less this be done, the commerce with India and the East will never rest on a secure foundation; nor will the government of India be properly conducted. Those who are engaged in details about the prices of cotton and indigo cannot attend to the weightier matters with which they are entrusted. Let them, if they prefer it, give up the latter; but do not let them attempt to be Hamlet and Harlequin-sovereigns and hucksters, at the same

moment.

If the Company take an enlightened view of their own interests, they will be the last to object to the measures now proposed. Notwithstanding their monopoly costs the people of Britain 1,800,000l. a year, it is exceedingly doubtful whether the Company gain any thing by it, after paying the dividend of 630,0001. The mass of accounts laid by them before Parliament are in such a state of confusion, discordant items are so jumbled together, and estimates are so mixed up with real payments, that it is impossible for the most expert accountants to tell what is the real state of their affairs. The Company's own servants seem to know quite as little of the matter as others. They have not produced a single document drawn out on fair mercantile principles, or such as any merchant would think of exhibiting. Mr. Rickards, who was examined at great length by both Lords and Commons' committees, and who, from his long experience in Indian affairs, is well qualified to form a correct opinion upon such a subject, contends that, as far as any thing can be learned from the defective accounts produced by the Company, their trade has uniformly been attended with a heavy loss; and that, had it not been for the aid derived from the revenues of India, they would long since have been completely bankrupt. We have very little doubt that Mr. Rickards's will turn out to be the correct view of the matter; at all events, however, it is abundantly clear, taking the Company's statements as they stand, that their commercial surplus is absolutely nugatory. They state that it amounted during the last fifteen years, to 15,414,4147., including interest and insurance, being at the rate of about a million a year. But they also state, that their commercial assets, or capital embarked in trade, amounts to 22,787,0347., and that their commercial debts, both foreign and at home, amount to only 2,484,0787. taking then the balance of 20 millions, and supposing it to be invested at 4 per cent., it would yield a nett revenue of 800,0007.; but the Company owe a large amount of territorial debt, for which they pay 5 per cent., and supposing the commercial assets were applied to pay it off, they would produce to the Company 1,000,000l. a year. It is, therefore, as clear as the sun at noonday, taking the Company's accounts as they have presented them, that the trade which they carry on does not yield them a single shilling beyond the dividend. They tell us, that they derive from it a surplus million a year; but, in the same breath, they tell us that they have twenty millions employed in it. It is therefore obvious, that if they give up the trade, and employ their commercial assets either in extinguishing their own debt, or in loans to others, they will yield them as large a surplus as they affirm they derive from the trade. In so far, too, as the interests of the proprie tors of India Stock are concerned, this measure would be for their ad vantage. The maximum dividend they are entitled to receive is fixed by law at 10 per cent., or 630,0001. a year; but it may fall to any They, therefore, have no interest in carrying on trade, but the reverse. It may lessen their dividends, and it cannot, under any circumstances,

extent

augment them; whereas, according to the plan now suggested, they would be secure of receiving the greatest dividend, without any risk of its reduction.

We should be making a heavier demand than we have ever done upon the patience of our readers, were we to enter upon any examination of the statements of those who contend, that, without the surplus derived from the China trade, the government of India could not be carried on. As well might it be said, that the government of Great Britain could not be carried on without the revenue of Shetland. Supposing the Company's accounts to be quite correct, and supposing that they are debarred from trading, and that their commercial assets are invested as above stated, the entire defalcation in the funds at their disposal would not exceed 600,0007. a year. But the revenue of India amounts to from twenty-four to twentyfive millions; and to imagine that it could not be made to defray the expenditure, were it diminished about one-fiftieth part, is something too ridiculous to deserve notice. If the Company will but enforce a little of that economy which is now the order of the day, they will procure for themselves a ten times larger surplus than they even pretend to derive from their trade.

We submit, that this statement is decisive of this part of the question, admitting the Company's accounts to be accurate. But in truth and reality they are most inaccurate. The trifling surplus which they exhibit has no real existence. It is not more substantial than one of Mr. Sadler's harangues. The Company's monopoly imposes a direct tax of nearly two millions a year on the people of Britain; it cripples and depresses our commerce by shutting us out of the best markets, at the same time that it inflicts incalculable injury on the Eastern world. And in return for all this it produces to the Company-absolutely nothing! The invaluable privileges enjoyed by them privileges which, had they been enjoyed by private individuals, would have produced a profit of 100 per cent.-have been swallowed up in the abuses inseparable from monopoly. Nothing so monstrous was ever heard of as the proposal to continue such a system. If the Company are wise, they will voluntarily withdraw at once and for ever from their trading concerns, relinquishing the monopolies they have. so long enjoyed, so much to the injury of others, and so little to their own advantage.*

