events, linked together as cause and effect, and must have manifested a degree of energy to which, in the early periods of his life, it would have been totally inadequate.

Corol. These examples make it very obvious that there is a gradual progress in the developement of this faculty, and, consequently, that there is a fair field spread out for the application of culture.

276. It is well known, from experience, that the activity and consequent improvement of the Imagination, depend not a little upon the character of the objects with which it is first occupied.

Illus. The great, the sublime, the beautiful, the new, and the uncommon, in external nature, are not only striking and agreeable in themselves, but by association, these qualities powerfully awaken the sensibilities of the heart, and kindle the fires of youthful Imagination. On the other hand, there are certain objects so mean, so tame, and pursuits so ignoble, amidst which the early years of life are sometimes doomed to be spent, as neither to have produced one impression, nor excited one train of thought, which could ever afterwards enter into the conceptions, or aid the fancy, of the painter or the poet. (JARDINE.)

Corol. If, therefore, the student shall permit objects which are mean, low, or sensual, to usurp possession of his mind; if the books which he reads, and the studies that he pursues, are contaminated with gross ideas, he has no right to expect that this omnipotent faculty shall ever draw from the polluted treasures of his memory, any thing noble, useful, or praiseworthy; or that his name shall ever be enrolled among those who have delighted, instructed, and honoured their native land and the world at large:-"Out of the fulness of the heart, the mouth speaketh."

277. But the Imagination is not only improvable, in point of vigour and activity, it likewise admits of culture in respect of regularity and chasteness. (Corol. Art. 270.)

Illus. No faculty is naturally more irregular and rambling in its motions, or demands more loudly the controul of a governing power. Whilst we are awake, indeed, and in a sound state of mind, it is kept within some bounds by the presence of external objects, and by the impression derived from them through the medium of the senses; but in a dream, those centinels being off their guard, we have sufficient experience of its eccentric flights, and its fantastic combinations. The first efforts, too, of men of genius, may be compared to the curvetings of an unbridled colt, which scampers over the fields, spurning all constraint, till its strength is exhausted; nor is it until experience, with its usual accompaniments of improved knowledge, and enlightened taste, has tamed the impetuosity of youthful feeling, that this faculty becomes subjected to those regular movements of reason, sensibility, and passion, to which we owe the many fine specimens of poetry, eloquence, statuary, and painting, that adorn the brighter eras of civilized society. (JARDINE.) Corol. 1. From the foregoing illustrations in this section, it natu

rally occurs, as a rational enquiry, whether there might not be constructed such a scheme of discipline and instruction, as would invigorate and call forth, in regular and systematic exercises, the latent powers of Imagination? The enlightened Tutor of a well adjusted plan of education, will find many of the first steps within his reach, and the virtuous student will find, in the end, that the company he has kept, the conversation he has maintained, and the books he has used, are of some avail in influencing his general taste, and in determining the bias of fancy, and improving deteriorating the powers of Imagination.

2. From certain varieties, which no doubt subsist in the original constitution of the intellectual powers, from early habits and particular associations, the Imagination of some youths may be more early directed to sensible or to visible imagery than to other trains of thought; but, in all cases, the Imagination, the active instrument of reproduction, is within the reach of culture, when applied properly, and at a proper season. Great poets, and illustrious painters, are, it is true, distinguished by original differences of activity and strength of Imagination; nor is it less true, on the other hand, that no degree of labour or of industry can raise a weak and feeble Imagination to the highest degree of poetical or of limning genius; still, it may be maintained, (See Corol. Art. 270. Section III. of this chapter,) that by reasonable culture, this power can be made capable of greater efforts, and invested with higher qualities, than could arise from the mere natural and unimproved endowments.

This is the opinion of Professor Jardine, and it is supported by the authority of Dugald Stewart. See the "Outlines of a Philosophical Education," by the Former, and the "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind," ch. vii. vol. 1. by the Latter.

CHAPTER X.

