crime, and the checking of criminalizing influences. Perhaps no reform in this direction would be more effective or far-reaching than one by which organized or commercialized crime could be reached and exterminated. There is no influence more pernicious, or a graver menace to the welfare of a law-abiding community than tolerance of practices subversive and defiant of law, indulged in by those who find such practices profitable. Law cannot be defied, even where unwise or unpopular, without bringing the gravest reproach upon the community where such practices exist, or without discrediting its officials, criminalizing the weak and those predisposed to crime, and breeding both the spirit of mob law and anarchy. Misdemeanors are not infrequently committed openly and defiantly because the perpetrator can either pay the fine involved, and make a comfortable profit; or, by reason of a debased or debauched law-enforcing power, safely calculate on escaping the penalties announced by law. Nor is this practice limited to misdemeanors where the profit is sufficient, and the security of the criminal against punishment satisfactorily guaranteed by unfaithful public officials. The activities of those taking these almost inconceivable risks for the sake of the profit afforded by such practice embraces not only the familiar practice of bribery, and corruption of elections, but also resort to every form of intimidation of witnesses, grand and petit jurors, ministerial and judicial officers. Though it be almost inconceivable that any one with sufficient spirit to call his soul his own could thus be intimidated, the wide prevalence of public gambling houses, illegal sales of liquors and habit-forming drugs, and offenses against election laws in most, if not all of our large cities, and many of the smaller cities and rural districts, known beyond question to exist, and very rarely punished, affords abundant proof of the effective employment of this means of security by the conscienceless benefactors of commercialized crime.

We conceive that there is no remedy for this evil except a radical quickening of the public conscience. No man can do his whole. duty as a good neighbor or a good citizen who contents himself by merely leaving the duty of law-enforcement to public officials. Even the most faithful and vigilant public officials cannot fully discharge

this duty without the active co-operation of law-abiding citizens. It is the part of good citizenship not only to hold public officials to strict accountability for the performance of duty, but to be ever alert and sensitive to all infractions of the law. Though mob law be universally decried by all law-abiding and law-loving people, yet it is unquestionably true that mob law finds its main strength and passing tolerance in the inadequacy, inefficiency, or corruption of the law-enforcing power.

The public should be alive to the fact that the best of laws, or even perfect laws, cannot be made to work automatically. Their efficacy necessarily depends upon the conscience and purpose of the public servants trusted with their enforcement. When the interest and the influence of those finding it agreeable and profitable to suspend the operation of a particular law outweighs the interest of the public in its enforcement and the exercise of such power as the public is willing to employ to compel its enforcement, we have the appalling spectacle of a reign of crime, sufficiently masked, perhaps, as not to excite public inquiry and revolt, but a reign of crime nevertheless, gnawing at the very vitals of the law, criminalizing thousands, breeding the mob spirit in the breast of the lawabiding, and fanning the flames of anarchy among those indifferent to legal restraints.

It is often said that what we need is not more laws for reaching evil-doers, but enforcement of the laws already enacted. This is probably true of every civilized community. One more law, however, might be helpful-a law to compel the enforcement of law. True we have some such laws now, but such as commercialized crime has been pretty generally successful in evading. With a genuine awakening of the public conscience, and such law that can, under reasonable safeguards against abuse, be invoked by the public independent of any official action, or concurrent power both to the proper officials and the public, authorizing the summoning of faithless public officials before the bar of justice to answer for their pro tection of criminal practices, or lack of diligence in their discovery and extermination, supported by penalties of removal from office, disfranchisement and disqualification to hold office in the future, an effective remedy would be found-a remedy not only for the

immediate evil, but a remedy infinitely more important and farreaching in its ultimate effect-a remedy for the most pernicious and prolific breeding places of crime.

CENTRALIZED BOARDS AND THEIR POWERS AND DUTIES.

P. H. LINDLEY, VICE-PRESIDENT WISCONSIN STATE ROARD OF CONTROL,
CHIPPEWA FALLS, WISCONSIN.

The developments of the last two or three decades along industrial, commercial, financial, and social lines, show abundant evidence of a tendency towards centralization of powers and centralization of authority. Since it has been shown in industrial and commercial activities that centralization has produced more economical and more efficient results than where power and authority are divided, it is only fair to assume that centralization will result in more efficiency and better economy in social work.

