last paragraph, where he expressly says, that what constitutes the Poet an imitator, is the

invention of a Fable: ποιητην

ΜΥΘΩΝ είναι δει ΠΟΙΗΤΗΝ

μαλλον ΤΩΝ

ὅσῳ ποιητης

ΚΑΤΑ ΜΙΜΗΣΙΝ ἐςι μιμειται δε ΤΑΣ ΠΡΑΞΕΙΣ He repeatedly calls the fable, or Mul☞, an imitation of an action;" but this it can be in no other sense than as it is feigned, either entirely, or in part. A history, as far, at least, as it is strictly history, is not an imitation of an action.

2. It seems equally clear, that he considered DRAMATIC Poetry as peculiarly imitative, above every other species. Hence his first rule concerning the epic or narrative imitation, that its fable "should be dramatically constructed, like that of tragedy:”τες μυθος, καθάπερ ἔν ταις τραγῳδίαις, APAMATIKOTE :-his praise of Homer for "the dramatic spirit of his imitations:"— ori xa ότι και ΜΙΜΗΣΕΙΣ ΔΡΑΜΑΤΙΚΑΣ ἐποιησε : and above all, the remarkable expression he uses, where, having laid it down as a precept that the epic Poet "should speak as little as possible in his own person,” (ΑΥΤΟΝ δεν τον ποιητην ἐλαχιςα λεγειν) he gives this reason—or ἐσι κατα ΜΙΜΗΤΗΣ : "for he is not then the IMITATOR'."

ταυτα

• See Mr. Harris, Philol. Inq. p. 139.

Part III. Sect. 1. Of the orig. ch. xxiii.

Part I. Sect. 6. Orig. cap. iv.

Part III. Sect. 3. Orig. cap. xxiv.

But,

But, he had before expressly allowed the Poet to be an imitator even while he retains his own person. I see no other way of removing this apparent inconsistence, than by supposing him to speak comparatively, and to mean no more, than that the Poet is not then truly and strictly an imitator"; or, in other words, that imitation is applicable in its strict and proper sense, only to personative poetry, as above explained; to that Poetry in which speech is represented by speech, and the resemblance, as in painting and sculpture, is immediate. I am not conscious that I am here forcing upon Aristotle a meaning that may

not

See above, note b.

h So Victorius: " amittit pené eo tempore nomen Poeta." Castelvetro's solution of this difficulty is the same; and I find his ideas of this matter so coincident with my own, that I am induced to transcribe his words: In his comment upon the passage, he says, speaking of the dramatic part of epic poetry, "Si domanda qui "solo rassomigliativo, (i. e. imitative) non perché ancora

quando il Poeta narra senza introducimento di persone " à favellare, non rassomigli, ma perché le parole diritte poste in luogo di parole diritte, figurano, rappresentano, "e rassomigliano MEGLIO le parole, che le parole poste in luogo di cose non figurano, non rappresentano, non rassomigliano le cose; in guisa che, in certo modo si puo "dire che il rappresentare parole con parole sia rassomigliare; e il rappresentare cose con parole non sia rassomigliare, paragonando l'un rassomigliare con l'altro, " & non semplicemente." p. 554.

66

66

not be his. I seem to be only drawing a clear inference from a clear fact. It cannot be denied, that, in the passages alleged, he plainly speaks of personative Poetry as that, which peculiarly deserves the name of imitation. The inference seems obvious-that he speaks of it as peculiarly imitative, in the only sense in which it is so, as being the only species of Poetry that is strictly imitative.

I do not find in Aristotle any express application of the term, except these two. Of the other two senses in which Poetry may be, and by modern writers has been, considered as imitation--resemblance of sound, and descriptionhe says nothing.

With respect, indeed, to the former of these, sonorous imitation, it cannot appear in any degree surprising that he should pass it over in total silence. I have already observed, that even in a general inquiry concerning the nature of the imitation attributed to Poetry, it is by no means that sense of the word which would be likely first to occur; and it would, perhaps, never have occurred at all, if, in such inquiries, we were not naturally led to compare Poetry with Painting, and other arts strictly imitative', and as naturally led by that comparison to admit sonorous imitation as one species, from its agreement with those strictly

See above, p. 4.

1

strictly imitative arts in the circumstance of immediate resemblance. But no such general inquiry was the object of Aristotle's work, which is not a treatise on Poetic Imitation, but on Poetry. His subject, therefore, led him to consider, not all that might without impropriety be denominated imitation in Poetry, but that imitation only which he regarded as essential to the art; as the source of its greatest beauties, and the foundation of its most important rules. With respect, then, to that casual and subordinate kind of imitation which is produced merely by the sound of words, it was not likely even that the idea of it should occur to him. Indeed, it is to be considered as a property of language in general, rather than of Poetry; and of specch-of actual pronunciation—rather than of language*. Besides that the beauties arising from this source are of too delicate and fugitive a nature to be held by rule. They must be left to the ear of the reader for their effect, and ought to be left to that of the Poet for their production.

But neither does Aristotle appear to have included description in his notion of Poetic imitation; which, as far as he has explained it, seems to have been simply that of the imitation of human actions, manners, passions, events, &c. in feigned story; and that, principally, when conveyed

* See above, p. 5.

veyed in a dramatic form. Of description, indeed, important as it is to the beauty of Poetry in general, and to that of fiction itself, more particularly in the epic form, he has not said one. word throughout his treatise: so far was he from extending Poetic imitation, as some have done, to that general sense which comprehends all speech'.

But here, to avoid confusion, the sense in which I have used the term description must be kept in view. When it is said that Aristotle "did not include description in his notion of "imitation," it is not meant, that he did not consider the descriptive parts of narrative Poetry as in any respect imitative. The subject of a description may be either real, or feigned. Almost all the descriptions of the higher Poetry, the Poetry

1 Thus I. C. Scaliger, Poet. lib. vii. cap. 2. “ Deni"" que imitationem esse in OMNI SERMONE, quia verba sunt "imagines rerum." He is followed by Is. Casaubon; De Rom. Satirâ, cap. v. p. 340. Both these acute critics dispute warmly against Aristotle's principle, that the essence of Poetry is imitation. And they are, undoubtedly, so far in the right, that if, as they contend, the only proper sense of Poetry is that in which it is opposed to prose (" omnem metro astrictam orationem et posse et "debere Poema dici." Cas. ubi sup.) then, there can be no other imitation common to all Poetry, than that which is common to all speech. See above, p. 32, 33.