OF JUDGMENT.

I. Analysis of this Fuculty in general.

278. JUDGMENT has been defined the faculty by which the mind comes to determinations concerning the truth or falsehood of any thing that is affirmed or denied. (Art. 97. No. X. p. 44.)

Obs. As it is impossible, by a definition, to give a notion of colour to a man who never saw colours; so it is impossible, by any definition, to give a distinct notion of Judgment, to a person who has not often judged, and who is not capable of reflecting attentively upon this act of the mind. The best use of a definition, is to prompt the reader to that reflection; and without it the best definition will be apt to mislead him. The definition we have given is confirmed by the following illustrations.

Illus. 1. True it is, that by affirmation or denial, we express our judgments; but there may be judgments which are not expressed. Judgment is a solitary act of the mind, and the expression of it, by affirmation or denial, is not at all essential to it. It may be tacit, and not expressed. Nay, it is well known, that men may judge contrary to what they affirm or deny; the definition must, therefore, be understood of mental affirmation or denial, which indeed is only another name for Judgment. (See Illus. Art. 28.)

2. The affirming or denying of a thing, is very often the expression of testimony, which is a direct act of the mind, and ought to be distinguished from Judgment.

Example. A judge asks a witness what he knows of such a matter, to which he was an eye or an ear witness. The witness answers, by affirming or denying something. But his answer does not express his Judgment; it is his testimony. Again, you ask a man his opinion in a matter of science, or of criticism. His answer is not testimony; it is the expression of his judgment. Thus, testimony is distinguished from judgment. (See Illus. 2. Art. 116.)

Illus. 3. Testimony is a social act, and it is essential to this act that it be expressed by words or signs. A tacit testimony is a contradiction; but there is no contradiction in a tacit Judgment: it is complete, without being expressed. In testimony a man pledges his veracity for what he affirms; so that a false testimony is a lie; but a wrong judgment is not a lie, it is only an error. In the structure of all languages, says Dr. Reid, testimony and judgment are expressed by the same form of speech. A proposition, affirmative or negative, with a verb in what is called the indicative mood, expresses both. (See Art. 25.)

4. Although men must have judged in many cases before tribunals of justice were erected, yet it is very probable that there were tribunals before men began to speculate about Judgment, and that the word may be borrowed from the practice of tribunals. As a judge, after taking the proper evidence passes sentence in a cause, and that SENTENCE is called his judgment; so the mind, with regard to whatever is true or false, passes sentence, or determines according to the evidence that is before it. Some kinds of evidence leave no room for doubt, and sentence is passed immediately, without seeking or hearing any contrary evidence, because the thing is certain and notorious. In other cases, there is room for weighing evidence, on both sides, before sentence is passed.

Corol. The analogy between a tribunal of justice and this inward tribunal of the mind, is too obvious to escape the notice of any man who ever appeared before a judge; and we may thence infer, that the word Judgment, as well as many other words which we use in speaking of this operation of the mind, are grounded on this analogy. (See Chapter IV. Book I.)

279. In Article 140, we pointed out the distinction between conception, as used in Chapter V. of this book, and simple apprehension, which, in the language of the schoolmen, includes our apprehension of general propositions, Judgment is an act of the mind specifically different from

simple apprehension, or the bare conception of a thing. (See Illus. Art. 25.)

Illus. Although there can be no Judgment without a conception of the things about which we judge; yet conception may be without any Judgment. Judgment can be expressed by a proposition only, and a proposition is a complete sentence; but simple apprehension may be expressed by a word or words, which make no complete sentence. When simple apprehension is employed about a proposition, every man knows that it is one thing to apprehend a proposition, that is, to conceive what it means; but it is quite another thing to judge it to be true or false. (Illus. Art. 28.) 280. Every Judgment must be either true or false, but simple apprehension can neither be true nor false. (See Corol. Art. 52.)