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT FOR FORGERY.†

Ir is understood that the manuscripts of Sir Samuel Romilly contain matter of a very high interest to the science of jurisprudence. They are said to comprise his speculations upon all the most important questions

As the question so ably discussed in this Essay is one of vast importance, and will soon occupy the attention of the legislature with a view to its final settlement, 1 lament that I cannot transfer to these pages more than one of the many excellent articles which the Edinburgh Reviewers have written on the subject. See Vol. iv. p. 303. Vol. ix. p. 391. Vol. x. p. 334. Vol. xv. p. 255. Vol. xvi. p. 128. 229. Vol. xx. p. 471. Vol. xxix. p. 433. Vol. xxxix. p. 458, Vol. xlv. P. 340. Vol. xlvii. p. 134. Vol. xlviii. p. 335.

† Anti-Draco; or, Reasons for abolishing the Punishment of Death in case of Forgery. By a Barrister.-Vol. lii. page 398. January, 1831.

which have of late agitated men's minds connected with this subject. He had directed his attention to the amendment of the law, especially the criminal law, from a very early period; and had perceived the expediency of some reforms, and the necessity of others, long before it ever entered into the imaginations of most other men that any juridical thing could be different from what it is, or that any thing could be better than the provisions of the English law in all its branches. Of the various improvements which he proposed, and which would have been thought wild imaginations of a visionary speculator had they been made public at the time, it is remarkable that a large proportion are now either the law of the land, or almost certain of speedily becoming so. From hence we might draw a very favourable inference touching the rest which are still resisted, and predict their soon being accepted, if we were made acquainted with their nature and purport.

Can any one doubt that it would be of the greatest benefit to the community to have access to these important manuscripts, were it for no other reason than to give the proposed reforms of the law the advantage of such high authority in their favour? They would have not merely the sanction of his name, whom all wise men have revered, and all good men loved; but also, in some sort, the authority of the legislature itself, which has adopted so many of his propositions, and still hesitates to receive the rest. But there is every reason to expect matter valuable for its intrinsic importance from such a quarter; and even where late writters may have gone over the same ground, there is a high degree of curiosity in observing how far Sir Samuel Romilly had gone in the path of law reform, in an early age, as it were, and before men had been taught by Mr. Bentham to speculate with unrestrained freedom. We, therefore, venture to hope that these valuable remains will no longer be withheld from the world. Their truly illustrious author, when he bequeathed them to the care of his chosen friends*, charged them by no means to think of his literary reputation, but only to consider whether or not the publication of these papers was likely to benefit mankind; -a noble sentiment, well worthy of the exalted mind from which it proceeded a sentiment which those friends would betray their trust were they ever to lose sight of.

In approaching the proper subject of this article, we were naturally led to the remarks which we have now premised; for no subject as deeply or so constantly engrossed Sir Samuel Romilly's regards, as the severity of our criminal code. His speeches, and his able and eloquent tract, upon the subject, are fresh in every one's recollection. He was the first person who broached the question fairly and systematically in Parliament; and he shared the fate of all propounders of change in any institution; he was derided by some, pitied by others, by not a few execrated, by almost all regarded as the advocate of a desperate cause. It can hardly be thought extravagant in us to state the change which less than the quarter of a century has produced in public opinion, as almost unparalleled, when we remind the reader of the origin of a phrase, much in men's mouths who would resist change "The wisdom of our ancestors." It was first invented by Mr. Canning to oppose, by a kind of outery, or appeal to vulgar prejudice, the law reforms so gradually, so temperately proposed by Sir Samuel Romilly; and yet

* Lord Brougham and Mr. Whishaw.

Mr. Canning lived to be regarded as a leader, by some unthinking, and by some most ungrateful* men, as the the chief leader of what are now deemed liberal opinions.

Upon Sir Samuel Romilly's lamented death, (the greatest misfortune that has befallen the country since that of Mr. Fox, for he died at the height of his power, and when a new career of usefulness had opened to him with his extended influence,) the reform of the criminal law was taken up by Sir James Mackintosh, with congenial feelings, and great resources of learning, philosophy, and eloquence, and a large experience derived from his judicial station. All the friends of enlightened and humane legislation cheerfully rallied round so able a leader, and he was, of course, vehemently opposed by the government of the country. Lord Castlereagh was at his post, as were the Attorney and Solicitor General of the day at theirs; the Judges lent, as usual, the weight of an authority, not then estimated at quite its just value, on such points, against all change of all laws; Sir Robert Peel, and the other lesser authorities, were all ranged on the same side, mustered by the watchword—“Resist all change!" The friends of sound policy carried the day, and Sir James Mackintosh succeeded in his motion for a committee to inquire. This important victory was, some time after, followed by important events. For Sir Robert Peel, having opened his eyes

to the merits of the bullion question, and one or two others, became sensible how much he had erred in his former conduct; candidly avowed his conversion; and began to doubt the soundness of his opinions and votes on the questions connected with law reform. In a word, he became a law reformer himself; and though as yet he has not gone so far as was to be expected from the clearness and strength of his opinions, the acquisition of such an ally is, on many accounts, of extreme importance to the cause of juridical improvement; and there can be no manner of doubt that it will facilitate some of the great steps now in contemplation.

