INTRODUCTION.

DEFINITION OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS

INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY treats of the faculties of the human mind, and of the laws by which they are governed.

The only forms of existence which, in our present state we are capable of knowing, are matter and mind. It is the mind alone that knows. When, therefore, we cognize matter, the object known, and the subject which knows, are numerically distinct. When, on the other hand, we cognize mind, the mind which knows and the mind which is known are numerically the same. The mind knows, and the mind is the object of knowledge.

1. The mind becomes cognizant of the existence and qualities of matter, that is, of the world external to itself, by means of the Perceptive faculties. It knows not what matter is, or what is the essence of matter, but only its qualities; that is, its power of affecting us in this or that manner. When we say, "This is gold," we do not pretend to know what the essence of gold is, but merely that there is something possessed of certain qualities, or powers of creating in us certain affections.

2. In a similar manner we become acquainted with the energies of our own mind. We are not cognizant of the mind itself, but only of the action of its faculties or sensi

bilities. When we think, remember, or reason; when we

are joyful or sad, when we deliberate or resc ve, we know that these several states of the mind exist, and that they are predicated of the being whom I denominate I, or myself. The power by which we become cognizant to ourselves of these mental states is called Consciousness. When, by an act of volition, a particular mental state is made the object of distinct and continuous thought, the act is denominated Reflection.

3. An idea of perception or of consciousness terminates as soon as another idea succeeds it. It is perfect and complete within itself, and is not necessarily connected with anything else. I see a ball either at rest or in motion; I turn my eyes in another direction and perceive a tree or a house; in a moment afterwards they are both violently thrown down. I am conscious of several separate perceptions, which follow each other in succession. Each one of these mental acts is complete within itself, and might have been connected with no other. We find, however, that these ideas of perception are not thus disconnected. They do not terminate in themselves, but give occasion to other ideas of great importance; ideas which, but for the acts of perception, could never have existed. Thus, we saw a house standing, we now see it fallen; there at once arises in the mind the idea of a cause, or of something which has occasioned this change. Several ideas following in succession, occasion the idea of duration. The existence of these secondary ideas under these circumstances is owing to the constitution of the human mind itself. It suggests to us these ideas, which, when once conceived, are original and independent. This power of the mind is termed Original Suggestion.

4. The knowledge acquired both by our perceptive faculties and by consciousness, as well as much that is given us by original suggestion, is the knowledge of things or acts as individuals. We perceive single objects; we are con

scious of single mental states. These pass away and become recollections. The recollections are like their originals, merely recollections of individuals. Had we no other power, our knowledge would consist of separate isolated ideas, without either cohesion or classification. Our knowledge would be all either of single individuals, or of single acts performed by particular agents. When, however, we reflect upon our knowledge, we find it to be of a totally different character. It is almost all of classes. With the exception of proper names, all the nouns of a language designate classes; that is, ideas of genera and species, and not ideas of individuals. There must, therefore, exist a power of the mind by which we transform these ideas of individuals into ideas of generals. We give to this complex power the name of Abstraction.

5. We have thus far considered the intellectual faculties without reference to the element of time. We, however, all know that the ideas obtained in the past remain with us at this present. The history of our lives from infancy is continually before us, or, at the command of the will, it may be spread out before our consciousness. We know that the ideas which we now acquire may be retained forever. Nay, more, we are conscious of a power of recalling at will the knowledge which we have once made our own. The faculty by which we do this is called Memory.

6. Possessed of these powers, we might obtain all the ideas arising from perception, consciousness and original suggestion; we might modify them into genera and species, we might treasure them up in our memory and recall them at will. But we could proceed no further. Our knowledge would consist wholly of facts, or the information which we have derived either from our own observation or the observation of others. But this manifestly is not our condition. We are able to make use of the knowl

edge acquired by the powers of which I have spoken, ir such a manner as to arrive at truth before unknown, truth which these powers could never have revealed to us. In this manner we make use of the facts in geology in order tc determine the changes which have taken place in the history of our globe. Thus, from the axioms and definitions of geometry, we proceed to demonstrate the profoundest truths of that science. The faculty by which we thus proceed in the investigation of truth is termed Reason.

7. Thus far we have treated of those powers which give us knowledge of things and relations actually existing, o which modify and use this knowledge. Were we limited to these, we could consider no conception but as actually true. We could conceive of nothing except that which we had perceived, or which some one had perceived for us. But we find ourselves endowed with a power of taking the elements of our knowledge and combining them together at will. We thus form to ourselves pictures of things that never existed, and we give to them form and substance by the various processes of the fine arts. It was this power which conceived the group of Laocoon, or Milton's Garden of Eden. We give to this power the name of Imagination.

8. The exercise of all our faculties is generally agreeable, and sometimes is productive of exquisite pleasure. I look at a rainbow, I pursue a demonstration, I behold a successful effort in the fine arts, and in all these cases I am conscious of a peculiar emotion. The causes producing this emotion are unlike, but the mental feeling produced is essentially the same. Every one recognizes it under the name of the beautiful; and the sensibility by which we become capable of this emotion is called Taste.

The faculties which will be treated of in the present work may, then, be briefly defined as follows:

1. The Perceptive faculties are those by which we become

acquainted with the existence and qualities of the externa! world.

2. Consciousness is the faculty by which we become cognizant of the operations of our own minds.

3. Original Suggestion is the faculty which gives rise to original ideas, occasioned by the perceptive faculties or consciousness.

4. Abstraction is the faculty by which, from conceptions of individuals, we form conceptions of genera and species, or. in general, of classes.

5. Memory is the faculty by which we retain and recall our knowledge of the past.

6. Reason is that faculty by which, from the use of the knowledge obtained by the other faculties, we are enabled to proceed to other and original knowledge.

7. Imagination is that faculty by which, from materials already existing in the mind, we form complicated conceptions or mental images, according to our own will.

8. Taste is that sensibility by which we recognize the beauties and deformities of nature or art, deriving pleasure from the one, and suffering pain from the other.

It is by no means intended to assert that these are all the powers of a human soul. Besides these, it is endowed with conscience, or that faculty by which we are capable of moral obligation; with will, or that motive force by which we are impelled to action; with the various emotions, instincts and biases, which, as observation teaches us, are parts of a human soul. These are, however, the most important of those that are purely intellectual. In the following pages we shall consider them in the order in which they have been named.

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