Sometime in the sixties, many of the Eastern States established Boards of Charities and Reform, and Boards of Charities and Correction. At that time, all the state charitable, reformatory and penal institutions were governed by local boards of trustees. As a rule, the boards of charities were clothed with but little power or authority. Their chief functions consisted in visiting the institutions at stated times and suggesting certain things and making certain recommendations to the local boards of trustees. Under the law that established these boards, they were not given power or authority to enforce their recommendations or suggestions, and in many instances it was found that the local trustees entirely ignored the recommendations and suggestions of the boards of charities.

Every local board had its own ideas as to what were the best methods to be employed in the management of its institution, and as many different systems of management were in operation as there were institutions in the different States. Investigation showed that there was much inefficiency and lack of method in the management of institutions, and the social workers of the different States were trying to inaugurate some system by which more efficiency and better methods would be employed in the management of institutions and better results obtained. Many of the social

workers did not believe that it would be proper to establish centralized boards with paid members. They did not believe that in philanthropic work, members of any board or any commission should be compensated for their services. At the national conferences which were held at various places for many years, a large number of representatives or delegates scoffed at the idea of creating a centralized, paid board and giving them full power of authority to manage the state institutions.

It might be well at this time to call attention to the conditions which led to the establishment of the first paid centralized board, and I will now use the Wisconsin Board to illustrate.

Prior to 1880, all the Wisconsin institutions were managed by local boards of trustees. There was an accompanying Board of Charities which had but little powers. The only powers that board had were to visit the state institutions, confer with the trustees and make recommendations and suggestions, which were seldom carried out. The legislature of 1880 was advised that the management of the state institutions was very bad; that there was no uniformity in their business methods; that every institution had its own methods; that there was no adequate accounting system and that on account of the loose condition of affairs there was every opportunity for dishonesty among the officials of the institutions. The legislature of that year appointed a committee to make an investigation of the institutions and report the result of such investigation to the legislature of 1881. That report of the committee was made and showed a very bad condition in the institutions. It showed that the responsibility of conducting the institutions was divided among various officers; that there was a lack of business accounting systems; and that at some of the institutions there was considerable dishonesty; that the dishonesty involved a number of business men who were compelled to return large sums of money to the State that had been unlawfully taken by them.

The question as to what should be done by the legislature to improve conditions of the institutions was agitated for some time, but it was finally agreed to create a centralized board for the management of the state institutions and abolish the trusteeships

of the institutions, but not to interfere in any way with the powers and duties of the then existing Board of Charities and Correction. All the county institutions such as poor houses, asylums, jails, police stations and lockups, and all private benevolent institutions were left subject to inspection by the State Board of Charities.

Immediately after the establishment of the board, it took charge of all the state charitable, reformatory, and penal institutions, and started a reorganization of those institutions. In all institutions where either the chief officer or any of the other officers were found to be incompetent or inefficient, they were removed and competent heads substituted. It was found necessary to change practically all of their business methods and change many of the methods that had been employed in the care and treatment of inmates of the institutions for mental defectives and to change the policies in reference to the reformatory and penal institutions. In the educational institutions, such as the Industrial School for Boys and the Schools for the Deaf and Blind, many changes in methods had to be made. Among other things, the board adopted a new and up-to-date accounting system, and also adopted a central control system for the finances of the institutions so that the board knew at any time what the conditions of the finances were in the various funds, and also had a check on all expenditures. An estimate system was adopted by which monthly estimates had to be made to the board of the expenditures for the future month, and no institution officer or employe could make any purchase until after the estimates for expenditures had been received and approved by the board.

The changes made by the board resulted in a short time in much more efficiency and economy in the institutions, and much better care and training of the inmates.

The board, that is, the centralized board known as the State Board of Supervision, and the State Board of Charities, continued to exist for a period of ten years, or until 1891. The legislature of that year was advised that the two boards did not get along well together and that the centralized board, known as the State Board of Supervision, ignored many of the recommendations and suggestions of the State Board of Charities, and that no harmony