Illus. One Judgment may be contradictory to another; and it is impossible for a man to have, at the same time, two Judgments, which he perceives to be contradictory. But contradictory propositions may be conceived at the same time without any difficulty. That the Sun is greater than the Earth, and that the Sun is not greater than the Earth, are contradictory propositions. He that apprehends the meaning of the one apprehends the meaning of both. But it is impossible for him to judge both to be true at the same time. He knows that if one is true, the other is false.

Corol. For these reasons, we hold it to be certain, that Judg ment and simple apprehension are acts of the mind specifically different. (See Art. 279.)

281. There are notions, or ideas, that ought to be refer red to the faculty of Judgment as their source; because, if we had not this faculty, they could not enter into our minds; and, to all those that have this faculty, and are capable of reflecting upon its operations, they are obvious and familiar.

Illus. Among these we may reckon the notion of Judgment itself; the notions of a proposition, of its subject, of its predicate, and of its copula;-of affirmation and negation, of true and false, of knowledge, belief, disbelief, opinion, assent, evidence. From no source could we acquire these notions, but from reflecting upon our judgments. Relations of things make one great class of our notions, or ideas; and we cannot have the idea of any relation, without some exercise of Judgment.

282. In persons come to years of understanding, Judg ment necessarily accompanies all sensation, perception by the senses, consciousness, and memory.

Obs. Infants and ideots are of course excluded in the consideration of this position.

Illus. 1. In persons having the exercise of Judgment, it is evident, that the man who feels pain, judges and believes that he is

really pained. (See Illus. Art. 39.) The man who-perceives an object believes that it exists, and that it is what he distinctly perceives it to be; nor is it in his power to avoid such a Judgment. And the same may be affirmed of Memory, and of Consciousness.

2. Whether Judgment ought to be called a necessary concomitant of these operations, or rather a part or ingredient of them, enters not into the illustration before us; but it is certain, that all of them are accompanied with a determination and a consequent belief that something is true or false. If this determination be not Judgment, it is an operation that has received no name by philosophers; for it is not simple apprehension, neither is it reasoning; it is a mental affirmation or negation; it may be expressed by a proposition affirmative or negative, and it is accompanied with the firmest belief. These are the characteristics of Judgment, 285. The judgments which we form are either of things necessary, or of things contingent.

Illus. 1. That three times three are nine; that the whole is greater than its part;-are judgments about things necessary. Our assent to such necessary propositions is not grounded upon any operation of sense, of memory, or of consciousness, nor does it require their concurrence; it is unaccompanied by any other operation but that of conception, which must accompany all Judgment, (See Art. 147. Illus. 1.)

2. Our Judgment of things contingent must always rest upon some other operation of the mind, such as sense, or memory, or consciousness, or credit in testimony, which is itself grounded upon sense. That I now write upon a desk covered with green baize, is a contingent event, which I judge to be most undoubtedly true. My Judgment is grounded upon my perception, (Art. 23.) and is a necessary concomitant, or ingredient, of my perception. That I yesterday dined with such a person, I judge to be true, because I remember it, and my Judgment necessarily goes along with this remembrance, or makes a part of it. (See Art. 49.)

284. There are many forms of speech in common language which show that the senses, memory, and consciousness, are considered as judging faculties.

Illus. We say that a man judges of colours by his eye, of sounds by his ear. We speak of the evidence of sense, (Corol. Art. 121.) the evidence of memory, (Art. 243. Illus.) and the evidence of consciousness, (Corol. Art. 101. Evidence is the basis of Judg ment; and when we see evidence it is impossible not to judge.

Corol. 1. Hence, when we speak of seeing or remembering any thing, we hardly ever add that we judge it to be true; because such an addition would be a superfluity of speech. And, for the same reason, in speaking of what is self-evident, or strictly demonstrated, we do not say that we judge it to be true. Hence the grammarians say, that to see with the eyes, is a tautology; and they are perfectly correct.

2. There is, therefore, good reason why, in speaking or writing, Judgment should not be expressly mentioned, when all men know