*] *Whatever, therefore, may be our views respecting the interpretation to be given to the first section, separately considered, or whatever opinions we may entertain respecting the impolicy of confining the remedy given by the statute to contracts or injuries arising within this state, we are constrained to say that, construing the first section in connection with the other sections of the same act, a specific lien is given by that section, and that the other sections provide a remedy by which it is to be enforced. I have struggled to arrive at a different conclusion, believing, as I do, that a policy more liberal and enlightened towards citizens of other states ought to prevail, and knowing full well that this conclusion will exclude from the benefits of the statute a large class of our own citizens, from rights secured to others. But the inferences to be drawn from a literal interpretation of the first section must be controlled by the clear and express language to be found in other sections of the same stat Freeman vs. Freeman. ute, although the policy of the act may to some extent be defeated. It is only when a staute is ambiguous in its terms, that courts exercise the power of so controlling its language, as to give effect to what they may suppose to have been the intention of the law maker. In the statute now before us, the language admits of but one construction. No doubt can arise as to its meaning. It must therefore be its own interpreter. We are not permitted to look out of, or beyond it, to ascertain whether the legislature may not have intended what, upon the face of the statute, they have failed to express. Certified accordingly. *FREEMAN VS. FREEMAN. [480*] Where, in chancery, the order for the appearance of a non-resident defendant in a divorce case, was not in compliance with sec. 12, ch. 2, tit. 7, part 2, R. S. 1838, but was the same as in other cases of non-resident defendants, the decree of the chancellor granting a divorce was reversed for want of jurisdiction. APPEAL from the Court of Chancery, third circuit. A petition for a divorce was filed against a non-resident defendant, under R. S. 1838, and the following order was made for the appearance of the defendant, viz.: "Melancthon Freeman, petitioner, v. Rebecca Freeman, respondent. It satisfactorily appearing to this court that the NOTE. Courts have no jurisdiction where both parties are non-residents, People v. Dowell, 25 Mich. 247; where husband and wife reside in different states, each may proceed in his or her own state, and both may proceed simultaneously, Wright v. Wright, 24 id. 180. The statute in Michigan having required that the notice published in divorce cases should state the nature of the petition, the question involved is simply one of obedience to the statute, which of course must be complete to give the court jurisdiction. -In Illinois, no persons are protected under divorce granted, upon publication and constructive notice only, until the expiration of three years after divorce granted; meanwhile it is liable to be opened and vacated on motion of defendant, Lawrence v. Lawrence, 73 Ill. 677. Bidwell vs. Whitaker. and which shall be established to have been subsisting lien upon such ship, boat or vessel, "at the time of exhibiting th same respectively." This language is unambiguous, and clea ly imports that a lien actually subsisted at the time of exhi iting the claims specified in the first section. Section shows, very conclusively, that the object of the proceeding not to create, but to enforce liens.. If any doubt existed as to what the legislature inter judging of that intention by what appears on the face act itself, that doubt must vanish when we come to con that in an action upon the bond given under section 1 attaching creditor must aver that his claim was a sub lien on the ship, boat or vessel, at the time the same hibited, as provided by section ten. If the averment necessary by the statute, it must be proved on the tri the claimant could not do, if, as contended by the F the boat was not subject to a lien when the claim was ed. We cannot attribute to the legislature the fo. quiring the plaintiff to aver, and prove a fact, whe terms of the statute no such fact existed. [479*] *Whatever, therefore, may be our views the interpretation to be given to the first se rately considered, or whatever opinions we may e specting the impolicy of confining the remedy gi statute to contracts or injuries arising within thi are constrained to say that, construing the first sect nection with the other sections of the same act, a is given by that section, and that the other section remedy by which it is to be enforced. I have arrive at a different conclusion, believing, as I do. more liberal and enlightened towards citizens of ought to prevail, and knowing full well that th will exclude from the benefits of the statute a our own citizens, from rights secured to others But the inferences to be drawn from a liter of the first section must be controlled by press language to be found i Freeman vs. Freeman. defendant in this cause, Rebecca Freeman, is not a resident of this state, but that she resides in the city of New York. On motion of Johnson and Martin, solicitors for petitioner, it is ordered, that the said defendant cause her appearance in this cause to be entered within four months from the date of this order, and that, in case of her appearance, she cause her answer to said petition to be filed, and a copy thereof to be served on the petitioner's solicitors within forty days after service of a copy of said petition and notice of this rule, and in default thereof, said petition be taken as confessed by said defendant. And it is further ordered, that within twenty days, the said petitioner cause a copy of this order to be published in the state paper, and that said publication be continued it said paper at least once a week, for eight weeks in succession, or that he cause a copy of this order to be personally served on said defendant at least twenty days before the time above provided for her appearance." Which order was published as therein required; and the defendant not appearing, and testimony having been taken in the cause according to the rules and practice of the court, a decree was granted for a divorce from the bonds of matrimony. The court held: 1. That as the order did not comply with sec. 12, ch. 2, tit. 7, part 2, R. S. 1838, the decree was wholly void for want of jurisdiction in the court. 2. That the order for the appearance of the respondent should have included a notice of the nature of the petition. Campbell, for the appellant. Lothrop & Duffield, for respondent. 592 |