The object of the present remarks is, to invite the reader's attention, and if possible, that of the government, to the very important question concerning the punishment of death, debated so often in the last Parliament. Sir Robert Peel's bill for consolidating the laws respecting forgery, while it abrogated the capital punishment in a few cases, left it, unfortunately, in the great bulk of those to which practically, it has ever been applied; particu→ larly the case of bills and notes. This gave rise to the discussions in the last session of that Parliament, and is the ground of our present remarks.

Those who have objected to the punishment of death, may be ranged under two classes;-the reasoners who deny the lawfulness of taking away life for any offence; and the reasoners who contend that capital punishments defeat their own object, and are not effectual to the purposes of penal infliction.

The first of these objections leads to a wide and intricate discussion; but it appears to us, upon the whole, untenable. At least we conceive it to be untenable, unless there be rational grounds for denying that any exigency can justify the shedding of human blood. If it be admitted that capital punishment has sufficient power to deter from the commission of crime (and

* We allude to, we hope, only certain of the Catholics. They have chosen to consider Mr. Canning as the person to whom they lie under the greatest obligations for their emancipation. Yet, without undervaluing the services, of a very secondary cast, which that able and eloquent man rendered to their cause, can they have forgotten that Lord Grey, Lord Grenville, &c., sacrificed office to it for the best part of their lives, while Mr. Canning never once affected to make any sacrifice whatever to it?

in order to try the question upon the first ground, we must admit this), then there can be no good reason assigned for not taking away the lives of great, and cruel, and hardened offenders. The question is thus to be stated: the duty of the lawgiver is to prevent murder and rapine; to make life and property secure; to put down enormous crimes, which none but the most desperate of men would commit, and which make life not merely uncomfortable, but wretched-crimes which are inconsistent with all orderly government, and threaten the very existence of society. Suppose it is allowed that putting the convicted offender to death has sufficient efficacy, by way of example, to prevent the commission of such offences, there can be no reason against taking this course, unless we also deny the right to destroy an enemy who invades our country, or an individual who seeks our life. The denial of the lawfulness of doing this assumes the existence of some law against the provisions of which the act is supposed to be done. What is this law? Not certainly the law of nature; for that presents all measures as not merely justifiable, but fitting, in self-defence. Not certainly the revealed will of God; for there is no system of religion which does not contain express enactments of a capital nature against various crimes, except, perhaps, the Christian religion, and that is silent upon the subject, and must be understood to refer on this head to the provisions of the Mosaic law-a code full of capital inflictions. But it is said that the punishment of death differs from all others in a very important particular, it is irrevocable. When a man is sentenced to imprisonment or banishment, and his innocence is afterwards discovered, his sentence is easily remitted; but if a man is put to death, and the error of his judges is afterwards made apparent, a grievous load lies on the public conscience; for a judicial murder has been committed. We are not insensible to the force of this consideration; it is well deserving of influence, and should in all cases make the lawgiver incline strongly against capital penaltics. Yet is there somewhat of deception in the argument, if those who use it intend to maintain that the difference is specific, and that capital punishments alone are by their nature irrevocable. A man has by mistake been convicted and subjected to five years' imprisonment or transportation; when his innocence is made to appear, the residue of his term is of course remitted. But how can he be restored against the five years' suffering which he has already endured? Is not that infliction of necessity irrevocable? He has suffered so much, and that can never by any power be undone. The legislator is, in truth, to assume that such errors will not be commited; he is to adapt his laws to the ordinary course of events; and the possibility of innocence suffering, hard though it be, ought not to decide the question in hand: otherwise it would be an argument against our punishing in any way.

The second head of objection is certainly the most deserving of attention. In most cases capital punishments are found to frustrate themselves. Granting that the public spectacle of an offender put to death has the effect of deterring the beholders, and those who hear of it, from repeating the same offence, the question is, whether this can, in every case, be safely exhibited, and whether, in many cases, it can be exhibited at all? One observation may here be made: if no circumstance is to be taken into the account, except the power of graver examples to deter from following the criminal courses that led to them, then no crime, how light soever, should be punished, except by death; for the well-being of society requires that all crimes shall be prevented, and the securing of that well-being is the first duty of the law